Opinion
Case No. 5:18-cv-37-MTT-CHW
08-14-2018
MIGUEL JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY C. DOZIER Defendant.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Miguel Jackson filed, through counsel, a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2018. Doc. 1. On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction that, among other requests, moved the Court to render an order that returned Plaintiff to general population from the Special Management Unit ("SMU"). Plaintiff has since been removed from SMU and has been placed in a Step-Down Program, rendering Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief moot. Additionally, Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 9) be DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Stay (Doc. 11) be GRANTED. The stay shall be lifted when the pending preliminary injunction and class certification motions in Gumm v. Sellers, No. 5:15-cv-41 (MTT), are resolved.
FACTUAL HISTORY
The Complaint alleges that prison officials at Smith State Prison "brutally" beat Plaintiff on December 31, 2010, for no alleged reason, causing Plaintiff to be taken to the hospital. Doc. 1, p. 2. Defendants contend that the incident arose when Plaintiff and other inmates assaulted officers in an attempt to retrieve drugs that prison officials had previously confiscated. Doc. 17, p. 4; Doc. 17-1, ¶ 8. When Plaintiff returned from the hospital, Plaintiff was transferred to Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison ("GDCP") and placed in the Special Management Unit ("SMU"). Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in SMU pending an investigation of the December 31 incident. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. Charges were eventually brought against Plaintiff for his participation in the incident (¶ 15), but the charges were later dismissed in May of 2013. ¶ 70. Plaintiff, nevertheless, has continued to remain in SMU. ¶ 71. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's continuous placement in SMU has not been tied to any disciplinary action or criminal charges, but is due to Plaintiff posing a serious threat to institutional safety. Doc. 17, p. 4; Doc. 17-1, ¶ 9.
Plaintiff has been in the SMU for over six years and was placed in "23-Hour Lockdown Maximum Security[.]" Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff has alleged that conditions in SMU are severe and that inmates in SMU are subject to poor medical treatment (Doc. 1, ¶ 11-12), prolonged isolation (¶ 37), underfeeding and poor nutrition (¶39, 59), limited recreation (¶ 40, 55), restricted visitations (¶ 43, 56), and rare or no educational programs (¶ 49-50). These conditions are significantly different from conditions in general population. See generally Doc. 1, pp. 15-20.
In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff has moved the Court to "immediately [. . .] order his reinstatement to General Population." Doc. 9, p. 19. Plaintiff has also requested that the Court order Defendant to:
(1) Immediately return Mr. Jackson to General Population with all privileges associated therewith under prison policy;
(2) Return all permissible property to Mr. Jackson;
(3) Immediately provide Mr. Jackson with a physical examination to supply all necessary medical and dental care and comply with all physician's instructions;
(4) House Mr. Jackson with other inmates with his similar history of good behavior;
(5) Amend all DOC prison files to reflect verbatim any Order from this Court concerning his release to General Population and any foregoing court filings requesting it;
(6) Immediately notify all visitors on Mr. Jackson's visitation list that he may now receive visitation and phone calls;
(7) Provide phone credit in proportion to the time he has been unconstitutionally confined;
(8) Allow access and enroll Mr. Jackson in any educational, training, counseling, and religious activities to be selected by Mr. Jackson at DOC expense; and,
(9) Report to this Court or a Special Master appointed by this Court within ten calendar days demonstrating their immediate compliance with the Court's order.
Doc. 9, pp. 19-20
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's request to be transferred from SMU is moot. A prisoner's request for injunctive relief relating to his conditions of confinement at a prison becomes moot when the prisoner plaintiff is transferred to a new prison. Davila v. Marshall, 649 F. App'x 977, 979-80 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2116, 198 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2017); Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir.1988); see Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Absent class certification, an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred.") (citation omitted); Hill v. Corporal Ryan Gunn, No. 5:17-cv-340 (MTT), 2018 WL 1731911, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2018). In his Motion, Plaintiff's overarching request was that Plaintiff be immediately transferred from the SMU at GDCP to general population. Both Parties agree that Plaintiff was transferred from SMU at GDCP to the Step-Down Program at Georgia State Prison ("GSP"). Doc. 17, p. 2; Upton Aff. Doc. 17-1, ¶ 7, 15; Doc. 19.
Plaintiff was recently transferred back to GDCP but was placed in the step-down program at GDCP. Doc. 18. Steve Upton, Director of Field Operations for the GDC, testified that the Step-Down program at GSP and GDCP offers a program for inmates to transition to general population. Upton Aff. Doc. 17-1, ¶16; Upton Aff. Doc. 18-1, p. 1. The step-down program at GDCP is comparable to the program Plaintiff was enrolled in at GSP, and Plaintiff was only transferred to the step-down program at GDCP because that program offered vegan meals as to satisfy Plaintiff's dietary restrictions. Upton Aff. Doc. 18-1, 2-3. The step-down program at GDCP offers inmates access to educational and programming opportunities, exercise time, and other privileges that are less restrictive than the conditions at SMU. Upton Aff. Doc. 18-1, 2-3. The GDCP step-down program is housed in the main building and is separated from the SMU. Id. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief regarding his conditions in the SMU, that relief is moot.
Furthermore, due to Plaintiff's transfer out of the SMU, Plaintiff cannot sufficiently establish an irreparable injury. Preliminary injunctions are considered "extraordinary and drastic" remedies. Jernard v. Comm'r, Georgia Dept of Corr., 457 F. App'x 837, 838 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc)). Injunctive relief should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Jernard, 457 F. App'x at 838; Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2011). The granting of a preliminary injunction is "the exception rather than the rule." Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975)).
