" (citations omitted) See also ITT Cannon Electric, Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114 (no estoppel or fraud removing bar of statute to enforcement of oral promise to employ for eighteen months); Starkey v. Galloway (1949), 119 Ind. App. 287, 84 N.E.2d 731 (no bar to invoking statute upon an oral agreement to sell 45 head of cattle.) Were this not the rule the statute would be rendered virtually meaningless because the frustrated claimant would always assert an oral promise/agreement to defeat by means of estoppel the statute's requirement for a written one.

In ITT Cannon Elec., Inc. v. Brady, the oral contract at issue was alleged to extend for at least eighteen months. 141 Ind.App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114, 115 (1967). Finally, in Montgomery Ward Co., Inc. v. Guignet, the oral contract was for "permanent employment" and was intended to last more than five years.

The representations must have been made to party B, with the intent to induce B's reliance on those statements. Finally, B must have changed his position in reliance upon A's statements. Justice et al. v. Mid-State Homes (1970), 146 Ind. App. 662, 257 N.E.2d 843; Schill v. Choate (1969), 144 Ind. App. 543, 247 N.E.2d 688; ITT Cannon Elec., Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114."Kokomo Veterans, Inc. v. Schick, (1982) Ind. App., 439 N.E.2d 639, 643, trans.

The representations must have been made to party B, with the intent to induce B's reliance on those statements. Finally, B must have changed his position in reliance upon A's statements. Justice et al. v. Mid-State Homes (1970), 146 Ind. App. 662, 257 N.E.2d 843; Schill v. Choate (1969), 144 Ind. App. 543, 247 N.E.2d 688; ITT Cannon Elec., Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114. The courts may find fraud where there was no actual intent to defraud the third party, but law requires a finding of constructive fraud to prevent an injustice or inequity that would result from the party's misrepresentation. Hoosier Insurance Co. v. Ogle (1971), 150 Ind. App. 590, 276 N.E.2d 876, citing Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co. (1971), 149 Ind. App. 120, 270 N.E.2d 884. The courts have made it clear that representations of fact intended to be actionable also includes conduct.

There is nothing to indicate that plaintiff could not have completed his required performance within a year, regardless of the formation date of the agreement and, of course, plaintiff could have upon the fulfillment of the conditions necessary to bind defendants immediately died, thereby rendering the agreement fully performed. Defendants argue that the agreement alleged in the amended complaint is analogous to a contract of employment which was determined to be within the one year clause of the Statute of Frauds in the case of ITT Cannon Electric, Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114. Therein, following discharge by his employer, the plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for breach of an alleged oral contract of employment providing for a minimum term of eighteen months. The contract was held to be within the statute on the ground that this alleged minimum term rendered it incapable of performance within one year.

In order to establish an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais in Indiana it must be shown that there existed a false representation or concealment of material facts made with [1] actual or constructive knowledge of the true state of facts; such representation must be made to one who is without knowledge or reasonable means of knowledge of the true facts with the intent that he rely upon it; and the second party must rely or act upon such representation to his damage. Justice et al. v. Mid-State Homes (1970), 146 Ind. App. 662, 257 N.E.2d 843; Schill v. Choate (1969), 144 Ind. App. 543, 247 N.E.2d 688; ITT Cannon Elec., Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114; Voorhees-Jontz Lum. Co. v. Bezek (1965), 137 Ind. App. 382, 209 N.E.2d 380; Richardson v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. (1963), 135 Ind. App. 1, 191 N.E.2d 337; 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, §§ 67-77, at 402. It is settled law in this State that the representation of fact necessary to such an estoppel may be accomplished by "the conduct of a party, using the word `conduct' in its broadest [2] meaning as including his spoken words, his positive acts and his silence when there is a duty to speak."

"This court, in Schill v. Choate (1969), 144 Ind. App. 543, 247 N.E.2d 688, 696, has quoted Richardson v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, as still being the law and we believe it is good authority on this point." I.T.T. Cannon Electric, Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 230 N.E.2d 114; Starkey v. Galloway (1949), 119 Ind. App. 287, 84 N.E.2d 731. Defendants-appellants did not show that they had been damaged in any amount by plaintiff-appellee, Dr. Jolly, re-entering the practice of medicine for about four or five weeks with their permission and pending the drawing up of the contract giving Dr. Jolly the right to practice in Madison.

This court determined that the receipt did not completely evidence the contract the parties made and affirmed the judgment of the trial court which was, as heretofore stated, for the defendants after their demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained. The Block case is followed by a later case covering the same problem in this court, namely ITT Cannon Elec., Inc. v. Brady (1967), 141 Ind. App. 506, 511, 230 N.E.2d 114. In the case at bar the complaint did set out the terms of the sale on the real estate as hereinabove set out.