See FED. R. APP. P. 4(c); Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2007). It is clear from his brief that he did not do so. He was three days late.

But although Pollard now alleges that he had good cause for his untimely filing, i.e., that he was in Temporary Lockup at the time the ICE decision was issued, and he now alleges that he placed his documents in the prison mailbox on October 29, 2020 (two days after he received the rejection notice on October 27, 2020), he did not explain either of these things in the original submission. See Dkt. No. 21-2 at 9. Because Pollard did not explicitly provide a reason for the late filing, as he was required to do under §DOC 310.07(2), or affirmatively invoke the prison mailbox rule by including a declaration which set forth the date of deposit, as required by Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2007), the RA did not know to review the issue of whether good cause existed and/or whether to apply the prison mailbox rule to a submission that was untimely filed on November 2, 2020.

Rule 3(d), Rules Governing 2255 Proceedings. The Rule, colloquially known as the "prisoner mailbox rule," is modeled on the appellate procedure rule regarding inmate filings, Fed. R.App. P. 4(c), and the Court looks to cases construing that rule for instruction. Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2007). Generally, the mailbox rule determines that a motion mailed by an inmate is "deemed filed on the date the prisoner deposits the notice in the prison mail system, and not on the date when it is received by the clerk of court."

April 8 postage stamp came from 53073, an area that includes Plymouth, Wisconsin, but not Milwaukee. The only "logical inference" is that Felton's envelope was deposited into the prison's mailing system on April 8 and then sent to Milwaukee on April 9 for delivery to the district court. See Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on "logical inference[s]" to establish the prison mailbox rule's factual predicates). Thus, this appeal is timely, and we proceed to the merits.

Lacking proof of compliance, Harris cannot benefit from the prison mailbox rule's second option. Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Craig, 368 F.3d 738, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2004). With tolling out of the picture, Harris filed his notice of appeal too late to appeal the judgment.

See FED. R. APP. P. 4(c)(1); Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2007). But this overly literal reading of the rule makes little sense because, in this case, the record contains the envelope Bentz used to mail his notice of appeal.

And waiver aside, although Wisconsin has adopted a tolling rule similar to the prison-mailbox rule, see State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 247 Wis.2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292 (2001), there's no reason to believe that Wisconsin's rule permits prisoners to send correspondence submitted to the mailroom without proper postage. Cf. Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.2007) (“Although prisoners have right of access to courts, they do not have right to unlimited free postage.”). So the rule would not have excused Johnson's default anyway. The claimed impediment here—the Business Office's denial of Johnson's request for a legal loan—is not quite like any of these examples.

Ford was not required to file this declaration simultaneously with his notice of appeal. See Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 642–44 (7th Cir.2007) (relying on declarations filed after the notice of appeal to establish compliance with Rule 4(c)(1)); Grady v. United States, 269 F.3d 913, 917–18 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that the declaration required by Rule 4(c)(1) need not accompany the notice of appeal). Moreover, he was required to “attest to ‘only two things': the date the notice was deposited into the prison mail system and that first class postage was prepaid.”

A “legal” mail system for purposes of Rule 4(c)(1), is one that, at a minimum, is a “special” system separate from the prison's general mail system. See Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that the prison had a “separate legal mailing system”); United States v. Gray, 182 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir.1999) (requiring prisoners to use the legal mail system where a “prison maintains a legal mail system separate from its regular mail system”); Porchia v. Norris, 251 F.3d 1196, 1198 (8th Cir.2001) (noting that if a prison has “two internal mail systems, one for regular mail and another for legal mail,” the prisoner must use the legal mail system); 1998 Advisory Comm. Note to Fed. R.App. P. 4(c) (stating that a legal mail system is a “special internal mail system[ ] for handling legal mail”). Hurlow's statements regarding the system at F.C.I. Williamsburg for sending certified mail say nothing about the existence of a separate system, let alone one for legal mail; they are therefore not a “concession” regarding the existence of a legal mail system for purposes of Rule 4(c).

We have explained previously the importance of strictly enforcing the postage requirement: "If we allowed prisoners to file declarations under Rule 4(c)(1) and assert a blanket statement that 'postage has been prepaid' without verifying that they have the funds or the entitlement to do so, we would give them our stamp of approval to violate the timeliness requirement of the Rule." Ingram v. Jones, 507 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Craig, 368 F.3d at 740 ("The postage requirement is important: mail bearing a stamp gets going, but an unstamped document may linger."). Because Parrish did not pay for postage before the notice of appeal was due, this appeal is