Opinion
2:22-cv-42
02-03-2023
KAI D. INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. B. RUDZIENSKI, et al., Defendants.
Marilyn J. Horan Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Patricia L. Dodge United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 16) and dismiss all claims brought in the Complaint (ECF 7) except for one of the retaliation claims asserted against Defendant Lynch.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff, Kai D. Ingram (“Ingram”), is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who is currently housed at SCI Greene. Ingram is proceeding pro se in this lawsuit in which he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous individuals based on alleged events that occurred from April 2021 through August 2021 when the DOC housed him at Progress Community Corrections Center (“Progress CCC”) and then at SCI Greene. As explained below, all but one of Ingram's claims are premised on his assertion that as a result of an alleged “false misconduct” and unfair disciplinary hearing, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) rescinded his automatic reparole date. Ingram contends that his current confinement at SCI Greene is unlawful because under state law he should have been released on re-parole no later than August 3, 2021.
This is the second lawsuit Ingram has filed in recent years in which he challenges the legality of his imprisonment. In the first lawsuit, Ingram v. SCI Smithfield, et al., No. 2:21-cv-359 (“Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359”), Ingram brought § 1983 claims against SCI Smithfield (where he was previously housed), the Board and numerous individual defendants. He claimed that his February 3, 2021 arrest by a parole agent and subsequent detention in DOC facilities as a technical parole violator were illegal because there was a seven-day delay in receiving his notice of a parole violation. Ingram claimed that one or more of the defendants named in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also unlawfully arrested and imprisoned him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. As relief, Ingram sought money damages and an injunction in the form of an order directing that he be immediately released from his alleged illegal detention to an approved parole plan.
The undersigned recommended that the Court grant the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. On March 7, 2022, the Court adopted the report and recommendation as the opinion of the Court and dismissed Ingram's claims with prejudice. The Court held, among other things, that Ingram's allegations did not state a Fourth Amendment false arrest or false imprisonment claim or a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against any defendant and that amendment would be futile. (ECF 37, 39 in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court's judgment in Ingram v. SCI Smithfield et al., No. 22-1541, 2023 WL 110588 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2023). The Court of Appeals also explained that because it affirmed this Court's determination that Ingram could not state a claim under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, it was unnecessary to address any of the alternative rulings made by this Court in disposing of Civil Action No. 2: 2:21-cv-359, including that Ingram failed to allege the personal involvement of many of the individual defendants named in that action. Id. at *2 n. 3.
In the meantime, on March 25, 2021 the Board had notified Ingram that it was recommitting him “as a technical parole violator to a community correction center/community correction facility/PVC [a parole violator center] to serve up to 6 months, pursuant to Act 122 of 2012.” The Board further advised Ingram: “You are reparoled automatically without further action of the Board, upon successful completion of all recommended programs, provided you are in good standing with the Board. Reparole Date not to exceed 08/03/2021.” (ECF 33-1 in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359; ECF 7-1 at p. 3.)
The Board's March 2021 Notice was submitted by the defendants in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss. Because that Notice was issued by an adjudicating body, the Court may take judicial notice of it. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2); Davis v. Cotov, 214 F.Supp.2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (district court took judicial of an administrative appeal decision notice issued by state parole board.)
As explained below, Ingrams asserts in the Complaint (ECF 7) he filed in the instant lawsuit that on April 16, 2021, officers at Progress CCC, in retaliation for the lawsuit he filed at Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-359, falsely charged him with committing disciplinary infractions. The Board then rescinded Ingram's automatic reparole date as a result of those alleged false charges and the unfair disciplinary hearing that followed, at which Ingram claims the hearing examiner refused to consider evidence that would have proved that the officers involved in the misconduct were lying. Ingram asserts in this lawsuit that his current confinement at SCI Greene is unlawful because the unconstitutional actions of the officers and hearing examiner led the Board to rescind his automatic reparole date of August 3, 2021.
