Opinion
Case No. CV415-079
10-08-2015
RODERICK BO JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN JOSEPH GROGAN, et al., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Roderick Bo Jackson filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant that constituted a "false document" because the judge's signature was not "legible." Doc. 1 at 7. This is one of four civil cases Jackson has commenced in this Court related to his arrest and prosecution on aggravated assault charges. Here, he seeks both the dismissal of the criminal case and $100,000 in damages for his "pain and suffering." Id. at 8. This complaint, like his others, is frivolous and should be dismissed upon initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (which requires early screening and dismissal of prisoner/detainee complaints against governmental entities or officials that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state claim for relief, or seek monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (imposing the same dismissal obligation as to any factually or legally insubstantial complaint filed in forma pauperis).
The Court is citing to the CM/ECF page numbers imprinted by its docketing software at the top of each document.
In each case Jackson alleges that one or more state officials (a police detective, prosecutor, and/or judge) violated his constitutional rights during the investigation and prosecution of state criminal charges arising from his arrest on September 30, 2013. Id.; Jackson v. Phillips, CV415-127 (filed May 11, 2015); Jackson v. Ruffini, CV414-250 (filed November 17, 2014); Jackson v. Grogan, CV414-249 (filed November 17, 2014). Jackson's central claim is this: although he was properly charged with, and confessed to, the misdemeanor offense of obstruction by fleeing, he was falsely charged and prosecuted for various felony offenses (each dependent upon his possession of a firearm). Since the filing of these complaints, Jackson was tried by a jury, convicted, and sentenced in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia on one of the felony charges. See attached criminal docket (reflecting his sentencing on Aug. 7, 2015). --------
As part of his claim for relief, Jackson requests that his aggravated assault case "be dropped," which would require his immediate or speedier release from custody. Doc. 1 at 8. It is well established, however, that "a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge 'the fact or duration of his confinement.'" Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 77 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Because Jackson is seeking the dismissal of the state criminal charges pending at the time he filed his complaint (and hence is challenging the validity of his subsequent conviction on those charges), "his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. But before he can seek federal habeas relief, he must first exhaust his state court remedies. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 79 ("habeas corpus actions require petitioner fully to exhaust state remedies, which § 1983 does not"); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1973) (the exhaustion requirement codified in § 2254(b) applies to all habeas corpus actions, including § 2241 petitions); Thomas v. Crosby, 372 F.3d 782, 786 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). If Jackson wishes to proceed via habeas corpus, he must submit a separate petition in compliance with the applicable rules. Again, however, any such petition would be subject to immediate dismissal for lack of exhaustion of his available state remedies, for it is clear that Jackson could not possibly have done so in the short time since his August 2015 state sentencing proceeding.
Jackson also seeks monetary damages from Kevin Grogan, the officer who executed the warrant for his arrest, as well as the "Chatham County Police Department" and the Recorder's Court Judge who "supposedly signed" the warrant. Id. at 1, 4. He contends that the warrant was "a false document" because the judge's signature is illegible. Because this suit relates to the "wrongful institution of legal process" by a state official, Jackson's cause of action rests upon a theory of malicious prosecution rather than false arrest. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007) (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit "has identified malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). But an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim is the termination of the criminal prosecution in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 882. At the time he filed his complaint Jackson's state criminal case was still pending, and the attached state court docket reflects that the state criminal proceeding culminated in his conviction following a jury trial in the local superior court. Jackson, therefore, cannot bring suit challenging the wrongful issuance of legal process (his arrest warrant) until that conviction is overturned.
Even were this not the case, Jackson would still lose on initial review. Jackson does not contend that the Recorder's Court failed to issue the arrest warrant but only that the judge's signature on that warrant is illegible. In fact, he furnishes a copy of the arrest warrant reflecting that the judge did sign the warrant. Judges, like everyone else, sometimes have bad penmanship or otherwise develop an abbreviated signature that more resembles a mysterious glyph than a script that is actually readable. But any distinctive mark can suffice as a signature on a bank check, promissory note, contract, marriage license, will, or judicial order. Indeed, there is no constitutional requirement that a warrant contain a signature of any kind, much less a readable one. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see United States v. Cruz, 774 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2014) (unsigned search warrant not facially invalid); United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 727 (1st Cir. 2014) ("we find no sufficient reason to read a signature requirement into the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Eubank, 2015 WL 3557962 at * 2, n. 2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2015). None of Jackson's rights, therefore, were violated because the signature on the warrant failed to meet his personal standards of good penmanship.
Finally, even if Jackson's complaint stated a non-frivolous claim for relief (which it does not), judges are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken within their judicial capacity, except when they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Harris v. Goderick, 608 F. App'x 760, 762 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2015). The signing of an arrest warrant is clearly an act taken by a judge in the course of his judicial duties. The defendant judge, therefore, enjoys absolute immunity from suit on the theory raised in Jackson's complaint. Id. at 763 (judge entitled to absolute immunity for mistakenly issuing warrant for plaintiff's arrest).
Jackson has failed to state any plausible claim for relief, and there is no hope that if given a chance to amend he could cure the deficiencies of his complaint. His action, therefore, must be dismissed sua sponte as legally frivolous or, at the very least, for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring screening "before docketing if feasible or . . . as soon as practicable after docketing"); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring dismissal "at any time" the Court determines the suit to be factually or legally insubstantial).
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 8th day of October, 2015.
/s/ _________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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