Opinion
04-19-2017
In the Matter of Walter JACKSON, petitioner, v. Adrian H. ANDERSON, etc., et al., respondents.
Miller & Miller, Brooklyn, NY (Andrew R. Miller of counsel), for petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Michael A. Berg of counsel), for respondent Peter M. Forman.
Miller & Miller, Brooklyn, NY (Andrew R. Miller of counsel), for petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Michael A. Berg of counsel), for respondent Peter M. Forman.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Peter M. Forman, a Judge of the County Court, Dutchess County, dated December 8, 2015, denying the petitioner's application for an amendment to his pistol license.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.
Penal Law § 400.00(1), which sets forth the eligibility requirements for obtaining a pistol license, requires, inter alia, that the applicant be at least 21 years of age, of good moral character with no prior convictions of a felony or serious offense, and a person "concerning whom no good cause exists for the denial of the license" (Penal Law § 400.00[1][h] ). A person may also apply to amend his or her pistol license to include additional weapons (see Penal Law § 400.00[9] ). "A pistol licensing officer has broad discretion in ruling on permit applications and may deny an application for any good cause" (Matter of Orgel v. DiFiore, 303 A.D.2d 758, 758, 756 N.Y.S.2d 870 ; see Penal Law § 400.00[1][g] ; Matter of Gonzalez v. Lawrence, 36 A.D.3d 807, 808, 831 N.Y.S.2d 180 ).
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the determination of the respondent Peter F. Forman (hereinafter the respondent) that good cause existed, based on the petitioner's criminal history, to deny the petitioner's application to amend his license to include additional handguns was not arbitrary and capricious, and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Velez v. DiBella, 77 A.D.3d 670, 670–671, 909 N.Y.S.2d 83 ; Matter of Gonzalez v. Lawrence, 36 A.D.3d at 808, 831 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The fact that the majority of the petitioner's arrests resulted in the dismissal of the charges against him, or were ultimately resolved in his favor, did not preclude the respondent from considering the underlying circumstances surrounding those arrests in denying the application (see Matter of Velez v. DiBella, 77 A.D.3d at 670–671, 909 N.Y.S.2d 83 ; Matter of Gonzalez v. Lawrence, 36 A.D.3d at 808, 831 N.Y.S.2d 180 ).
Moreover, the petitioner's constitutional challenge to the licensing scheme is unfounded (see Matter of Gonzalez v. Lawrence, 36 A.D.3d 807, 831 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). We further note that the petitioner's contention that certain aspects of the licensing eligibility requirements of Penal Law § 400.00(1) unconstitutionally infringe upon his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment (U.S. Const., 2d Amend) is not properly before this Court in an original proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, as a declaratory judgment action is the proper vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of a statute (see Matter of Velez v.
DiBella, 77 A.D.3d at 671, 909 N.Y.S.2d 83 ).