Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-01477 (CJN)
2021-07-08
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
Ryan S. Baasch, Texas Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, Andrew D. Prins, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Kristina Marie Portner, Ryan O'Connor McMonagle, Catriona M. Coppler, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant Internal Revenue Service. John Moustakas, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant Department of Justice.
Ryan S. Baasch, Texas Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, Andrew D. Prins, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Kristina Marie Portner, Ryan O'Connor McMonagle, Catriona M. Coppler, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant Internal Revenue Service.
John Moustakas, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant Department of Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CARL J. NICHOLS, United States District Judge
This case involves a series of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests about a controversial form of civil asset forfeiture carried out by the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS has processed tens of thousands of pages, but tens of thousands remain, and the Institute for Justice (the requester, "IJ") now challenges the scope of the IRS's redactions under several FOIA exemptions. Before the Court are the Parties’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, which the Court determined would promote the resolution of this litigation. ECF Nos. 49, 50. For the reasons below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part each Party's respective motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2016, IJ lodged a FOIA request to secure information about how the IRS enforces its structuring laws. Structuring laws help the IRS detect money laundering by prohibiting individuals from avoiding financial reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act ("Act"). 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). Under the Act, banks must file with regulators currency transaction reports, which list all transactions over $10,000. Id. § 5313(a). Structuring laws support the Act by prohibiting individuals from "breaking down ... a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into small sums," 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(xx), "for the purpose of evading reporting requirements." 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a).
While structuring laws are designed to "detect[ ] and deter[ ] [underlying] criminal behavior" (like fraud or money laundering), a 2017 investigation by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that the IRS "largely pursued [structuring] cases against legal source funds from business accounts," not against suspected "criminal enterprises." Treasury Inspector Gen. Tax Admin., Criminal Investigation Enforced Structuring Primarily Again Legal Source Funds and Compromised the Rights of Some Individuals and Businesses, Ref. No. 2017-30-025, at 2-3 (Mar. 30, 2017), ECF No. 50-8 ("TIGTA Report"). The practice of seizing money from legal businesses that happen to make large cash deposits led to widespread criticism. See, e.g. , Leonard v. Texas , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848, 197 L.Ed.2d 474 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.) ("[B]ecause the law enforcement entity responsible for seizing the property often keeps it, these entities have strong incentives to pursue forfeiture."). And in the wake of the Inspector General's investigation, the IRS pledged that it would "no longer pursue the seizure and forfeiture of funds associated solely with ‘legal source’ structuring cases unless there are exceptional circumstances." TIGTA Report at 3.
IJ submitted FOIA requests seeking records relating to that pledge, and over the last 26 months the IRS has produced approximately 26,000 pages of records, withholding or redacting certain records under various FOIA Exemptions. See Pl.’s Partial Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 1–3, ECF No. 50 ("Pl.’s Mot."). Although the IRS's production continues, on January 15, 2020, the Court determined that a decision regarding the appropriateness of certain categories of withholdings would promote the resolution of this litigation. See Minute Order dated Jan. 15, 2020. In particular, IJ now challenges the IRS's decision to either fully or significantly redact three categories of records: (1) policy documents describing the agency's approach to legal-source structuring cases; (2) agency-level documents about how the IRS considers petitions for remission or mitigation filed by individuals "seeking the return of money seized under the structuring laws;" and (3) the case files and decision letters the IRS complied for a number of individuals who filed petitions to get their money back. Pl.’s Mot. at 10-11. Following briefing on the Parties’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court directed the agency to submit a representative sample of those disputed records under seal. See Minute Order dated Jan. 26, 2021. After reviewing those records in camera , the Court heard oral argument. See Minute Order dated Feb. 18, 2021.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOIA "generally require[es] federal agencies to make their records available to the public upon request." DiBacco v. U.S. Army , 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). An agency may redact or withhold information covered by one of the exemptions listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). If a plaintiff objects, "the agency has the burden of showing that [the] requested information comes within a FOIA exemption." Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA , 185 F.3d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). To do so, an agency must "describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption," Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 746 F.3d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), and "reveal as much detail as possible" about "the nature of the document, without actually disclosing information that deserves protection." Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army , 79 F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court must then decide "whether [the agency's] non-disclosure was permissible." Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Privacy Exemptions
Most of the Parties’ current dispute turns on FOIA's privacy exemptions. Those exemptions let agencies redact "names and identifying information" from "personnel and medical files" (Exemption 6) and "law enforcement" records (Exemption 7(C)) to prevent "unwarranted invasion[s] of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) & (b)(7)(C). IJ argues that the IRS has impermissibly redacted interview notes that cannot be used to identify any individual. Pl.’s Mot. at 13–19. Those notes memorialized interviews between IRS Task Force Officers and bank employees and became part of the case files the IRS compiled on individuals who attempted to recover their assets. Id. at 14. The IRS largely sidesteps IJ's identification principle, focusing instead on its perceived obligation to redact any non-public information that is personal in nature. See, e.g. , Defs.’ Opp'n & Reply 4, 7–8, ECF No. 53 ("Defs.’ Opp'n"). IJ has the better argument.
