Izen v. Winoker

37 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. Stanley

    84 A.3d 1157 (R.I. 2014)   Cited 14 times
    In James W. Brown v. Elmer Stanley, No.2012–169–A., 84 A.3d 1157, 1165–64 (R.I.2014), we held that Project Hope did not have a duty to the walkathon participants to ensure their safe passage across public streets.

    The plaintiff attempts to distinguish Ferreira, however, by contending that, unlike the case at bar, the church in Ferreira did nothing to ensure the safety of the parishioners as they crossed the street after Midnight Mass. In this case, plaintiff argues, defendants assumed a duty to provide for the safety of the Good Friday Walk participants—including Cummings—by taking affirmative steps to provide for the safety of the marchers by controlling traffic on Broad Street. The plaintiff cites to Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828 (R.I.1991), in support of the contention that once defendants assumed a duty by controlling traffic for the safety of all the walkers, defendants were then responsible for carrying out that duty with reasonable care. In Izen, we acknowledged that “one who assumes a duty to perform an act must do so with reasonable care whether or not that person had an obligation to perform the act or repairs prior to assuming the duty.”

  2. Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates

    819 A.2d 666 (R.I. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed

    But even if I could join my colleagues in concluding that reasonable minds could differ about whether defendant was negligent and that the evidence in this case reasonably could have supported a verdict for either plaintiff or defendant particularly in light of the trial justice's instruction on comparative negligence — I do not believe we are at liberty to conduct a de novo review of the evidence presented, especially when the trial justice, as here, has conducted the requisite two-step process of evaluating the evidence presented at trial in light of the jury instructions and of deciding whether the jury's verdict clearly was wrong because it "fail[ed] to respond truly to the merits of the controversy, fail[ed] to administer substantial justice, and [was] against the fair weight of the evidence." Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828-29 (R.I. 1991). In these circumstances, our mandate is to give "great weight" to the trial justice's new-trial decision, refusing to disturb it unless he has "overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong."

  3. Pantalone v. Advanced Energy Delivery Systems

    694 A.2d 1213 (R.I. 1997)   Cited 25 times
    Recognizing that "an intervening act of negligence will not insulate an original tortfeasor if it appears that such intervening act is a natural and probable consequence of the initial tortfeasor's act. . . however, [if] the intervening cause was not reasonably foreseeable, the intervening or secondary act becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries."

    We have said on numerous occasions that if a trial justice reviews the evidence, comments on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and exercises his independent judgment, his determination either granting or denying a motion for new trial will not be disturbed unless he has overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828-29 (R.I. 1991);Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 899-900 (R.I. 1987); Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. 191, 193-96, 196 A.2d 836, 837-39 (1964). In the case at bar there was a disputed question of fact in regard to whether Pantalone had substituted another extension cord for the one originally loaned to him by Smeltz.

  4. Mellor v. Berube

    685 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1996)

    The standard applied by a trial justice in considering a motion for a new trial is well settled. In Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828-29 (R.I. 1991) this court stated: "On the motion for new trial the trial justice must evaluate the evidence in light of his or her charge to the jury and exercise his or her independent judgment regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

  5. Cinq-Mars v. Rodriguez

    674 A.2d 401 (R.I. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    Rodrigues v. Miriam Hospital, 623 A.2d 456, 460 (R.I. 1993). If, however, after this analysis of the evidence, the trial justice concludes that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff, the motion should be granted. Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 827 (R.I. 1991). Applying this same standard, we are of the opinion that in the instant case the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict on the issue of informed consent.

  6. Powers v. Calvo, 92-1185 (1995)

    KC No. 92-1185 (R.I. Super. Jan. 19, 1995)

    Thus, evidence before this Court supports Calvo's argument that he was not negligent. Calvo did not have a written agreement to repair wiring problems in Le Blanc's premises. Nor did Calvo have an implied covenant to repair the wiring because he had not previously repaired the fluorescent light which short-circuited, and he had no knowledge that it was defective. See Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828 (R.I. 1991) (landlord responsible for maintaining sprinkler system which was located in part on the landlord's retained premises); Saritelli v. Industrial Trust Co., 84 R.I. 42, 48-49, 121 A.2d 329, 332-33 (1956) (landlord responsible for maintaining roof but not for maintaining ceiling). Moreover, the wiring was not part of the premises retained by Calvo.

  7. Davet v. Maccarone

    973 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992)   Cited 607 times
    Holding that failure to object to magistrate judge's ruling waives review by district judge

    In Rhode Island, the standard for imposing punitive damages is rigorous: "one seeking punitive damages must produce 'evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amount[s] to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished.'" Morin v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 478 A.2d 964, 967 (R.I. 1984), quoting Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974); see also Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I. 1991). Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 381 (1st Cir. 1991).

  8. Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.

    935 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1991)   Cited 140 times
    Holding that "a federal court sitting in diversity is free, if it chooses, to forgo independent analysis and accept the parties' agreement" as to which state's law controls

    In Rhode Island, the standard for imposing punitive damages is rigorous: "one seeking punitive damages must produce 'evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amount[s] to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished.'" Morin v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 478 A.2d 964, 967 (R.I. 1984), quoting Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974); see also Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I. 1991). As strict as the standard may be, the standard for intentional infliction is even more onerous.

  9. Gray v. Derderian

    400 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D.R.I. 2005)   Cited 7 times

    We have recognized the doctrine that one who assumes a duty must do so with reasonable care whether or not that person had an obligation to perform the act or repairs prior to assuming the duty.Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 828 (R.I. 1991). Moreover, Plaintiffs are able to cite several Rhode Island Supreme Court cases where a cause of action was found to exist for negligent enforcement of the State's building code, which, like the Fire Safety Code, does not include a private right of action or civil remedy.

  10. Hall v. Eklof Marine Corp.

    339 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.R.I. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    Assuming that Plaintiff can meet the high standard of willfulness, recklessness, or wickedness that is necessary for a punitive damage claim, he has failed to show that such conduct on the part of Defendants proximately caused his loss. D'Amato v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank 772 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (R.I. 1991); Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I. 1991). Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Counts IV and V.