Plaintiff has alleged that the conditions at the SMU are causing Plaintiff irreparable harm. Doc. 9, pp. 4, 18. To constitute an irreparable injury, an injury must be ongoing, actual, and imminent. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). Courts have emphasized that "the asserted irreparable injury 'must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.'" Id. (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990)). Plaintiff cannot "demonstrate a threat of continuing irreparable harm" from the SMU conditions, as he has been moved from the SMU to the step-down program, where the conditions are less restrictive. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1177. The absence of an irreparable injury, "standing alone, make[s] preliminary injunctive relief improper." Id.; see Snook v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A., 909 F.2d 480, 486 (11th Cir.1990) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction even though plaintiff established a likelihood of prevailing because the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving irreparable injury). Plaintiff's contentions that the GDCP's step-down program poses a risk of irreparable harm because there are "no parameters" and because the program is "still administrative segregation" are unpersuasive. Doc. 19, p. 2. Indeed, as Plaintiff himself acknowledged, the GDCP's step-down program provides "relief to Plaintiff." Id.
Additionally, Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief is adverse to the public interest. Courts generally afford wide discretion to prison administration to preserve internal order and security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Torres v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 17-14359, 2018 WL 3387518, at *2 (11th Cir. July 11, 2018); Johnson v. Bryson, No. 5:16-cv-453-TES-MSH, 2018 WL 3118685, at *6 (M.D. Ga. June 25, 2018). The Department of Corrections has implemented a step-down program to help transition inmates from the SMU to general population. The requested injunction would interfere with this program in a highly intrusive manner and would involve the Court in prison administration against the public interest. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 9) be DENIED.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY
Defendant has also filed a Motion to Stay the Proceedings. Doc. 11. Defendant contends that the Court should exercise its discretion to stay this case, as the Court has done in several similar cases concerning the conditions and procedures at the GDCP's SMU. Doc. 11. "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). District courts "enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them" and have the authority and discretion to stay the proceedings in cases. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997); Lawrence v. Governor of Georgia, 721 F. App'x 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2018). "A variety of circumstances" may warrant a stay of discovery, including the court's need to control its own docket and manage its cases or the need to await the pending resolution of related proceedings. Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Communications, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000). A stay of discovery may thus be warranted where a related matter is "likely to have a substantial or controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009); Morrissey v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-21106-KMM, 2015 WL 4512641, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2015). The parties need not be the same or the issues identical. Morrissey, 2015 WL 4512641, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2015); see also Postel Indus., Inc. v. Abrams Group Constr., No. 6:11-cv-1179-Orl-28DAB, 2013 WL 1881560, at *3 (N.D.Fla. Mar. 29, 2013).
The Court has stayed several other cases that are identical to Plaintiff's present case. Beginning in early 2015, numerous prisoner plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed complaints regarding the conditions at the GDCP's SMU. These plaintiffs brought identical claims to Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in this case. In the fall of 2016, the Court appointed counsel to assist the plaintiff in Gumm v. Sellers, No. 5:15-cv-41 (MTT). The parties in Gumm have conducted extensive discovery, and the plaintiff has filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking injunctive relief for those inmates in SMU. The Gumm plaintiff has also filed a motion for class certification to certify the inmates of the SMU for purposes of injunctive relief. The Court, exercising its discretion, stayed the remaining similarly situated SMU plaintiffs while Gumm proceeded with counsel, because "allowing the proceeding in Gumm to move forward with the supervision of counsel may assist in defining and developing future issues in this case." Curry v. Sellers, No. 5:17-cv-424.
Those cases include:
1. 5:15-cv-41, Gumm v. Sellers
2. 5:15-cv-2, Rodriguez v. Chatman
3. 5:15-cv-175, McCoy v. Chatman
4. 5:15-cv-276, Brooks v. Bryson
5. 5:15-cv-267, Coleman v. Danforth
6. 5:15-cv-387, Rodriques v. Chatman
7. 5:15-cv-331, Emberson v. Chatman
8. 5:15-cv-374, Garcia v. Chatman
9. 5:15-cv-355, Salgado v. Chatman
10. 5:15-cv-338, Diaz v. Chatman
A stay of the present proceedings is appropriate. The Court is inclined to issue a stay because this case is directly related to the matter in Gumm. Discovery in Gumm is closed and the pending motions for preliminary injunction and for class certification will soon be ripe for review. Any rulings on those motions in Gumm will likely have a controlling effect on claims and issues in this case. As Gumm is farther along in litigation than the case at hand, and because any ruling on the pending motions in Gumm would likely "have a substantial or controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case[,]" it is appropriate to stay the current case. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 559 F.3d at 1198.
Any stay implemented by the Court in this case must not be "immoderate." Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc'ns, 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000); CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 1982). Courts examine the scope of the issued stay and the reasons cited for the stay when evaluating whether a stay in is immoderate. Ortega Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264; Danner Const. Co. v. Hillsborough Cty., 2009 WL 3055315, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2009). A stay in this case is appropriate due to the direct similarity between the issues at hand and Gumm. Upon the resolution of the pending preliminary injunction and class certification motions in Gumm, the parties in this case will have a better perspective on the potentially controlling effect Gumm may have on this case. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Stay (Doc. 11) is GRANTED, and discovery in this case shall be STAYED until the pending preliminary injunction and class certification motions in Gumm are resolved, after which the parties will be directed to submit a proposed scheduling and discovery order.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 14th day of August, 2018.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge