Opinion
2:20-cv-01090-SB
02-07-2023
CALVIN JACKSON, Jr., Plaintiff, v. TROY BOWSER, DR. VRIESMAN, S. JOHNSTON, C. DIGIULIO, and T. BUGHER, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Calvin Jackson, Jr. (“Jackson”), a self-represented litigant, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Troy Bowser, Dr. Vriesman, S. Johnston (“Johnston”), C. DiGiulio (“DiGiulio”), and T. Bugher (“Bugher”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights. (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 35.) Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 52.)
The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 52.)
PRELIMINARY MATTER
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Jackson initially filed a complaint on July 7, 2020. (ECF No. 2.) The complaint contained factual allegations and exhibits supporting Jackson's claims against Defendants. (Id.) Jackson filed an amended complaint on July 9, 2021, which omitted allegations from his original complaint and failed to attach the original exhibits. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 35.) However, in his response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Jackson cites the exhibits that were attached to his original complaint.
Jackson is self-represented, and the Ninth Circuit has “ held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore construes Jackson's amended complaint to incorporate the allegations set forth in his original complaint. See Beutler v. Potter, No. C 06-1833 CW, 2007 WL 2990360, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2007) (noting that “[t]he amended complaint does not contain a statement of the underlying facts supporting Plaintiff's discrimination claim,” and “because pro se complaints should be read liberally, the Court construes the amended complaint to incorporate the allegations set forth in the original complaint”).
The Court also construes Jackson's amended complaint to incorporate the exhibits attached to his original complaint. See Willis v. Ritter, No. CIV. 04-2303WQHJMA, 2008 WL 821828, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008), aff'd, 372 Fed.Appx. 780 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the “Amended Complaint . . . did not include any of the medical records or other exhibits submitted in support of his original pleading[,]” and granting the self -represented plaintiff “permission to incorporate the exhibits filed in support of his original complaint as if they were attached to his amended pleading” because he “mentions these exhibits in his opposition” to the defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Additionally, Jackson verified his amended complaint, which means that he filed it with a sworn statement declaring that, under penalty of perjury, the allegations are true and correct in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The Court may therefore treat the amended complaint as an affidavit opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts “must consider as evidence in [a self-represented plaintiff's] opposition to summary judgment all of [the plaintiff's] contentions offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [he] attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct”); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56.”).
The following background facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson.
This action arises out of Jackson's time at Two Rivers Correctional Institution (“TRCI”) as an adult in custody (“AIC”). (Am. Compl.) On or about March 19, 2014, Jackson complained to TRCI medical staff that he was experiencing anal pain. (Id. ¶ 3.) On March 27, 2014, Dr. Vriesman examined Jackson and determined that he most likely had anal abscesses or fissures, also known as “anal fistula.” (Decl. Aggrey Supp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. (“Aggrey Decl.”), Ex. 1 at 12, ECF No. 53-1.) Dr. Vriesman prescribed Septra to treat Jackson's condition. (Id.)
After Jackson began taking Septra, the skin on his feet and hands became red and itchy, and there was “dry peeling skin” on the pads of his feet. (Id., Ex. 1 at 11.) Medical staff examined Jackson twice on March 30, 2014. (Id.) On the morning of March 30, medical staff observed the red, itchy skin condition of his hands and feet, and noted that the “tip of [Jackson's] penis” had “whitish/gray patches” on the skin. (Id.) In the afternoon, medical staff examined Jackson again and noted that “several areas on [the] head of [his] penis appear[ed] to have been blisters, now popped.” (Id.) Medical staff discontinued Septra for Jackson and made an appointment for him to see a provider the next day. (Id.) On March 31, 2014, Dr. Vriesman diagnosed Jackson with an allergic reaction to Septra and prescribed Prednisone to treat his symptoms. (Id. at 6.)
Medical staff continued to treat Jackson's allergic reaction in April 2014. (Id. at 9.) Jackson continued to experience “penial skin issues” that required medical dressings. (Id.) On April 8, 2014, medical staff observed “several open areas on [the] tip of [Jackson's] penis” and noted “slight drainage.” (Id.) On April 15, 2014, when Jackson received additional gauze wrap supplies from medical, his penis appeared “red and raw,” and he reported to staff that his penis “stings” and was “painful.” (Id.) On April 18, 2014, medical staff provided Jackson with additional supplies to treat his skin and noted “raw tissue to penis and groin” in his medical notes. (Id.) On April 28, 2014, Jackson told medical staff that he continued to experience “some discomfort” but, overall, was “much better.” (Id.)
On May 1, 2014, Jackson submitted a kyte regarding the “prescription that made [his] body react badly” and noted that it caused him “great pain for three weeks.” (Id. at 16.) Jackson asked, “[i]s it common procedure for medical staff to give their patients medication before seeing if there's perhaps side effects?” and said, “I want it to be recognized I was never given anything nor told about what could happen if I take [Septra].” (Id.)
Regarding Jackson's anal fistula, Jackson reported to medical staff on June 16, 2014, that his symptoms were better and less painful. (Id. at 8.) Jackson sought medical care for his anal fistula again on October 22, 2014, and reported “no improvement” after six months. (Id. at 7.) On October 28, 2014, a provider proposed that Jackson receive a colonoscopy and fistulectomy to treat his anal fistula, and a medical committee approved the proposed treatment. (Id. at 13.) Medical staff referred Jackson to a surgeon for a consultation regarding the proposed fistulectomy, and the surgeon recommended the procedure. (Id. at 14-15.) On December 12, 2014, Jackson signed an ODOC Patient Informed Consent/Refusal form stating that the proposed fistulectomy and colonoscopy were explained to him and that he understood that he was refusing the medical treatment that the medical staff recommended. (Id. at 17.)
Regarding Jackson's allergic reaction to Septra, Jackson submitted a grievance on August 13, 2018, that stated:
I spoke with Dr. Melnick on 7-31-18 about the complication I am still having. He was apologetic for my catastrophic experience. Dr. Melnick said my pigment to my private area will not return to its normal color because I am black.(Compl., Ex. 1 at 1.) On September 9, 2018, registered nurse Johnston responded:
Mr. Jackson I have read your grievance where you are having concerns regarding the pigmentation of your penis. You state that you were told by Dr. Vriesman that the pigmentation of your penis should return to normal within 3-4 years. I have read your medical file and cannot find any documentation that this conversation took place. On 3/27/14 you were started on Septra DS, for your anal fistula infection and on this date it was documented in your medical file that you had no allergies to medication.
On 3/30/14 you were evaluated and seen for a possible reaction to this antibiotic. Your medication was held on 3/30/14 and Dr. Vriesman discontinued this medication on 3/31/14. The loss of pigmentation to your penis was most probably a side effect of this medication. If you were not issued a medication information
sheet I apologize, your follow up treatment for the allergic reaction for this medication was standard community care. Your pigmentation will most likely never return to normal color.(Id., Ex. 2 at 1.) When Jackson appealed Johnston's grievance response, Dr. DiGiulio, the ODOC Medical Director, responded as follows on October 23, 2018:
An original review of your medical record shows you started Septra DS prescribed by Dr. Vriesman on March 27, 2014, for your anal fistula. The medication was discontinued on March 30, 2014, due to a possible reaction to the antibiotic....
Further review of your medical record shows that Dr. Vriesman, and other medical staff, followed standard treatment protocol for an allergic reaction to an antibiotic. Your allergic reaction apparently resulted in Stevens-Johnson syndrome causing a change in pigmentation to your penis. If you were not issued a medication information sheet at the time regarding the Septra you were prescribed, I apologize.(Id., Ex. 4 at 1.) Jackson filed a second and final grievance appeal and received a response from Bugher, the ODOC Health Services Administrator, on December 18, 2018. (Id., Ex. 6 at 1.) Like Dr. DiGiulio, Bugher stated that Jackson received “appropriate treatment” that was “consistent with community standards” for the allergic reaction he suffered after taking Septra. (Id.) He noted that “[a]ll medications come with cautions and possible side effects,” and stated “I apologize if you were not given the drug information sheet.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). At the summary judgment stage, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the truth of matters in dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
“Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his pleadings liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt.” Wilson v. Peters, No. 2:19-cv-01724-AC, 2020 WL 6437606, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 25, 2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), findings and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6393901 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2020). However, “there is no authority for the proposition that, on motion for summary judgment, that rule operates to lighten the pro se litigant's obligation to show a genuine issue of material fact for trial through the presentation of specific, admissible evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides a private right of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff [1] must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [2] must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “A cognizable claim under Section 1983 also requires an [AIC] to show causation; that a particular defendant engaged in “an affirmative act, participat[ed] in another's affirmative act, or omit[ted] to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Wilson, 2020 WL 6437606, at *3 (citing Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) and quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).
II. ANALYSIS
Jackson alleges that Defendants provided him with inadequate medical care and left him with “an untreated anal fistula.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Jackson further alleges that he suffered a “deadly allergic reaction to the medication ‘Septra'” and experienced “excruciating pain and suffering” which continue to affect him “to this very day[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Jackson's claims on five alternative grounds: (1) Jackson cannot show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; (2) his claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (3) he failed to allege that each defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of his rights; (4) each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) Jackson failed to provide timely notice under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. (Defs.' Mot. at 4.)
