Opinion
9:99-CV-1969 (GLS).
February 23, 2004
TYRONE L. JACKSON, New York, NY, FOR THE PETITIONER.
G. LAWRENCE DILLON, Esq., Assistant Atty. General, HON. ELIOT SPITZER, Office of Attorney General State of New York, Utica, NY, FOR THE RESPONDENT.
DECISION and ORDER
I. Background A. State Court Proceedings
On April 23, 1998, petitioner, pro se Tyrone L. Jackson, was an inmate at the Gouverneur Correctional Facility ("Gouverneur"), and was charged with assault on staff and violent conduct in two separate misbehavior reports ( Dkt. No. 5, Ex. A). On April 27, 1998, a Tier III disciplinary hearing relating to these charges was conduced by Captain C. Rabsatt of Gouverneur, after which Jackson was found guilty of misconduct. As a result, Captain Rabsatt recommended that Jackson: i) be placed in keeplock status and deprived of various privileges for eighteen months; and, ii) be deprived of twelve months good time credits ( Dkt. No. 5, Ex. F). Jackson appealed that decision to Donald Selsky, who affirmed the hearing officer's finding of misconduct but reduced the recommended keeplock sentence as well as the recommended loss of privileges, from eighteen months to three hundred sixty-five days ( Dkt. No. 5, Ex. G). Selsky affirmed the recommended loss of twelve months good time ( Id.).
Jackson filed a petition in Albany County Court pursuant to Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules ("Article 78") challenging the foregoing. That application was transferred by that court to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. On July 15, 1999, the Appellate Division affirmed the finding of misconduct and recommended loss of good time. Jackson v. Goord, 263 A.D.2d 726 (3d Dept. 1999). On October 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied Jackson's application for leave to appeal. Jackson v. Goord, 94 N.Y.2d 753 (1999).
Inmates found guilty of Tier II or III violations are entitled to judicial review in state court through a proceeding brought under Article 78. See Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. Proceedings in this District
Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this District on November 15, 1999 ( Dkt. No. 1) ("Pet."). In his petition, Jackson claims that he was wrongfully found guilty of misconduct at the April 27, 1998, disciplinary hearing and seeks restoration of the twelve month good time credits taken from him as a result of that proceeding. Specifically, Jackson claims that: i) due to "gaps" in the transcript of the disciplinary hearing, he was unable to obtain a "fair adjudication" of his claims; ii) one or more individuals withdrew $40.00 from his inmate account because he had filed a grievance while at Gouverneur; iii) the hearing officer who presided over his disciplinary hearing was neither fair nor impartial; iv) the charges in the misbehavior reports which were the subject of the disciplinary hearing were false, arbitrary and capricious, and the result of retaliatory conduct on the part of corrections officers; and, v) the decision of the hearing officer was not based on substantial evidence. See Pet.
On February 23, 2000, the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, acting on respondent's behalf, submitted an answer and memorandum of law in opposition to the petition ( Dkt. Nos. 5-6). On March 12, 2001, Jackson advised this court of his new address, which indicated that he was no longer incarcerated. II. Discussion
This letter was filed in another action Jackson commenced in this District, Jackson v. Ricks, 9:00-CV-1758 ("00-C V-1758"), Dkt. No. 27.
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the subject matter of the federal courts to cases that present a "case or controversy." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 6 (1998); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631-32 (2d Cir. 2003); Greif v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman Dicker LLP, 258 F. Supp.2d 157, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). "A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Lavin v. United States, 299 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002); Yekimoff v. New York State Div. of Parole, 02 Civ. 8710, 2003 WL 22305171 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2003). Thus, this court must initially determine whether events that have transpired since this action was commenced have rendered this action moot.
As noted above, after Jackson filed his petition, he was released from prison. See 00-CV-1758, Dkt. No. 27. Generally, a habeas petitioner's release from prison does not render that party's habeas corpus petition moot because § 2254 requires only that the petitioner be "in custody" at the time the petition is filed. Wheel v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1994); Cadilla v. Johnson, 119 F. Supp.2d 366, 371 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The United States Constitution's "case-or-controversy" requirement will also generally be satisfied by the typical habeas petition challenging the validity of the conviction because the incarceration "constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.
