Opinion
H043682
09-21-2017
RONALD JERRELL INMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STEVEN J. BECHTOLD, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. M131283)
Plaintiff Ronald Jerrell Inman appeals from an order striking his complaint against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Steven J. Bechtold, under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Representing himself throughout these proceedings, plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in striking his complaint because the conduct it alleged did not constitute free speech and was not privileged under Civil Code section 47. We agree with defendants, however, that their disclosure of plaintiff's mental health records in his underlying habeas corpus proceeding met the criteria for protection under section 425.16. Accordingly, we must affirm the order.
Further statutory references to section 425.16 are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Background
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, serving a 61-years-to-life sentence that began in September 2002. On July 1, 2013, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming a "Deliberate Indifference to A Serious Medical Need And An Eighth Amendment Violation," based on the CDCR's refusal to accommodate his allergy to onions by preparing onion-free meals for him. Plaintiff alleged that his allergy was documented in his prison medical file and was comparable to the restrictions of vegetarians and those with religious needs as well as prisoners allergic to peanuts or fish. Plaintiff said he had to rely on quarterly packages from his family "to supplement the nourishment and caloric intake he is being deprived of" by the CDCR. The CDCR had rejected his request for a special diet and denied his health care appeal at all levels of administrative review.
The superior court directed the CDCR to answer a number of questions, including whether any medical information was available that verified plaintiff's claimed allergy. Bechtold, representing the Receiver's Office of Legal Affairs, and the attorney general on behalf of the CDCR responded, stating that no objective indication existed that plaintiff had symptoms of an onion allergy or that he had sought medical care for such an allergy. All inmates had been directed to avoid problem foods, they noted; only those with extreme food allergies were placed on a medical diet. The CDCR also pointed out that its menu provided for an extra 300 to 400 calories to allow inmates to avoid certain foods without compromising nutrition. In a supplemental response, Bechtold noted that the packages from plaintiff's family included snack foods containing onion powder. Plaintiff was thus "mistaken and/or confused" about his medical condition and dietary needs.
In his reply, plaintiff explained that it was only fresh and freshly cooked onions that triggered his gastrointestinal symptoms, due to acid released in the cutting or cooking process.
In support of his response, Bechtold provided the court with copies of entries from plaintiff's medical file and four pages of progress notes, dated November 22, 2013 from staff psychologist Barry Balch, Ph.D. Dr. Balch reported his diagnosis of delusional disorder, of both persecutory and somatic type, along with pedophilia. His recommendations included "combined medical and mental treatment for [plaintiff's] somatic delusions." Based on this record, Bechtold urged the court to consider the diagnosis of delusional disorder, somatic type, as evidence that plaintiff believed he had a physical condition for which there was no physiological basis.
On April 8, 2014, the superior court found that plaintiff had not stated a prima facie case for relief and denied his petition. In June 2014 he submitted a government claim protesting the release of his confidential psychological records to five "parties," including the superior court, the attorney general, and three individuals who were listed with question marks beside their names. The claim was rejected, and on March 10, 2015, plaintiff filed his complaint.
In the complaint, plaintiff alleged an "Intentional Tort," in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5328, 5328.7, and 5330, along with federal statutes identifying the right of mental health patients to confidentiality of their records. (42 U.S.C. §§ 9501, 10806.) He sought $50,000 in actual damages ($10,000 "per instance"), plus $250,000 in punitive damages based on defendants' "malice, fraud, and oppression."
Plaintiff cited 42 U.S.C. sections 9501 and 10806, which together recognize the rights of mental health patients to appropriate treatment, informed consent, and confidentiality of their records.
On April 15, 2016, defendants moved to strike the complaint under section 425.16. Defendants asserted that the activity of which plaintiff complained—the disclosure of his health records—was protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), because it was a statement made in the prior habeas corpus proceeding. Defendants further asserted that plaintiff would not be able to show a probability of prevailing on his claim, because (1) Bechtold's submission of plaintiff's records to the court was protected by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47; (2) plaintiff put the truth of his dietary restriction at issue in his habeas petition; (3) the Welfare and Institutions Code statutes relied on by plaintiff were inapposite; and (4) both CDCR and Bechtold were immune from suit.
