These sections create substantive rights that were absent from the previous version of the UCATA and therefore, cannot be applied retroactively. Our decision in J–McDaniel Construction Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing, Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458, is not inapposite to this holding because the statutory provisions at issue in that case did not directly impact the newly created substantive right to allocation of fault. In that case, the plaintiff had brought suit against a construction company, which in turn filed third-party complaints against subcontractors.
The right to contribution is "derivative in nature, and the cause of action does not accrue until one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her share of liability"; thus, the circuit court erred in determining that the right of contribution existed because no award of damages has occurred. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd. , 2014 Ark. 282, at 3, 436 S.W.3d 458, 467 ; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202(b). By determining that the right of contribution exists before a party has paid his or her fair share, the circuit court erred as a matter of law.
Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 294, 956 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1997) ; Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 349, 516 S.W.2d 602, 604 (1974). Accord,J–McDaniel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (applying same rule to order granting summary judgment in general terms). 3.