The Complaint names these defendants: Allen Lynch, Matthew Mackey, Ed Morris and David LeMasters (the officers at Progress CCC who were involved in the issuance of the false misconduct); B. Rudzienski (the hearing examiner who determined Ingram was guilty of having committed two of the misconducts as charged); Deborah L. Carpenter (the Board employee who issued the notice to Ingram that rescinded his automatic reparole date); SCI Greene Superintendent Michael J. Zaken, J. Sibauda, M. Guyton, J. Soikerum, Zachary J. Moslak, D. Varner and M. Darr (officials who denied the administrative appeals and grievances Ingram filed challenging the disciplinary proceeding and the Board's decision to rescind his automatic reparole date); and S. Davis and Milliken (officers at SCI Greene whom Ingram does not mention in the body of the Complaint).
In the Complaint, Ingram identifies Sibauda, Guyton and Soikerum as members of the Program Review Committee (“PRC”). They are referred to collectively as the “PRC Defendants.”
Ingram sues all defendants in both their official and individual capacities. The official-capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies and state officials acting within their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Betts v. New Castle Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010). In this case, all of the defendants work for either the DOC or the Board. The DOC and the Board are agencies or arms of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, they and their employees who are sued in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity unless an exception to such immunity applies. See, e.g., Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). Ingram cannot proceed with his damages claims asserted against any individual defendant in his or her official capacity because the Commonwealth has not waived its immunity, see, e.g., id. (citing Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11 and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b)), and Congress did not abrogate states' sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-46 (1979).
Ingram claims that one or more of the defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that, as a result of their alleged violations of his rights, he is being illegally detained. (ECF 7 at p. 3.) He contends that his current confinement at SCI Greene is unlawful and as relief he seeks $1 million from each defendant and $1 million for each day he has been allegedly illegally detained. (Id. at p. 13.)
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF 16.) The motion is fully briefed. (ECF 17, 20.)
B. Facts Pleaded in the Complaint
On April 8, 2021, Ingram was transferred to Progress CCC to serve his six-month term as a technical parole violator in accordance with the Board's March 25, 2021 Notice. At that time, Ingram was challenging the legality of his February 3, 2021 arrest and subsequent detention in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. (ECF 7-1 at p. 1.) Ingram alleges that Lynch, a corrections officer (“CO”) at Progress CCC, “stole” his legal materials and grievances related to that civil action. (ECF 7-1 at p. 1.)
According to Ingram, on April 16, 2021 Lynch issued a retaliatory “false misconduct” charging him with “threatening, refusal to obey a direct order and abusive language.” (Id.; ECF 20 at pp. 2-3, 12-13.) Ingram contends that LeMasters and Mackey (two other COs at Progress CCC) and Morris (whom Ingram identifies as the “CCCM” at Progress CCC) signed the misconduct as witnesses even though they “knew with certainty that the facts contained in the misconduct were fraudulent.” (Id.; ECF 20 at p. 13.) Ingram asserts that this April 16, 2021 “misconduct was issued in retaliation because he never committed any of the acts presented in the misconduct.” (Id.)
In the Complaint, Ingram alleged that Morris issued the misconduct and that Lynch signed it as a witness. (ECF 7-1 at 1.) Ingram clarifies in his response in opposition to Defendants' motion that Lynch issued the misconduct and that Morris was one of the individuals who signed it at as witness. (ECF 20 at pp. 2-3, 13.) This discrepancy is not relevant to the disposition of Defendants' motion since both Lynch and Morris were involved in some manner in the events surrounding the alleged false misconduct.
Later that same day, Ingram was transferred to SCI Greene. Ingram claims that during this transfer he informed Lynch that he needed the box that contained his legal materials and grievances. According to Ingram, Lynch knew about Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 because Ingram had told him about it. Ingram alleges that Lynch instructed the transport officers not to transfer Ingram's box of documents. As of the date listed on the Complaint, Ingram still had not had access to this box. (ECF 7-1 at p. 6.)
Ingram's misconduct hearing was held before Rudzienski on April 23, 2021. Ingram requested that Rudzienski review a video recording of the incident which he claimed showed he was innocent and that the officers who had lodged the alleged false charges against him lied about his culpability. Rudzienski did not review the video. Ingram claims Rudzienski violated his right to due process because she refused to view the video, was biased against him and complicit in the retaliatory actions of the officers involved. (ECF 7-1 at p. 2.)
Rudzienski found that Ingram committed the offenses of using abusive language and engaging in threatening behavior. Ingram appealed Rudzienski's decision to the PRC Defendants, Zaken and Moslak. They denied his appeals. (Id. at pp. 2-3.)