In his opposition, plaintiff insisted that the cited Welfare and Institutions Code sections were applicable to him because he was receiving mental health services in prison. He also cited title 15, section 3361, subdivision (c), of the California Code of Regulations, which addresses the privacy of prisoners undergoing mental health treatment. The superior court, however, agreed with defendants on all the points raised in their motion and struck plaintiff's complaint. Judgment in defendant's favor was entered on May 20, 2016, followed by plaintiff's timely appeal.
Discussion
1. The Statutory Framework of the Anti-SLAPP Law
"A SLAPP suit— a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party's exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights." (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056 (Rusheen).) Under subdivision (b)(1) of the statute, "A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Subdivision (e) defines "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech" to include "(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law" and "(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law."
Settled principles govern the determination of an anti-SLAPP motion and appellate review of the ensuing ruling. A moving defendant has the initial burden to show that the lawsuit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) "A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, 'the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.' " (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063 (Park), citing City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc . (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66; Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1114.) A defendant can meet its initial burden by showing that the underlying conduct fits one of the categories described in section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Navellier, supra, at p. 88.)
If the defendant makes this threshold showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 88.) The plaintiff then " ' "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." ' " "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute." (Id. at p. 89; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278-279.) "We review an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 de novo." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 811, 820; Park, supra, 2 Cal. 5th at p. 1067.) 2. Defendants' Showing
Defendants met their burden under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), by showing that Bechtold's submission of the psychologist's notes fell into the category defined by subdivision (e)(1) of the statute. " 'Any act' includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action. [Citation.] This includes qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation." (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056.) It was unquestionably the act of filing those four pages of notes as an exhibit to support defendants' position in the habeas proceeding that "underlies or forms the basis for the claim" at issue in this action. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) Defendants thus demonstrated that plaintiff's claim arose from their act in furtherance of speech and petition rights, within the meaning of section 425.16. The burden therefore shifted to plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on his tort claim. 3. Plaintiff's Showing
The first ground on which the court found plaintiff unable to prevail was the litigation privilege. Civil Code section 47 makes a publication privileged if it is made in specifically defined circumstances, including "any . . . judicial proceeding." (§ 47, subd. (b)(2).) " 'Although originally enacted with reference to defamation [citation], the privilege is now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.] Further, it applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved. [Citations.] [¶] The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.' " (Rushing, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057, quoting Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).)
Further references to section 47 are to the Civil Code. --------
"The principal purpose of section 47[, subdivision (b)] is to afford litigants and witnesses . . . the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.) The statute "further promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients' interests." (Id. at p. 214.) "Finally, in immunizing participants from liability for torts arising from communications made during judicial proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of exposing during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby enhancing the finality of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result." (Ibid.)
"To accomplish these objectives, the privilege is 'an "absolute" privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.' [Citation.] " (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322; Action Apartment Assn. Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 (Action Apartment).) Furthermore, the litigation privilege is given "a broad interpretation." (Action Apartment, supra, at p. 1241.) "Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. [Citation.]" (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.)
The conduct of which plaintiff complains satisfies the four-part test delineated in Silberg. First, the communication was made in a judicial proceeding. Second, the communication was made by Bechtold, a "participant authorized by law," in the course of his advocacy on behalf of the Receiver and in support of the CDCR. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) Finally, the third and fourth elements were satisfied, in that the challenged communication was made "to achieve the objects of the litigation" and had direct "connection or logical relation to the action." (Ibid.)
Defendants' conduct was therefore immunized from plaintiff's lawsuit under the litigation privilege of section 47, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the superior court did not err by granting defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's complaint on that ground. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the remaining theories on which defendants contested plaintiff's ability to prevail on his claim.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.