IJ concedes, as it must, that the government may redact information that can plausibly lead to the identification of individuals discussed in those interviews, like "names, addresses, social security numbers, birth dates, or bank account numbers." See Pl.’s Mot. at 14 (citing Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. , 746 F.3d at 1094 ).
Identification is the touchstone of FOIA's privacy exemptions. The Supreme Court has held that Exemption 6 "cover[s] detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual." Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 602, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982) (citation omitted). Exemption 7(C) sweeps more broadly, covering traditional examples of personally-identifiable information like "names, addresses, [and] dates of birth," as well as information whose "mosaic effect" may "lead to the identification" of "third parties." BuzzFeed Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. , 2019 WL 3718928, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2019) (comparing cases). But neither exemption authorizes agencies to withhold information that (either on its own or in combination with other disclosed information) cannot reasonably be used to identify a specific individual. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington , 746 F.3d at 1094 (agencies may not redact "all of the material in" a responsive record "solely on the grounds that the record includes some information which identifies a private citizen or provides that person's name and address"). Courts thus regularly require agencies to disclose information that some may deem personal, so long as strategic redactions are used to stop readers from linking those records to any particular person. See Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 380, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976) (summaries of Air Force Academy disciplinary proceedings released "with personal references ... deleted"); U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray , 502 U.S. 164, 169, 178, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991) (interviews between immigration officers and deported non-citizens released after redacting all names); Arieff v. Dep't of Navy , 712 F.2d 1462, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (released records listing prescription medications taken by unnamed members of Congress); New Orleans Workers’ Ctr. For Racial Justice v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't , 373 F. Supp. 3d 16, 63 (D.D.C. 2019) (immigration "case history" descriptions released without "personally identifying information"); BuzzFeed Inc. , 2019 WL 3718928, at *2 (Title IX investigation letters released, which had language "too general to allow for identification of individuals involved"). In each case, the key question is not whether the "investigative details" described in an agency's records touch on personal matters in the abstract, but whether those details "would reveal the identity or otherwise implicate the privacy interests of any third party." Mays v. DEA , 234 F.3d 1324, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 2000). When an agency finds material likely to reveal the identity of a third party, it must redact that "specific information" and release the rest. Id. at 1327 ; see also Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons , 927 F.2d 1239, 1242–43 (D.C. Cir. 1991). And to ensure that it does so, the agency must "provide[ ] a detailed justification and not just conclusory statements to demonstrate that all reasonably segregable information has been released." Sciacca v. FBI , 23 F. Supp. 3d 17, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted).
When an agency justifies its redactions under both Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), "the Court need only address whether the agency has properly withheld ... documents under" the lower bar, "Exemption 7(C)." Braga v. FBI , 910 F. Supp. 2d 258, 267 (D.D.C. 2012).