On or around May 13, 2021, Ingram received from Carpenter a Notice informing him that the Board rescinded his automatic reparole date “as a result of being found guilty of the aforementioned institutional misconduct[.]” (Id. at p. 3.) Ingram asserts that the Board lacked the authority under the circumstances to rescind his automatic reparole date because he was innocent and also because he did not commit the type of misconduct that would disqualify him from receiving automatic reparole. He maintains that under Pennsylvania law, the Board was required to release him six months after his February 3, 2021 arrest date (that is, no later than by August 3, 2021) unless he committed a disciplinary infraction involving assaultive behavior, sexual assault, a weapon or controlled substances. Thus, Ingram contends, he had a vested liberty interest in his automatic reparole date and any disciplinary proceeding that might lead to its rescission had to comport with minimum requirements of procedural due process. (Id. at pp. 3-4; ECF 20 at pp. 9-12.)
Ingram describes Carpenter as “Pennsylvania State Parole Board Secretary.” (ECF 7 at p. 3.) Defendants explain that her official title is Special Assistant to the Director of the Parole Board. (ECF 17 at p. 6.) Carpenter's actual job title is not relevant to the disposition of Defendants' motion and there is no dispute that she works for the Board and her name was on the Notice rescinding his reparole date.
Ingram does not provide the citation to the specific state statute on which he relies, but it appears to the Court that he may be referencing 61 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 6138(d), which provided at the time of his arrest and also when the Board rescinded his reparole that “[a] [technical] parole violator recommitted to a State correctional institution or a contracted county jail[,]” shall be recommitted as follows:
(3) .. the parolee shall be recommitted for one of the following periods, at which time the parolee shall automatically be reparoled without further action by the board:
(i) For the first recommitment under this subsection, a maximum period of six months.
(5) The time limit under paragraph (3) shall not be applicable to a parolee who:
(i) Committed a disciplinary infraction involving assaultive behavior, sexual assault, a weapon or controlled substances;
(ii) Spent more than 90 days in segregated housing due to one or more disciplinary infractions; or
(iii) Refused programming or a work assignment.61 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 6138(d)(3), (5) (emphasis added) (version in effect through June 29, 2021). Ingram asserts, among other things, that he did not commit a disqualifying misconduct under the statute. However, Rudzienski found him guilty of engaging in threatening behavior and under Pennsylvania law threats that place an individual in apprehension of bodily harm have been found to constitute assaultive behavior. See, e.g., Henderson v. Pennsylvania Parole Bd., 277 A.3d 633, 634-36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022). To the extent that Ingram is claiming that the Carpenter erred in making the state law determination that he committed the type of misconduct rendering automatic reparole inapplicable, that claim must be dismissed. Board officials are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in adjudicatory acts. See, e.g., Goodwine v. Keller, No. 09-1592, 2012 WL 4482793, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2012). Moreover, any § 1983 claim asserted against Carpenter is Heck barred for the reasons discussed below.
The Board typically has the complete discretion under Pennsylvania law to deny or rescind parole. See, e.g., Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186, 190 (3d Cir. 2015); Rogers v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. 1999.) Moreover, a Pennsylvania inmate does not attain the status of a parolee, where a liberty interest is at stake, until the grant of parole is “executed,” meaning the inmate was “released on parole.” Id. (citations omitted). See also Anderson v. Pennsylvania Parole Bd., 266 A.3d 106, 110 n.7 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 2021) (a Pennsylvania prisoner does not attain the status of a parolee, where his liberty interest is at stake, until the grant of parole is executed, which is when the inmate signs the acknowledgment of parole conditions and the Board issues the release order). Ingram alleges, however, that Pennsylvania law mandated that the Board automatically release him by August 3, 2021 unless he was found to have committed one of the four disqualifying misconducts listed in the applicable state statute. Although the Court does not have to accept Ingram's legal conclusions, Defendants do not contest either his recitation of state law or its applicability to him. Nor do they contest Ingram's assertion that state law provided him with vested liberty interest in his August 3, 2021 automatic reparole date. Thus, the Court will accept Ingram's assertions for the purposes of deciding Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Ingram submitted a grievance on August 20, 2021 in which he asserted that he was being illegally detained because he should have been released on reparole no later than August 3, 2021. Darr denied this grievance because it was not the proper vehicle by which to challenge the Board's decision to rescind his reparole. Ingram administratively appealed Darr's response first to Zaken and then to Varner. They denied his appeals. (Id. at pp. 3-5, 7.)
