The court of appeals examined our precedent and determined that extrinsic evidence could only be considered for the purposes of demonstrating the validity of the underlying tax sale and not for the purposes of demonstrating the validity of the treasurer's deed. The court cited to Ireland v. Gunnison Mountain Coal Coke Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 P. 280 (1930), Kingore v. Wallace, 85 Colo. 381, 276 P. 332 (1929), and Miller v. Stoner, 107 Colo. 317, 111 P.2d 903 (1941), in support of this conclusion. We find none of these cases controlling.
The two tax certificates Nos. 18370 and 20913 show on their face that each was void, and being void, when attacked are ineffective against the owner's title. Ireland v. Gunnison Mountain Coal Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 Pac. 280. Tax deeds issued on such void certificates would have been void deeds, subject to be restrained and set aside.
The owner's legal title is therefore unaffected by a void sale and deed. See Ireland v. Gunnison Mountain Coal Coke Co., 87 Colo. 193, 198, 286 P. 280, 282 (1930) (Butler, J., concurring). B.
There was no question of recovery of taxes in the case. Ireland v. Coal Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 Pac. 280, is cited by counsel. It is not applicable. The point there was that the deed was based upon a sale held later than provided by statute, and for that reason void.
In Kingore v. Wallace, 85 Colo. 381, 276 Pac. 332, we said: "This sale was therefore held nine days late and, for aught that appears in this record, was void, and the deed under it, containing no explanation of that fact, was void." In Ireland v. Gunnison Mountain Coal Coke Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 Pac. 280, involving deeds with a similar recital, we called attention to the fact that the deeds show a belated sale and "give no reason for failure to comply with the statute, section 7410, C. L.," and we said: "This fact invalidates the sales and makes these deeds void on their face." And in the following cases, involving deeds containing a similar recital, we called attention to the fact that the deeds contained no explanation of the delay, and we held the deeds void on their face: Chase v. Bogardus, 78 Colo. 573, 243 Pac. 546; Denver v. Bullock, 80 Colo. 9, 249 Pac. 498; Wenig v. Lyons, 81 Colo. 6, 252 Pac. 889; Denver v. Murry, 82 Colo. 128, 257 Pac. 359; Hochmuth v. Norton, 90 Colo. 453, 9 P.2d 1060.
Sales for delinquent taxes are invalid unless held at the time required by statute. (26 R.C.L. 397; Hamer v. Glenn Inv. Co., 75 Colo. 423, 226 P. 299; Chase v. Bogardus, 78 Colo. 573, 243 P. 546; Howe v. Bennett, 81 Colo. 20, 253 P. 29; City and County of Denver v. Murry, 82 Colo. 128, 257 P. 359; Cooke v. Pennington, 15 S.C. 185; Ireland v. Gunnison Mountain Coal Coke Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 P. 280.) The sale was void because made for an excessive amount.
MR. JUSTICE BURKE. It is now urged that the question here decided was not raised in the Delta land case, supra; that the last paragraph of that opinion limits the application of said section 1999 to the owner of the land; and that our conclusion deprives the owner of the right, where certificates are sold by the county for less than their face, to redeem for the investment plus interest, as held in Ireland v. Coal Co., 87 Colo. 193, 286 P. 280. On the first point, we still think the express words of the statute "In any case," taken in connection with the first paragraph of the section, require the interpretation here given. On the second point, the language "before the owner can question the validity or regularity of the tax deed," found in the last paragraph of the opinion in the Delta land case, cannot be construed as a limitation, first, because no such question was there before the court, and second, because such limitation is without support in the section.