Here, the IRS has failed to show that it redacted no more than the information necessary to prevent readers from identifying third parties. For example, the IRS justifies its decision to fully redact 389 pages and partially redact another 785 documents with this: "[the following] information can be identified as applying to the petitioner(s) whose property was subject to seizure." See Decl. of William M. Rowe ¶¶ 42–47, ECF No. 49-1 ("Rowe Decl."). But the IRS does not limit its focus to personally identifiable information. See id. Instead, it withholds all information that it considers personal, like "financial records, criminal investigation history, driving history, child support obligations, and other personal factual information about petitioners’ cases and backgrounds." Defs.’ Opp'n at 7. The IRS has made essentially no effort to show that, once all personal identifiers are removed, the remaining information would lead readers to identify a particular person.
Of course, if the generic description of a crime is paired with a person's name or the date and location of an arrest, then the information (in combination) likely would identify a particular person. But the Court struggles to see how after names, dates, and locations are removed, readers could tie any one of the three-hundred-and-thirty million people in this Country to a general description of criminal history. The same is true of driving history, business history, or an anonymous history of divorce and child support obligations. Once all names, dates, times, locations, and traceable numbers are redacted, it is difficult to see how readers could link most of the information the IRS chose to redact to any specific person.
Consider the following hypothetical. Say the agency is about to redact the summary of an interview between IRS investigators and a person suspected of unlawfully structuring bank deposits. The summary might look like this:
Cathy Ames said she served in the Air Force for ten years, and she had been retired since 2004. Since her retirement, she has been working as a certified schoolteacher and teaches ballet lessons on the side. Ames said her divorce started in 2010 and was finalized in 2011. Before her divorce, she was married to Adam Trask for three years and has two sons from that marriage. Ames stated to investigators Sherlock and Holmes that she took $150,000 out of her bank account in 2009 because her marriage had started to sour, and she knew it would end in divorce. Ames stated that after the divorce, she began depositing the money into a new account with the Security Service Federal Credit Union in $9,999.00 increments to avoid filling out paperwork with the Credit Union. Investigators Sherlock and Holmes asked if Ames knew that she wasn't supposed to make small deposits to avoid reporting
large transactions. Ames said she knew it wasn't right. But as she had served her country and earned the money, she thought she could do whatever she wanted with it. The investigators thanked Ames for coming to talk this matter through. And then ended the conversation with Ames and walked her to the door.
In this hypothetical interview, it is easy to see how the various names, dates, and account information might lead readers to identify the people involved. But the appropriate remedy is to redact those exempt pieces of information and release everything else. Mays , 234 F.3d at 1327 ; see also Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv. , 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Indeed, FOIA does not "permit[ ] an agency to exempt from disclosure all of the material in an investigatory record solely on the grounds that the record includes some information which identifies a private citizen." Id. Now consider the same interview with obvious identifiers removed:
[Redacted] said she served in the [Redacted] for ten years, and she had been retired since [Redacted]. Since her retirement, she has been working as a certified schoolteacher and teaches [Redacted] lessons on the side. [Redacted] said her divorce started in [Redacted] and was finalized in [Redacted]. Before her divorce, she was married to [Redacted] for three years and has [Redacted] from that marriage. [Redacted] stated to investigators [Redacted] that she took [Redacted] out of her bank account in [Redacted] because her marriage had started to sour, and she knew it would end in divorce. [Redacted] stated that after the divorce, she began depositing the money into a new account with the [Redacted] Credit Union in $9,999.00 increments to avoid filling out paperwork with the Credit Union. Investigators [Redacted] asked if [Redacted] knew that she wasn't supposed to make small deposits to avoid reporting large transactions. [Redacted] said she knew it wasn't right. But as she had [Redacted] earned the money, she thought she could do whatever she wanted with it. The investigators thanked [Redacted] for coming to talk this matter through. And then ended the conversation with [Redacted] and walked her to the door.
