Opinion
03 CIV. 6987 (DLC) (RLE).
October 10, 2006
Stanley Jackson, pro se for petitioner.
Yael V. Levy Assistant District Attorney Bronx County New York, NY, for respondent.
OPINION ORDER
Stanley Jackson brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his April 16, 1998 conviction, following a jury trial, on murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Jackson was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. Jackson now challenges his conviction on the grounds that: (1) the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial after a prosecution witness gave testimony regarding uncharged killings; (2) the trial court gave improperly coercive Allen charges to the jury after it indicated it was deadlocked and informed the court of the identity of the lone hold-out; and (3) his arrest was unlawfully made by police officers "acting outside their jurisdiction," and the evidence they gathered — including Jackson's confession to having beaten and stabbed the victim — should therefore have been suppressed.
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis for a report and recommendation ("Report"), which was issued on April 11, 2006. The Report recommends that the petition be denied. On May 31, 2006, Jackson's objections to the Report ("Objections") were received. This Opinion adopts the Report.
Background
The facts relevant to the petition are set forth in the Report and summarized here. Jackson was convicted of the September 13, 1995 murder of Diane Sylvester ("Sylvester"). At trial, Joel Sylvester ("Joel"), one of Sylvester's sons, testified that on the morning of the murder, Jackson came to his family's apartment. When Joel returned home from school, Sylvester did not answer the door, so he went to a neighbor's apartment. The neighbor ultimately called the police, who entered Sylvester's home and found her body face-down in the bathtub. She had been stabbed 32 times, and her body showed signs of blunt force injuries, burns, and drowning.
Dolores Dent ("Dent"), the woman with whom Jackson was living at the time of the murder, testified that Jackson did not communicate with her for a number of days after September 13. He eventually called Dent from a mental facility in New Jersey and said he had tried to commit suicide. Dent later spoke with the New York City Police Department, which sent a detective to New Jersey to interview Jackson. The detective met Jackson at the mental health facility along with two detectives from the Somerset County, New Jersey prosecutor's office. He identified himself as a New York City detective and asked Jackson to come to the prosecutor's office with him. Jackson complied. Once at the office, the detective told Jackson that he wanted to talk about Sylvester, and he gave him a Miranda warning. Jackson then made a statement in which he admitted to going to Sylvester's apartment on the morning of September 13, stabbing and beating her, and then leaving her in the bathtub. The detectives procured an arrest warrant and arrested Jackson, who waived extradition and was returned to New York.
While he was incarcerated, Jackson wrote a letter to Dent admitting to the murder. According to Dent, she and Jackson had other conversations in which Jackson detailed how the killing occurred.
At the trial, Dr. Robert Berger ("Berger"), a prosecution expert in forensic psychiatry, testified about Jackson's mental state at the time of the murder, and mentioned that Jackson "talks about having killed people." The court had previously ruled that Jackson's statements about killing people were inadmissible, but it refused Jackson's motion for a mistrial. Instead, the court told the jury, "I am striking that testimony. I'm directing you to disregard it, and I'm going to ask whether there is anyone that thinks they might have any problem following that instruction." No jurors indicated that they would be unable to do so.
After the jurors had deliberated for two days, they sent a note to the judge indicating that they were deadlocked, with 11 jurors supporting a conviction, and one hold-out, whom the note identified. The judge instructed the jury not to inform him how it was voting or to identify the views of individual jurors. He also summarized earlier instructions regarding the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. After 15 minutes of further deliberation, the jury sent another note indicating it was still deadlocked. The defense made a motion for a mistrial, which the judge denied. The court gave the jury an Allen charge, urging each juror to "make every effort consistent with your conscience and the evidence in the case to harmonize your views and decisions in this case with those of your fellow jurors." He also cautioned that "no juror should surrender his or her honest view as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because you're outvoted or the hour is late."
The jurors deliberated for 80 minutes after receiving this instruction. They then sent a note stating that they remained deadlocked. After the judge denied Jackson's renewed motion for a mistrial, he gave the jury a modified Allen charge. The judge suggested that the jurors "should attempt to resolve your differences" and continue to deliberate "with a view to reaching a verdict." He reiterated that "no juror should surrender an honest opinion that is based upon the evidence solely because you're outvoted or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict." Three hours later, the jury indicated it had reached a verdict. The defense again moved for a mistrial, saying the judge'sAllen charges had created a coercive atmosphere for the hold-out juror. The court denied the motion, noting that he had not directed his instructions at the hold-out, and that the juror's demeanor had not changed. The court also stated that Jackson's attorney had not objected to the Allen charge at the time it was given. Jackson was convicted.
Jackson appealed his conviction and filed two post-judgment motions pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 ("Section 440") to vacate his conviction. First, proceeding pro se, Jackson filed a Section 440 motion on April 22, 1998, arguing that his confession was brought about by police brutality and that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer refused to investigate these allegations or to raise them as a defense. On January 28, 1999, the trial court found "no reasonable possibility" that Jackson's allegations were true and denied the motion on the merits.
