Opinion
Case No. 2D17-4686
06-03-2020
Anthony M. Candela of Candela Law Firm, P.A., Riverview, for Appellant. Julie Blazer, pro se.
Anthony M. Candela of Candela Law Firm, P.A., Riverview, for Appellant.
Julie Blazer, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
James E. Jackson appeals from a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Julie Blazer. Although he raises seven issues on appeal, we find merit in only one. In reaching a decision with respect to equitable distribution, the court classified a Chevrolet truck and an Infiniti car held by Mr. Jackson and a Nissan Altima held by Ms. Blazer as marital assets and a loan associated with the Nissan Altima as a marital liability. See § 61.075(3)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (2015) (requiring that a family court equitably distributing marital assets classify the parties' assets as marital or nonmarital). The only evidence bearing on the classification of the assets at the hearing leading to the entry of the final judgment, however, was that the husband acquired the pickup truck prior to the marriage and the Infiniti after the petition for dissolution was filed and that the wife acquired the Nissan and took out the associated loan after the filing of the petition for dissolution. There was no other evidence bearing on how the vehicles and the loan should be classified. As such, all three vehicles and the liability corresponding to the Nissan should have been classified as nonmarital. See § 61.075(6)(b)(1) (defining assets acquired before marriage as nonmarital), (7) (setting the filing of the dissolution petition as the cutoff date for determining whether assets are marital in the absence of an agreement setting a different date); Smith v. Smith, 169 So. 3d 220, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding that the trial court erred in classifying a vehicle acquired postpetition as a marital asset); Doerr v. Doerr, 751 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that a vehicle acquired prior to the marriage was a nonmarital asset absent evidence indicating that it was otherwise to be treated as marital).
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of dissolution and remand for the trial court to recalculate the equitable distribution in the final judgment in light of the correct classification of the vehicles and loan. To the extent that recalculation affects any other aspect of the final judgment, the trial court is free to reconsider that aspect of the judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the final judgment without comment.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.
SILBERMAN and SALARIO, JJ., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.