Once names, dates, and obvious identifiers are removed, thousands, if not millions, of people potentially fit the profile of this interviewee. But in the Court's in camera review of the disputed records, it was apparent that the IRS has redacted nearly every word of similar interviews, rather than strategically withholding identifying information and disclosing the rest. And by redacting information "too general to allow for identification of individuals involved," it overstepped its authority under FOIA. See BuzzFeed Inc. , 2019 WL 3718928, at *2.
As the IRS reassesses its productions in light of this decision, the Court expects it to change course and limit its redactions to information likely to trigger the identification of a particular individual. Should the IRS opt to redact more than personally identifiable information, it bears the burden of articulating the logical path a reader might take to link those additional pieces of information to a specific person, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. , 746 F.3d at 1088, so it can show that it has released all "reasonably segregable" portions of records that contain some exempt material, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). If the agency fails to prove that it has released all non-exempt material not "inextricably intertwined with" exempt material, then IJ may seek further relief at a later stage in this litigation. Gatore v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 327 F. Supp. 3d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 2018).
While the agency must adjust its redaction practices, it is not required to (as IJ requests) create anonymous identifiers for the officers or agents listed in its records. FOIA "does not obligate agencies to create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and retained." Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 445 U.S. 136, 152, 100 S.Ct. 960, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). Here, the case files IJ seeks do not contain anonymous identifying numbers for agency investigators. The IRS would have to create them. To support its request, IJ cites Lahr v. National Transpiration Safety Board . See Pl.’s Mot. at 23 n.10 (citing 453 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1183-84 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ). But in Lahr , the agency tried to withhold witness identification numbers that were already in the disputed records. The agency was not asked to create them from scratch. Id. ; see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 162, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) ("[I]nsofar as the order of the court below requires the agency to create explanatory material, it is baseless.").
As the IRS has yet to show that releasing information that cannot be linked to any particular person implicates a privacy interest under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) or (b)(7)(C), the Court does not have occasion to balance the public's interest in learning more about how the IRS processes petitions to recover seized assets against any protected privacy interest. See Wilson v. DOJ , 42 F. Supp. 3d 207, 217 (D.D.C. 2014).
B. The Deliberative Process Privilege
IJ also challenges the IRS's decision to withhold forty pages in full and eleven pages in part under the deliberative process privilege. Pl.’s Mot. at 21-23 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) ). The privilege exempts documents that are "predecisional" and "deliberative." Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). A document is predecisional when it contributes to "an agency decision or policy," Senate of the Commonwealth of P.R. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 823 F.2d 574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and it is deliberative when it "reflect[s] an agency's preliminary positions or ruminations about how to exercise discretion on some policy matter" or "policy-implicating judgment," Petrol. Info. Corp. v. U.S Dep't of the Interior , 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Assessing the "predecisional" and "deliberative" dimensions of an agency record helps courts answer the "key question" behind the deliberative process exemption: "whether disclosure would tend to diminish candor within an agency." Id. (citing Access Reports v. Dep't of Justice , 926 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ).
The Court does not doubt that compelling the release of the documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege would diminish candor within the IRS. Consider each of the three types of records disputed here: First, emails exchanged between an IRS special agent and other IRS officials discussing talking points about "legislative proposals to codify certain policy changes made by the Service in structuring cases." See Rowe Decl. ¶ 33(b). Second, a draft version of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration ("TIGTA") Report entitled "Fiscal Year 2016 Review of Compliance with Legal Guidelines When Conducting Seizures of Taxpayers’ Property." Id. And, third, a draft letter to a congressman about how the IRS reviews petitions for remission or mitigation of seized assets and an email accompanying that letter. Id.
Turning first to the emails about talking points. To demonstrate that the emails are predecisional, the IRS must "identify a decisionmaking process to which the document contributed." Judicial Watch v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 297 F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 (D.D.C. 2004). IJ argues that the IRS is using the deliberative process privilege to shield Congress's legislative process. Pl.’s Reply Support Partial Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 14 n.6, ECF No. 55 ("Pl.’s Reply"). The Court is not convinced.