C. Standard of Review
At the pleading stage, Rule 8 requires a “short plain statement” of facts, not legal conclusions, “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court typically must allow a plaintiff to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accepting] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11.
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”). Additionally, the Court must “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[,]” and “they cannot flout procedural rules- they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
Finally, under the PLRA's screening provisions, courts are required to screen complaints at any time where, as is the case here, a prisoner has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and/or seeks redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Accordingly, if there is a ground for dismissal which was not relied upon by a defendant in a motion to dismiss, the Court may nonetheless sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such ground pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. See, e.g., Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008). In performing a court's mandated function of sua sponte reviewing complaints under the PLRA to determine whether the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
D. Discussion
Ingram brings his claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1. Claims Related to the Alleged False Misconduct, Unfair Disciplinary Hearing and Resulting Rescission of Reparole
Defendants assert that Ingram's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by collateral estoppel because the legality of his detention was previously litigated in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. This argument is not persuasive because in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 Ingram challenged the validity of his February 3, 2021 arrest and his detention stemming from that arrest, whereas in this case he challenges the legality of his detention following the rescission of his automatic reparole date of August 3, 2021.
Ingram asserts that Lynch, Morris, LeMasters and Mackey retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights by filing the April 16, 2021 misconduct falsely charging him with committing disciplinary infractions; that Rudzienski denied him due process at his disciplinary hearing in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and that as a direct result of these defendants' alleged unconstitutional actions, the Board, via Carpenter, rescinded his automatic reparole date. Ingram also faults the PRC Defendants, Zaken and Moslak for denying the administrative appeal he filed challenging the finding of guilt made by Rudzienski. He similarly faults Darr, Zaken and Varner for denying the grievance he filed that challenged the Board's rescission of his reparole date. Ingram claims that but for these defendants' alleged unlawful actions, he would have been released on reparole no later than August 3, 2021 and thus his current confinement is illegal. In addition to asserting these retaliation and due process claims, Ingram also claims that one or more of these defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's requirement that prison officials not be deliberately indifferent to the risk of an unjustified deprivation of his liberty.
Ingram also brings a Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim against one or more of the defendants. Such a claim requires that an arrest was made without probable cause and would concern only the period before the issuance of legal process. Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634-36 (3d Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Dewees, 977 F.Supp.2d 449, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (just as for false arrest, a plaintiff's claim for “false imprisonment [is] predicated on an arrest made without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”) Ingram was in custody pursuant to the issuance of legal process during the events in question in this lawsuit and thus the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to this case.
The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). Under the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), inmates must seek federal habeas corpus relief or similar state remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.
In Heck, an inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that the state prosecutors and investigators had engaged in an unlawful investigation and knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence in connection with his criminal trial. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, but not injunctive relief or release from custody. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. In effect, the inmate was trying to challenge his criminal conviction while avoiding the rules requiring such challenges be brought in a habeas action after exhausting state remedies. The Supreme Court reiterated that a writ of habeas corpus “is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement.....even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Id. at 481. It compared the inmate's claim to a malicious prosecution claim, and held that a § 1983 action should not be available to challenge a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence had been invalidated. Id. at 484-87.
The Heck Court then announced the rule that narrowed the ability of inmates to bring § 1983 damage claims relating to their criminal convictions or imprisonment:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”)
In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court extended Heck's favorable termination rule to prisoner disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held than an inmate cannot bring an action in federal court for damages or injunctive relief challenging a disciplinary conviction that affected the length of confinement until that disciplinary conviction has been set aside in administrative or state appeals or some other means (such a federal habeas action). Edwards, 620 U.S. at 645-48.
