DTNA is not relying on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-202 as the basis for seeking an allocation of fault against Anderson but a separate third-party contribution claim under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202. See J-McDaniel Const. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 436 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Ark. 2014). Furthermore, non-party fault is the issue in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-202, but Anderson is a bona fide party in DTNA's contribution claim, brought into the case under the proper pleading rules, not the unconstitutional procedure outlined
A contribution cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, only when a tortfeasor pays more than her pro rata share of the liability. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 436 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Ark. 2014) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202(b));Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 597 S.W.3d 114, 119-20 (Ark. Ct. App.), rev. denied, No. CV-18-585, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 151 (Ark. Apr. 23, 2020).
These sections create substantive rights that were absent from the previous version of the UCATA and therefore, cannot be applied retroactively. Our decision in J–McDaniel Construction Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing, Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458, is not inapposite to this holding because the statutory provisions at issue in that case did not directly impact the newly created substantive right to allocation of fault. In that case, the plaintiff had brought suit against a construction company, which in turn filed third-party complaints against subcontractors.
The right to contribution is "derivative in nature, and the cause of action does not accrue until one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her share of liability"; thus, the circuit court erred in determining that the right of contribution existed because no award of damages has occurred. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd. , 2014 Ark. 282, at 3, 436 S.W.3d 458, 467 ; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202(b). By determining that the right of contribution exists before a party has paid his or her fair share, the circuit court erred as a matter of law.
The Court determines that this is a circumstance in which the Court may exercise its discretion to admit evidence as to the settlement and the amount of the settlement, depending on the proof at trial. See Howard W. Brill & Christian H. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages § 7.5 (5th ed. 2014) (citing St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center v. Shelton, 425 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Ark. 2013) (Hart, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, 2013 Ark. Acts 1116, as recognized by J-McDaniel Const. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 436 S.W.3d 458 (Ark. 2014); Ark. Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 519 S.W.2d 74 (Ark. 1975)). In doing so, the Court acknowledges that the general approach is for the settlement not to be introduced into evidence at trial because doing so informs the jury that one defendant, or in this case a potentially liable joint tortfeasor, has admitted liability and might permit the jury to use the amount of the settlement as compensation for the injuries.
"Our law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." J-McDaniel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, at 6-7, 436 S.W.3d 458, 464).
Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 294, 956 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1997) ; Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 349, 516 S.W.2d 602, 604 (1974). Accord,J–McDaniel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (applying same rule to order granting summary judgment in general terms). 3.
Our law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. J–McDaniel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458. Once the moving party has established a prima-facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support