Second, Jackson — who was represented by counsel — directly appealed his conviction. His attorney raised the first two issues that are part of this petition — namely, that the testimony regarding Jackson's statements about other killings should have resulted in a mistrial, and that the judge's Allen charges were improperly coercive. In addition, Jackson himself attempted to raise the third issue in this petition — that his arrest was illegal because it was made by officers acting outside their jurisdiction — by moving to file a pro se supplemental brief. That motion was denied, and on February 14, 2002, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Jackson's conviction.People v. Jackson, 737 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't. 2002). The court found that the judge had acted within his discretion in denying the mistrial motion, "since the court struck the testimony and issued prompt, thorough curative instructions which all the jurors promised to follow." Id. at 284. It also concluded that Jackson's objections to the language in theAllen charges were unpreserved and therefore procedurally barred. The Appellate Division noted, however, that if it were to review the charges, it would find that they "conveyed the proper principles, were sufficiently balanced and did not impart to the jury that it was obligated to come to a verdict." Id. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied on April 29, 2002.People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 638 (2002).
Finally, on May 22, 2002, Jackson brought another pro se motion challenging his conviction pursuant to Section 440. He argued that crucial evidence, including his confession, should have been precluded because his arrest was effected by New York police officers acting in New Jersey. The motion was denied as procedurally barred because Jackson had failed to raise the issue in either his first Section 440 motion or on direct appeal. Jackson requested leave to appeal this determination. Leave was denied on November 21, 2002. Jackson timely filed the instant petition on September 10, 2003.
Discussion
A petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that has been "adjudicated on the merits" in the state courts, unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Report concludes that the Appellate Division's ruling as to the testimony about Jackson's statements was not an "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." It also finds that Jackson's claims regarding the Allen charges and the legality of his arrest are unreviewable here, as they were dismissed by the Appellate Division for procedural reasons.
The Report nonetheless goes on to address the claims on the merits, dismissing the complaint regarding the Allen charge because the court's instructions appropriately incorporated Supreme Court and Second Circuit guidance regarding such jury charges; and dismissing the complaint about the allegedly illegal arrest because Jackson provided no evidence of coercion or other unlawful use of authority.
The court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The court shall make a de novo determination of the portions of the report to which petitioner objects. United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). In his Objections, Jackson takes issue with the Report's conclusion as to each of the three grounds for relief raised in the petition. Upon de novo review, however, Jackson's claims are properly denied for the reasons stated in the Report.
A. Testimony About Precluded Material
The Report correctly describes the legal standard for federal habeas review of a state court's evidentiary rulings: "The introduction of improper evidence against a defendant does not amount to a violation of due process unless the evidence `is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.'" Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). Moreover, to establish a constitutional violation based on the jury's exposure to this evidence, the evidence must have been "sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it." Id. (citation omitted).
Jackson concedes that the Report's legal analysis of this issue is "fully sound," although he nonetheless objects to the outcome. He provides no reason to believe, however, that the jury would have failed to convict him in the absence of this evidence. In light of Jackson's statements to Dent and confession to the police, the psychiatrist's brief reference to other killings is not sufficiently material to have removed the jurors' reasonable doubt as to Jackson's guilt. Moreover, as the Appellate Division noted, the judge provided an immediate curative instruction. The judge's refusal to grant Jackson's motion for a mistrial therefore does not entitle him to habeas relief.
B. Allen Charges
The Report finds that Jackson's objection to the Allen charges is procedurally barred because the Appellate Division found it to be unpreserved under New York law. Jackson, 291 A.D.2d at 268. When a state court's ruling rests on an "adequate and independent state procedural ground," it is exempt from federal habeas review unless the petitioner "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). Jackson does not attempt to make such a showing in his Objections.
Instead, he reargues the issue on the merits. Although it is not necessary to reach those arguments, it bears mention that the cases on which Jackson relies address situations that are distinguishable from the facts at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530, 531 (9th Cir. 1984) (court polled jurors before giving Allen charge); United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (court inquired into jury's numerical division); Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (jury attempted to replace dissenting jurors with alternates, and judge inquired whether there was "a clear minority" on the panel). Moreover, as the Second Circuit recently reaffirmed, "it is generally accepted that the mere fact that the jury made known its division to the court, without more, is not grounds for a mistrial or a bar to the court giving the Allen charge." United States v. Mejia, 356 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The judge'sAllen charges therefore do not entitle Jackson to habeas relief.
C. Allegations of Illegal Arrest and Coerced Confession
The Report finds that Jackson's objections to his arrest and confession are unreviewable because they were rejected by the state court that adjudicated Jackson's second Section 440 motion on "adequate and independent" state procedural grounds.Messiah, 435 F.3d at 195. Although this procedural bar makes it unnecessary to reach the substance of Jackson's arguments, it is again clear that they are without merit. Jackson provides no support for the proposition that a New York police officer acting in conjunction with New Jersey officials cannot question a suspect in New Jersey or take actions to secure his arrest. Nor does he point to any authority that would indicate that the officer's request that Jackson accompany him to the prosecutor's office somehow rendered the subsequent confession involuntary. Jackson's arguments about his arrest and confession therefore do not entitle him to habeas relief.
Conclusion
The recommendation of Magistrate Judge Ellis is adopted, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. In addition, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability. Jackson has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right, and appellate review is therefore not warranted. Grotto v. Herbert, 316 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2003). I also find, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The Clerk of Court shall dismiss the petition.
SO ORDERED.