Here, success on Ingram's due process and Eighth Amendment claims, as well as his retaliation claims (in which he asserts that he did not commit a disciplinary infraction and was charged only because Lynch and the other officers lied about his culpability) would necessarily imply the invalidity of the Board's decision to rescind Ingram's automatic reparole date. According to Ingram, the disciplinary proceeding was the sole reason the Board rescinded reparole and the only harm he alleges he sustained as a result of his alleged unfair disciplinary proceeding was that he was not released from imprisonment on August 3, 2021. His claims for damages are premised on his contention that he has been illegally confined since that date.
Thus, since neither the result of Ingram's disciplinary proceeding nor the Board's subsequent decision to rescind his reparole has been previously terminated in Ingram's favor, his due process, Eighth Amendment and retaliation claims related to the misconduct and the Board's decision to rescind his reparole are barred by Heck. See, e.g., Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997), which observed “[f]ew things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than the allegedly improper denial of parole”); Schreane v. Marr, 722 Fed.Appx. 160, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2018) (Heck barred plaintiff's claims that a prison officer retaliated against him for filing a lawsuit by fabricating a misconduct report against him and that his due process rights were violated at his disciplinary hearing and that, as a result, he lost good conduct time credits); Zuniga Hernandez v. Unknown Officer, 433 Fed.Appx. 56, 59 (3d Cir. 2011) (inmate's claim that a defendant gave a false statement and that as a result he lost good time credits following a disciplinary hearing was barred by Heck); Royal v. Durison, 254 Fed.Appx. 163, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (plaintiff's due process and Eighth Amendment claims premised on his allegation that defendants' unlawful conduct caused him to serve a sentence in excess of the maximum statutory term were barred by Heck); Worthy v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 184 Fed.Appx. 262, 264-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Insomuch as [the plaintiff] sought relief for alleged due process deprivations that infected the parole revocation proceedings, success on his claims, and a concomitant award of damages or declaration of unconstitutionality, would imply that his continued confinement on the basis of his revoked parole was invalid” and were Heck barred).
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss all claims Ingram asserts against Lynch, Morris, LeMasters, Mackey, Rudzienski, Carpenter, the PRC Defendants, Zaken, Moslak, Darr and Varner based on the alleged issuance of the false misconduct, unfair disciplinary proceeding and the rescission of his automatic reparole. The dismissal should be with prejudice to Ingram attempting to reassert those claims in an amended complaint filed in this proceeding, but without prejudice to him bringing them in a subsequent civil action in the event he obtains a favorable termination related to his disciplinary proceeding or the Board's decision to rescind his automatic reparole.
In their motion, Defendants assert that Ingram's due process and Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by Heck and that his Eighth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation claims should be dismissed on other grounds. The Court may dismiss Ingram's First, Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims for the alternative reasons given herein under the PLRA's screening authority.
2. Remaining Claims Against Lynch
Separate from the claims discussed above that implicate the validity of his confinement, Ingram also asserts that Lynch retaliated against him for litigating Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-359 by “stealing” the box that contained his legal materials and grievances for that case. He also asserts Lynch violated his First Amendment right to access the court because Lynch allegedly deprived him of the documents he needed to litigate Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. Defendants to do not specifically address either of these claims in their motion to dismiss, but the Court can evaluate them under the PLRA's screening authority.
To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, Ingram must allege: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the defendant at issue took adverse action against him; and (3) a causal link, that is, that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take that adverse action. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
Filing a lawsuit is protected activity and thus Ingram meets the first element of a retaliation claim against Lynch. See, e.g., Fantone v. Lantini, 780 F.3d 184, 192 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015); Lakkis v. Lahovski, 994 F.Supp.2d 624, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2014). The second element is also satisfied. An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000). The conduct Ingram attributes to Lynch (“stealing” his property, or at least denying him access to that property) qualifies. See, e.g., Carter v. Slater, No. 1:19-cv-000112, 2021 WL 5605289, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2021). The third element's requisite causal connection between Ingram's lawsuit and the adverse action is also plausibly pled since Ingram alleges that Lynch knew about Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. Thus, Ingram states a plausible retaliation claim against Lynch for confiscating the box containing his legal documents and grievance.
The same cannot be said for the related access-to-court claim Ingram asserts against Lynch. To state a claim for a violation of the right to access the courts under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he (1) suffered an “actual injury,” meaning he “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable'” legal claim; and (2) that he has “no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “To that end, prisoners must satisfy certain pleading requirements: The complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,' and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.'” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).