Each email contains an agency employee's thoughts about what should and should not appear in a final set of talking points about several legislative proposals. Rowe Decl. ¶ 33(b); see also Tr. of Hr'g (forthcoming). An employee's thoughts about what the agency's position should be are not themselves a final statement of the agency's position. Gold Anti-Tr. Action Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. , 762 F. Supp. 2d 123, 135 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that the agency need only describe "what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents at issue in the course of that process"). In doctrinal terms, the emails are predecisional because they were part of the agency's process to develop its "opinions with respect to legislative proposals" and deliberative because the emails reflect the agency's ruminations about what policy stance it should adopt toward those proposals. Rowe Decl. ¶ 33(b). The IRS was thus entitled to withhold those emails.
The draft TIGTA Report was similarly "predecisional," as the draft was part of the deliberative process that led to the final report. Rowe Decl. ¶ 33(a)(3); see also Abtew v. DHS , 808 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("A document is ‘predecisional’ if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the ‘decision’ to which it relates." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). IJ nevertheless contends that the IRS has failed to demonstrate that the draft report is deliberative because it does not reveal any "exercise of agency policy-oriented judgement." See Pl.’s Reply 16, ECF No. 55 (quoting Petrol. Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1435 ). Not so.
The draft report revealed "opinions" and "recommendations" about what facts the final report should contain. Rowe Decl. ¶ 33(a)(3). And the act of "culling out relevant" facts involves a deliberative "judgmental process which could be compromised by disclosure." Petrol. Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1434–35 & n.6 (discussing Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train , 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 861 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding documents exempt because disclosure would reveal agency's evaluation of its preferred facts). The IRS has thus appropriately justified its decision to withhold the draft TIGTA Report.
As for the draft letter to a congressman and an email about that letter, IJ concedes that the records are predecisional, as they led to a final letter. Pl.s’ Mot. at 23-24. But it contends that neither record is likely deliberative because the final letter (which IJ has already received) contains only "factual material." Id. at 23. The IRS responds by stressing that those records reflect the agency's internal "advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations" about how to respond to a congressional inquiry. Defs.’ Opp'n at 20 (quoting Petrol. Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1433 ).
The agency's internal deliberations about whether and how to respond to a congressman involve discretionary, policy-oriented judgment calls about which facts are responsive and most appropriate to disclose to another branch of government. See Petrol. Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1434–35 & n.6. Moreover, the IRS has represented that its employees will be less likely to respond candidly and creatively when invited to comment on agency responses to congressional inquiries if their internal advisory opinions and drafts are subject to disclosure. See Tr. of Hr'g (forthcoming). Enabling and encouraging candor among agency actors is, of course, the primary objective of the deliberative process privilege. Access Reports , 926 F.2d at 1195. The IRS has appropriately withheld the draft congressional letter and accompanying email.
C. The Bank Secrecy Act
The Parties’ dispute over records withheld under the Bank Secrecy Act is largely semantic. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), the IRS is empowered to withhold records that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." And the Act specifically exempts currency transaction "reports and records of reports" from disclosure. 31 U.S.C. § 5319. That exemption shields the information in currency transaction reports, even if the information is quoted in other agency documents. Ortiz v. DOJ , 67 F. Supp. 3d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2014).
IJ quibbles with the IRS's decision to withhold "references" to currency transaction reports in its internal memoranda. Pl.’s Mot. at 24-25. To be sure, "references" might include something other than information taken directly from a currency transaction report. Cf. Davis v. FBI , 2019 WL 2870729, at *6 (D.D.C. July 3, 2019) ("[D]ocuments that involve [currency transaction] reports or records of reports ... are not, strictly speaking, the same thing as actual reports or records of reports."). But the IRS has represented that it used the word "references" to refer to information taken directly from currency transaction reports, see Tr. of Hr'g (forthcoming), and the agency is entitled to the presumption that it made that representation in good faith, Middle East Forum v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 297 F. Supp. 3d 183, 186 (D.D.C. 2018). The Court thus concludes that the IRS has withheld information directly extracted or taken from currency transaction reports, and therefore its withholdings are permissible under FOIA Exemption 3 and the Bank Secrecy Act. See Ortiz , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 118.
