Opinion
PD-0251-22
05-17-2023
CALLIE RENEE INMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
Do Not Publish
ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS GALVESTON COUNTY
Newell, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Hervey, Richardson, and McClure, JJ., joined. Keel, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., Yeary, and Slaughter, JJ., joined.
Originally appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See Tex. Gov't Code § 73.001.
Inman v. State, No. 13-20-00349-CR, 2022 WL 709832 at *1 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi - Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Callie Renee Inman, was indicted for intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter. She pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, and the State dismissed the intoxication manslaughter count. The trial judge placed her on deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years. The State subsequently filed several motions to adjudicate. After Appellant was arrested, a hearing was held. The trial court revoked her community supervision and adjudicated her guilty plea based on multiple violations of the conditions of her supervision.
On direct appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the admission of certain evidence at her adjudication hearing violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals disagreed in an unpublished opinion. It cited law from the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals (the original court for this filing), holding the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not apply during post-conviction proceedings. Inman v. State, No. 13-20-00349-CR, 2022 WL 709832, at *1 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022) (mem. op, not designated for publication) (quoting Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)). Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, and we granted review of the Confrontation Clause issue. However, after considering the parties' briefs and the record, we conclude that our decision to grant review was improvident. We therefore dismiss Appellant's petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted.
Newell, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Hervey, Richardson and McClure, JJ., joined.
I agree with the Court's opinion dismissing Appellant's petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted. I write separately to make two observations.
First, the trial court's order adjudicating Appellant's guilt for violating the conditions of community supervision can be upheld based upon ground for violation that does not implicate the Confrontation Clause and is not contested on discretionary review. As a condition of Appellant's deferred adjudication community supervision, Appellant could not travel outside of Texas without permission.1 Appellant testified that she had done so but claimed that her community supervision officer told her stepfather that she had permission to travel to Louisiana. Appellant's community supervision officer testified unequivocally that Appellant did not have permission to travel to Louisiana. The court of appeals held that the trial court could have credited the community supervisor's testimony and revoked Appellant's community supervision for this reason alone. Appellant does not challenge the court of appeals holding in this regard.
Id. at *3 (citing Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("We need not address appellant's other contentions since one sufficient ground for revocation will support the court's order to revoke probation.").
Second, Appellant only asserts a right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment in this case. However, there is also a right to confront witnesses as a matter of due process. At the hearing, Appellant only claimed her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses had been violated. She did not further object that her due process right to confront witnesses had been violated.
Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (noting that the Supreme Court has held that the "minimum requirements of due process" in probation revocation hearings includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses . . . have long been recognized as essential to due process.").
With these observations, I join the Court's opinion dismissing Appellant's petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted.
DISSENTING OPINION
Keel, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., Yeary, and Slaughter, JJ., joined.
We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate. The majority dismisses it as improvidently granted, but that's a mistake.
Our decision to grant was judicious because the lower court decided the confrontation issue on its merits, and there is a split among the courts of appeals on that point. Inman v. State, No. 13-20-00349-CR, 2022 WL 709832, at *2-3 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg March 10, 2022) (mem op., not designated for publication) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in adjudication hearings); compare Mauro v. State, 235 S.W.3d 374, 375-76 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. ref'd) (same), Diaz v. State, 172 S.W.3d 668, 673 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2005, no pet.) (same), and Smart v. State, 153 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. ref'd) (same), with Perez v. State, No. 13-14-00300-CR, 2015 WL 4234236, at *1 n. 2 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi-Edinburg July 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies in revocation hearings), and Hughes v. State, 651 S.W.3d 461, 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2022, pet. granted) (same).
Our purpose in granting review was to resolve the split among the courts of appeals. Rather than abandon that purpose, we should address the merits of the issue and resolve the split among the courts of appeals. Since the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.