Ingram has not satisfied these pleading requirements. The Complaint thus fails to state an access-to-court claim against Lynch for allegedly confiscating his legal property and grievances.
In his brief opposing Defendants' motion, Ingram contends that because of Lynch's alleged misconduct, he could not establish the personal involvement of defendants in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359. (ECF 20 at pp. 13-14.) It would be futile to provide Ingram with an opportunity to attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies for his access-to-court claim by including this allegation in an amended complaint. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 was disposed of on a motion to dismiss and at that stage of the litigation Ingram was not required to produce evidence to support his claims. That is, Ingram did not have to produce any documents to allege the personal involvement of any defendant in that case.
Moreover, the claims Ingram brought in Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-359 were ultimately subject to dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a claim because his allegations did not support a Fourth Amendment false arrest/false imprisonment claim or a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any defendant, and not because he failed to plead the personal involvement of any particular defendant. Ingram, No. 22-1541, 2023 WL 110588, at *1-2. Thus, Ingram cannot successfully claim that Lynch's confiscation of his legal materials caused him an actual injury. See, e.g., Henry v. Moore, 500 Fed.Appx. 115, 117 (3d Cir. 2012) (plaintiff “cannot claim he was barred from pursing a nonfrivolous, arguable claim by untimely receipt of the notice of dismissal” of an earlier lawsuit when he had failed in that earlier lawsuit to state a claim upon which relief could be granted).
Based on the above, Ingram has stated a plausible claim of retaliation against Lynch for confiscating his legal property and grievances. However, it is recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice the related access-to-court claim asserted against Lynch.
3. Claims against Davis and Milliken
To state a § 1983 claim against a defendant, the plaintiff must plead that defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus, each defendant can be held liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Corr. Med., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
The only instance in which the Complaint mentions Davis and Milliken by name is where it lists all defendants. (ECF 7 at p. 3.) Ingram identifies them as COs at SCI Greene but he does not attribute any of the misconduct alleged in the Complaint to them. Thus, the Complaint fails to allege that either Davis or Milliken had the requisite personal involvement sufficient to state a claim against him under § 1983.
In his response in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Ingram asserts that Davis issued a “fraudulent misconduct” against him on May 14, 2021. (ECF 20 at p. 4.) He also asserts that Davis' actions were “a continuation of the retaliatory abuse against [him,] and that Milliken, who the signed the misconduct as a witness, was also culpable in violating his rights. (Id.) Statements that a plaintiff makes in response to a motion to dismiss cannot amend the complaint, however. Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”) (internal marks and citation omitted); Bracken v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 2:16-cv-171, 2017 WL 5593451, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017) (“A pleading may not be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
Based on the above, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to the extent that it seeks the dismissal without prejudice of Davis and Milliken from this action.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 16) and also dismiss certain claims from this action pursuant to the PLRA's screening provisions. Specifically, it is recommended that the Court:
• dismiss with prejudice the official capacity claims Ingram asserts against all Defendants;
• dismiss with prejudice the First Amendment retaliation claims, Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims Ingram asserts against Lynch, Morris, LeMasters, Mackey, Rudzienski, Carpenter, the PRC Defendants, Zaken, Moslak, Darr and Varner based on the alleged
issuance of the false misconduct, unfair disciplinary proceeding and the rescission of his automatic reparole. The dismissal should be with prejudice to Ingram attempting to reassert those claims in an amended complaint filed in this proceeding, but without prejudice to him bringing them in a subsequent civil action in the event he obtains a favorable termination related to his disciplinary proceeding or the Board's decision to rescind his automatic reparole;
• dismiss with prejudice the First Amendment access-to-court claim that Ingram asserts against Lynch;
• dismiss without prejudice Davis or Milliken as defendants in this action because Ingram has failed to plead their personal involvement in the events that give rise to any of his claims.
Under the circumstances presented here, Ingram may, if he so chooses, file an amended complaint to attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies with respect to those claims he may wish to assert against Davis or Milliken. Alternatively, he may choose to proceed with the Complaint as it stands but only with respect to the retaliation claim against Lynch for confiscating and denying him access to his box of legal materials and grievances.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).