Opinion
2:21-cv-359
06-25-2021
KAI D. INGRAM, Plaintiff v. SCI SMITHFIELD, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
Plaintiff, Kai D. Ingram, is a state prisoner who is currently housed at SCI Greene. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 18).
II. Report
1. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in the civil action, which he initiated in March 2021 when he submitted to the Clerk of Court a complaint for filing. Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee or file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, the Court entered an order (ECF No. 3) that advised Plaintiff that the case could not proceed until he did one of those two things.
On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff paid the filing fee and the Clerk of Court filed his complaint on the Court's docket at ECF No. 6. In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against numerous defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to his recent arrest and current detention as a parole violator. He alleges that one or more of the defendants violated his procedural due process rights, and he also brings false arrest and false imprisonment claims arising under the Fourth Amendment. As relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages and “injunctive relief in the form of his immediate release to an approved parole plan.” (ECF No. 6, ¶¶ 26, 32.)
In May 2021, the Court received several letters from Plaintiff (ECF Nos. 7, 8 and 9) in which he stated that he wanted to file federal criminal charges against the “SCI Greene mail room” and numerous individuals for allegedly tampering with his prison mail. Then, in a letter dated May 18, 2021 (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff advised the Court that he wanted to file an amended complaint to add additional claims against new defendants.
On May 24, 2021, the Court issued an order (ECF No. 11) in response to Plaintiff's letters. The Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by June 23, 2021. The Court also explained to Plaintiff that no action would be taken on his request to file federal criminal charges because a civil rights action is not a proper vehicle in which to attempt to bring criminal charges. Sanders v. Downs, 420 Fed.Appx. 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (private citizen lacks standing to initiate criminal proceedings). The Court further advised Plaintiff that the Court would not order service of any complaint by the U.S. Marshal until all required forms are completed by Plaintiff and returned to the Court. (See ECF Nos. 11, 12.)
On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion (ECF No. 14) in which he stated that in April 2021 he instructed his sister to commence a separate civil action and file a complaint on his behalf that he had provided to her. According to Plaintiff, in that complaint he named as defendants officials at SCI Greene and raised § 1983 claims challenging the conditions of his confinement at that correctional institution. Plaintiff stated that it was that complaint (which was never filed with the Court) that he wanted to amend, not the complaint he filed in this case at ECF No. 6. Plaintiff further indicated that he understood that the Court did not receive for filing the complaint Plaintiff contended he had asked his sister to file in April 2021, and he explained to the Court that he intended to commence a separate civil action by filing a complaint against officials at SCI Greene challenging the conditions of his confinement at SCI Greene.
On June 9, 2021, the Court issued a Memorandum Order (ECF No. 17) in which it explained to Plaintiff that since he had clarified that the operative complaint in this civil action is the one docketed at ECF No. 6 he must provide the Court with the required service documents for defendants named in it. The Court further explained that if Plaintiff wants to pursue civil rights claims against SCI Greene officials challenging the conditions of his confinement, including for allegedly tampering with his mail and/or retaliating against him, he must pursue such claims in a separate civil action after he exhausts his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff recently provided the Court with the service forms for the defendants he names in the Complaint at ECF 6 and the Court has directed the U.S. Marshal to serve it. (ECF No. 22.) Service has not yet been made.
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. (ECF No. 18). It consists of one paragraph in which Plaintiff states that the Court should have construed his request for injunctive relief in his Complaint as a request for preliminary injunctive relief. He asserts that the Court should direct that he be immediately transferred to a halfway house. (Id.)
2. Allegations in the Complaint
In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that on February 3, 2021, he surrendered to the parole offices located in Scranton, Pennsylvania “as a result of not reporting.” (ECF No. 6, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was detained at that office for several hours and then was transferred to SCI Smithfield, where he remained for approximately thirty days until he was transferred to SCI Greene. (Id., ¶¶ 2-6.) Plaintiff claims that he did not receive notice of a parole violation until February 10, 2021, which was the date that Defendant Casner, a parole agent, visited him at SCI Smithfield. (Id., ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff's preliminary parole violation hearing was held twelve days later, on February 22, 2021. Plaintiff elected to waive his right to counsel. (Id., ¶ 7.) At the hearing, Plaintiff alleges, he expressed his concerns that his detention was unconstitutional. Plaintiff's detention continued after his preliminary parole violation hearing. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 14-18.) He was transferred to SCI Greene on March 4, 2021. (Id., ¶¶ 21-25.) Plaintiff alleges that he is being detained in violation of his procedural due process rights because he did not receive notice of an alleged parole violation until February 10, 2021-seven days after he was taken into custody. (Id., ¶¶ 3-12.) As explained above, in addition to seeking monetary relief Plaintiff also seeks “injunctive relief in the form of his immediate release to an approved parole plan.” (Id., ¶¶ 26, 32.) In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 18), he seeks an order from this Court directing that he be immediately released on parole to a halfway house.
Parolee and probationers are entitled to certain minimal due process protections because of the possible deprivation of liberty inherent in parole and probation revocation proceedings. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782-91 (1973). When a parolee or probationer is detained pending a revocation hearing, due process requires a determination at a preliminary hearing that probable cause exists to believe that a violation has been committed. Id. at 485. Due process requires that this hearing occur “as promptly as convenient after [an] arrest[.]” Id.; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786. Where a finding of probable cause is made, a second, more comprehensive hearing is required before a final revocation decision is made. Id. at 487-88; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786.
II. Discussion
It is well established that temporary or preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy” and “should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). In evaluating a movant's request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, courts employ the familiar four-factor balancing test. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176-79 (3d Cir. 2017). That test requires that the movant demonstrate a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and that it is more likely than not that he will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of immediate injunctive relief. Id. The remaining two factors are the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and the public interest. Id. If the movant meets his burden with respect to the first two factors, which are the “most critical[, ]” “a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief. Id. at 179.
“Although the plaintiff need not prove their case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Williams v. Lee, No. 1:19-cv-41, 2019 WL 2285776, *2 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This burden is ‘particularly heavy' where[, ]” as is the case here, “the requested injunction ‘is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but...at providing mandatory relief.'” Id. (quoting Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980)).
The Court should deny Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief because he has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of eventual success in this litigation. The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Instead, the prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief). Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). These Supreme Court decisions stand for the proposition that prisoners may “use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement-either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. As explained by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson:
a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.Id. at 81-82.
Under Wilkinson, parole challenges may be brought in a civil rights action where the plaintiff seeks “to render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility...or parole suitability” and does not seek an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community. Id. at 82. Such a suit under § 1983 would not necessarily invalidate the fact or duration of confinement, and at best, would afford a new eligibility review and speed consideration of a new parole application. Id.; see also Butler, 613 Fed.Appx. at 123-24.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that, as a result of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, he is entitled to injunctive relief in the form of an order directing that he be immediately released to parole (to a halfway house or other location) is not cognizable in this § 1983 action. Id.; see, e.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 613 Fed.Appx. 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2015) (district court properly concluded that to the extent the plaintiff sought an injunction invalidating or altering the sentence imposed by the Parole Board “he could not do so via a § 1983 civil suit.”); Alford v. Wisenhower, 17-6259, 2018 WL 650926, *3-4 (D. N.J. Jan. 1, 2018) (the plaintiff's claim that the warden illegally confined him when the warden knew the state parole board violated his right to due process was barred by the Supreme Court's decisions in Heck and Wilkinson). Because Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is not cognizable, there is no basis for the Court to grant him preliminary injunctive relief.
III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 18).
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).