After a careful review of the record, and considering all evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Jackson's serious medical needs. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that ground, and it is not necessary for the Court to reach Defendants' remaining arguments.
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an AIC is “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an AIC must show: (1) they had a “serious medical need,” and (2) defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to that need. Id. at 104. “[A] serious medical need is present whenever the failure to treat [an AIC]'s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[.]” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (simplified). An AIC's “serious need” for medical treatment can be indicated by “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain[.]” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997).
Deliberate indifference may be satisfied by showing: “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a[n AIC]'s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). “Indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.'” Id. at 1096 (citation omitted). Yet, “an ‘inadvertent [or negligent] failure to provide adequate medical care' alone does not state a claim under § 1983.” Id. at 1096 (citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[d]eliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchiv. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A] mere ‘difference of medical opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference'” and “[a] showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1058, 1060 (citations omitted). Rather, an AIC “must show that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,' and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the [AIC]'s health.'” Id. at 1058 (citation omitted).
Jackson alleges he suffered from an “untreated anal fistula,” but the record shows that TRCI medical staff treated that medical condition with oral and topical medications, consultations, examinations, and medical gauze and dressings in March, April, May, and June 2014, and in October 2014. (See Aggrey Decl., Ex. 1 at 7-12.) It is also undisputed that medical staff recommended a fistulectomy for Jackson and arranged for him to speak with a consultant. (Id. at 14-15.) Although the consulting surgeon recommended the procedure, Jackson signed an ODOC Patient Informed Consent/Refusal form on December 12, 2014, stating that the fistulectomy procedure was explained to him and that he understood he was refusing the medical treatment recommended by medical staff. (Id. at 17.) Thus, while Jackson broadly alleges that he was left with “an untreated anal fistula,” the record demonstrates otherwise. Jackson does not contest the evidence, and he does not explain what was inadequate about the care he received, let alone “medically unacceptable.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.
There is also no evidence in the record that Jackson suffered harm from the care Defendants provided for his anal fistula. In light of that fact, and given that Jackson refused a procedure that multiple medical providers recommended as treatment for his anal fistula, no reasonable jury could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Jackson's medical needs based on the care he was offered and received for his anal fistula. See Whitall v. Munk, No. 20-CV-03415-CRB (PR), 2021 WL 4442648, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2021) (noting that the “[p]laintiff's continued disagreement with the chosen course of treatment for his jaw pain . . . and continued refusal of treatment . . . does not alter the fact that there is no probative evidence that the chosen course of treatment/care was (or is) medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (citing Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058)).
With respect to Dr. Vriesman's decision to treat Jackson's anal fistula with Septra, the material facts are not in dispute. Jackson alleges that Dr. Vriesman and other TRCI medical staff never explained “the dangers that this drug could pose” and never provided him with an Inmate Medication Information Sheet for Septra. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 14.) Defendants do not dispute that fact. The parties agree that Jackson experienced an allergic reaction to Septra known as Stevens-Johnson syndrome, and there is no dispute that he developed a red, itchy, painful rash on his hands, feet, and genitalia that caused a permanent loss of pigmentation on the skin on his penis. (Id. ¶¶ 26-28.) Jackson argues that Defendants should have warned him about the possible side effects of Septra, but there is no evidence that Dr. Vriesman or any defendant had any reason to believe that prescribing Septra to Jackson “presented a serious risk of harm to [him,]” nor that Dr. Vriesman prescribed Septra to Jackson “in conscious disregard of such risk.” Montano v.Solomon, No. 2:07-CV-0800 KJN P, 2013 WL 2245145, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013). Furthermore, “[e]ven if a prison official should have been aware of the risk [to the AIC's health], if he ‘was not, then [he] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.'” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Martinez v. United States, 812 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that the defendant's prescription of a medication that caused a severe allergic reaction without first reviewing the plaintiff's medical records was not deliberately indifferent because the defendant was not “aware [the] plaintiff would react negatively to the medication”).
Jackson argues that “it has always been customary for Doctors and other medical staff to communicate certain details about a prescribed medication, or at least provide [an AIC] with an Inmate Medication Information Sheet” (Am. Compl. ¶ 13), but Dr. Vriesman's apparent failure to follow customary procedures does not show deliberate indifference unless “[he] actually knew that his actions put [Jackson] at risk.” Hall v. CSP-Los Angeles, No. CV 16-6216-RGK (KES), 2017 WL 2060011, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff failed to “sufficiently plead that [the] [d]efendant actually knew that his failure [to follow protocols] . . . would cause [the] [p]laintiff to receive the wrong medication and then suffer an adverse reaction” (citing Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1087)), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2039168 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017). Even where prison officials administer the wrong medication or dosage to an AIC, “[c]ourts have held that there is no Eighth Amendment violation . . . unless they were aware the [AIC] would react negatively to the medication.” Scott v. Bick, No. S-08-0117 LKK JFMP, 2008 WL 449798, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (citing cases); see also Hall, 2017 WL 2060011, at *4 (noting “[m]any other cases have specifically held that mistakenly administering the wrong medication to an [AIC] does not violate the Eighth Amendment” and citing cases).
