A contribution cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, only when a tortfeasor pays more than her pro rata share of the liability. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 436 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Ark. 2014) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202(b));Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 597 S.W.3d 114, 119-20 (Ark. Ct. App.), rev. denied, No. CV-18-585, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 151 (Ark. Apr. 23, 2020).
These sections create substantive rights that were absent from the previous version of the UCATA and therefore, cannot be applied retroactively. Our decision in J–McDaniel Construction Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing, Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458, is not inapposite to this holding because the statutory provisions at issue in that case did not directly impact the newly created substantive right to allocation of fault. In that case, the plaintiff had brought suit against a construction company, which in turn filed third-party complaints against subcontractors.
Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 294, 956 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1997) ; Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 349, 516 S.W.2d 602, 604 (1974). Accord,J–McDaniel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (applying same rule to order granting summary judgment in general terms). 3.