D. Exemption 7(E)
IJ argues that the IRS is redacting too much information under FOIA Exemption 7(E) as well. Exemption 7(E) shields records that "would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The documents need not be made during an ongoing criminal investigation, but they must describe administrative or operational guidelines which, if disclosed, would help criminals circumvent the law. See Peter S. Herrick's Customs & Int'l Trade Newsletter v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. , 2006 WL 1826185, at *7 (D.D.C. June 30, 2006).
Here, the IRS redacted portions of a document that describes "guidelines and steps for processing [petitions for remission or mitigation] as well as guidance in corroborating the information submitted by the petitioner." Defs.’ Reply 19, ECF No. 54 (discussing IFJ 0018-000500). The IRS says that disclosing those guidelines would enable "individuals seeking to circumvent structuring laws to operate in a manner that would avoid detection of their criminal activity." Rowe Decl. ¶ 48(a). The guidelines "describ[e] specific investigative techniques to be employed by Special Agents in structuring cases" and would "reveal the scope of investigative activity" so that disclosure would, at a minimum, help criminals avoid seizure by (as IJ acknowledges) concealing their identities. Id. ; see also Pl.’s Reply 22. By identifying the specific laws (structuring laws) "that would be easier to violate if the information were released," as well as the way in which those laws would be easier to exploit, the IRS has adequately justified its withholdings under Exemption 7(E). Bloche v. Dep't of Defense , 370 F. Supp. 3d 40, 58 (D.D.C. 2019).
E. Production Rate
Finally, the Parties dispute the appropriate monthly production rate. Over two years ago, Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted that it would be inappropriate for productions to extend over multiple years. See Minute Order dated May 29, 2019. Nevertheless, productions drag on. At the present rate, the IRS will not finish producing records for several years. See Joint Status Report (April 30, 2020), ECF No. 52.
The IRS has been processing 1,000 pages per month for over a year-and-a-half. See Decl. of Elizabeth Hill ¶¶ 23, 43–47, ECF No. 36-1. During the intervening time, the IRS's FOIA caseload has dropped from 60 to 49 cases and the agency has added six additional attorneys to review that smaller caseload. Supp. Decl. of Jamie Song Decl. ¶ 13. The IRS has confirmed that all the remaining records are case files and decision letters related to individual petitions for remission or mitigation. See Tr. of Hr'g (forthcoming). And this Opinion affords the agency direct guidance about how to process those remaining petitions. The Court is thus not persuaded that the IRS has submitted sufficiently "clear, specific, and reasonably detailed" justifications for continuing to process no more than 1,000 pages per month. See Voinche v. FBI , 412 F. Supp. 2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2006).
As this Opinion provides specific guidance about the appropriate application of FOIA Exemptions 3, 5, 6(b), 7(C), and 7(E), the Court will not at this time order the IRS to refrain from using any particular exemption to withhold information in future productions. The Court trusts that the agency will exercise good faith and comply with the Court's directives. But IJ is welcome to press for further in camera review if the agency deviates from the Court's guidance. See Pl.’s Reply at 23-24.
Courts regularly direct agencies to process records at far higher rates than what the IRS has been held to here. See, e.g. , NRDC v. Dep't of Energy , 191 F. Supp. 2d 41, 43 n.5 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering the majority of 7,500 pages to be processed within thirty-two days); Clemente v. FBI , 71 F. Supp. 3d 262, 269 (D.D.C. 2014) (5,000 pages per month). And as the IRS's resources to process FOIA requests have substantially improved since the Court first granted its request to limit productions to 1,000 pages per month, the Court believes it is appropriate to require the IRS to now process 3,000 pages per month. After three months of processing records at that higher pace, the IRS may submit a status report detailing the consequences of complying with its new production rate. At that point, the Court will reevaluate the agency's production schedule and decide whether any adjustment is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 49, 50, are granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.