Here, there is no evidence that Dr. Vriesman or any TRCI medical staff person knew, or should have known, that taking Septra would harm Jackson. Thus, even where it is undisputed that Defendants never warned Jackson about Septra's possible side effects, “[t]hese allegations amount to a claim of negligence and not a constitutional violation of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Murillo v. Thornton, No. 07-CV-0197 W POR, 2008 WL 110899, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2008) (acknowledging that the AIC suffered “severe” side effects for months after the defendant prescribed the “wrong medication and did not inform [the AIC] about the side effects[,]” and yet dismissing the plaintiff's claim because he “failed to allege that [the defendant] had a culpable mental state which is a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”); see also Williamson v. Steele, No. 4:12-CV-1548 CAS, 2015 WL 3620607, at *14 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2015) (noting “[t]he fact that [the defendant] erroneously prescribed [the] plaintiff a medication to which he may have been allergic-an error that was quickly corrected-does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference”).
Jackson further alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they never sent him to the hospital or referred him to “an outside medical specialist” to treat his allergic reaction to Septra, i.e., the blisters and discoloration of his skin. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 37.) There is no evidence in the record, however, that the failure of TRCI medical staff to hospitalize Jackson “presented a serious risk of harm to [him],” or that they failed to send him to a specialist “in conscious disregard of such risk.” Montano, 2013 WL 2245145, at *7. Jackson argues that “an outside specialist would have staved off some of the permanent damage” (id. ¶ 39), but his assertion is not based on personal knowledge and he cites no evidence to support his claim. In fact, Jackson's skin became blistered and discolored immediately upon taking Septra, and there is no evidence that his skin conditions worsened or failed properly to heal or caused him additional harm because he did not see a specialist. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2429 describing Jackson's symptoms and the loss of pigmentation on his penis within a few days of taking Septra.) The record also indicates that TRCI medical staff treated Jackson's rash and blisters with medication and medical dressings for a period of approximately three weeks in April 2014, and that Jackson told staff that he was “much better” after receiving that care, despite continuing to experience “some discomfort[.]” (Aggrey Decl., Ex. 1 at 9.)
Jackson does not allege that he requested to see a specialist or sought a different course of treatment. In any event, even where an AIC “request[s] a number of times that he receive care at a hospital or by a specialist,” he must still provide evidence “other than his own opinion” that he required outside medical care. Williamson, 2015 WL 3620607, at *14. Jackson argues that Defendants should have referred him to “an outside specialist [who] would have had the competence to recognize the signs and symptoms of Stevens-Johnson syndrome” (Am. Compl. ¶ 38), but “mere disagreement with a physician's medical decisions does not establish deliberate indifference as a matter of law.” Herringtonv. Bristol, No. 2:16-CV-00680-AC, 2019 WL 7598855, at *21 (D. Or. July 29, 2019) (citing Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058),findings and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 265192 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2020), aff'd, 2022 WL 1421442 (9th Cir. May 5, 2022). Rather, an AIC “must show that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,' and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the [AIC]'s health.'” Id. (citation omitted).
Like the plaintiff in Herrington, Jackson “has made no showing [Defendants'] treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances.” Id. Although Jackson insists that he “required immediate hospitalization” when he developed Stevens-Johnson syndrome, his bare assertion is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact on a claim for deliberate indifference. See Williamson, 2015 WL 3620607, at *14 (noting that the plaintiff “provided no evidence, other than his own opinion, that he required outside medical care” and finding that the “defendants were not deliberately indifferent to [the] plaintiff's medical needs by refusing to refer [him] to a specialist”). The record does not demonstrate that Defendants' failure to send him to the hospital or a specialist “somehow posed an excessive risk to [his] health, much less that [Defendants were] aware of and consciously disregarded that risk.” Herrington, 2019 WL 7598855, at *21. Thus, although the Court is sympathetic to Jackson's unfortunate allergic reaction to Septra, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Jackson's claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See id.; see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1056, 1058, 1061 (affirming the district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant physician on deliberate indifference claim where the AIC “died from the combined effects of [medications] administered to him by [the defendant]” but there was no evidence that the defen dant's actions were “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” or chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the AIC's] health”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 52), and enter judgment for Defendants on all of Jackson's claims.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.