In this proceeding, Jackson has clearly indicated that he only challenges the hearing officer's recommendation, which was approved by Selsky and affirmed by the Appellate Division, that he be deprived of twelve months good time ( See Pet. at ¶¶ 1-4). Jackson is not contesting the validity of the conviction which resulted in his incarceration. See Pet.
It appears as though Jackson was incarcerated due to his guilty plea on September 23, 1992, to first degree assault. Jackson v. Walker, 96 CIV. 1064, 1997 WL 97832 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997). Jackson was thereafter sentenced as a predicate felon to a period of imprisonment of five to ten years. Id.
In response to a motion for injunctive relief previously brought by Jackson, respondent filed documents which indicated that the maximum term of Jackson's sentence was to expire in March 2002 ( Dkt. No. 12, Ex. C). Based upon that information and the change of address Jackson filed which indicated that he was no longer incarcerated, a member of the court's staff searched the "Inmate Information Database" provided by the Department of Correctional Services in order to confirm the maximum expiration date relating to Jackson's sentence. That database revealed that: i) Jackson was conditionally released to parole on February 27, 2001; and, ii) the maximum expiration date of Jackson's sentence expired on March 27, 2002.
According to the DOCS web site, "[u]pon reaching the maximum expiration date, the individual's legal obligation to serve a custodial sentence or period of parole supervision ends" (available at www.docs.state.ny.us/univinq/fpmsdoc.htm#ME). The information regarding the date on which Jackson was released to parole as well as the maximum expiration date relating to his sentence is available at:
http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ1/WINQ000.
Once a litigant's sentence has expired, "some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole — some 'collateral consequence' of the conviction — must exist if the suit is to be maintained." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968)). In Spencer, the Supreme Court, in refusing to extend the "presumption" of collateral consequences to the area of parole revocation ( Id., 523 U.S. at 12) (citing Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982)), held that a petitioner must establish actual collateral consequences in order to meet Article III's injury-in-fact requirement. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
Since the petitioner in Spencer was unable to establish any collateral consequences relating to the decision to revoke his parole, the court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's case as moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18.
In this case, Jackson is not challenging his underlying criminal conviction. Instead, he claims that good time credits were wrongfully taken from him following the subject disciplinary hearing. See Pet. As the Spencer Court noted: "[t]he reincarceration that [petitioner] incurred as a result of the [allegedly wrongful conduct] is now over, and cannot be undone. Subsistence of the suit requires, therefore, that continuing 'collateral consequences' . . . be either proved or presumed." Id. at 8.
Jackson has not demonstrated that he will suffer any collateral consequences due to the fact that he was found guilty of misconduct at the disciplinary hearing held at Gouverneur on April 27, 1998. Nor can the court envision any collateral consequences that may adversely impact Jackson as a result of the foregoing sufficient to provide this court subject matter jurisdiction over his petition.
Since: i) this action does not attack the underlying criminal conviction that resulted in the sentence imposed on Jackson; and, ii) the latest date on which Jackson could have either been incarcerated or placed on parole for his crime appears to have expired nearly two years ago, this court finds that this action must be dismissed as moot. See e.g., Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-18; Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (habeas petitions are moot where there "is no material possibility" that petitioner will suffer collateral consequences regarding action challenged in petition); Hicks v. Lacy, 99 Civ. 4523, 2003 WL 22510323, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) (dismissing habeas petition challenging revocation of parole where petitioner was released after fully serving sentence); see also, Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir.) ("the presumption of collateral consequences does not apply to prison disciplinary proceedings"), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. Alameida, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2587 (2003).
It appears as though Jackson was incarcerated due to his guilty plea on September 23, 1992, to first degree assault. Jackson was thereafter sentenced as a predicate felon to a period of imprisonment of five to ten years. Jackson v. Walker, 96 CIV. 1064, 1997 WL 97832 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997).
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED, that this action is DENIED and DISMISSED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon the parties by regular mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.