And one of the most urgent of all the canons of construction is this one: that a statute must be construed, when possible, "in manner which would remove doubt of its constitutionality, and possible danger that it might be used to restrain or burden freedom of worship or freedom of speech and press" ( People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385). Put another way, the rule is that the construction, if at all possible, must be such as not only to avoid unconstitutionality but to avoid grave doubts thereof ( Matter of Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 87, 88; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267; People v. Realmato, 294 N.Y. 45, 50; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401). How can there be any dispute but that this article 5-C, if read so as to take this archbishopric from the control of the central church and give it to appellant's group, is unconstitutional?

Ex parte Heyfron 7 How., Miss., 127; Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 427, 430. Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. it was so held by the Court of Appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Matter of Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 81. 'Attorneys and counselors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.

"Barristers or counsellors-at-law, in England, were never appointed by the courts at Westminster, but were called to the bar by the inns of court." Cooper's Case, 22 N.Y. 67, 90. "The original institution of the inns of court nowhere precisely appears, but it is certain that they are not corporations, and have no constitution by charter from the crown.

The admission of an attorney is a judicial act, as much so as any other judgment of a Court. In re Cooper , 22 N.Y. 67, 81, 82, 84-86.          The admission of an attorney being a judicial act, his deprivation of the office can only be by a judicial act.

The essential nature of both proceedings is the same, the inquiry being to ascertain whether or not a person is or is not qualified and fitted to hold the office of attorney and counselor at law. In Matter of Cooper ( 22 N.Y. 67) there is an interesting discussion as to the nature of the proceeding to admit attorneys and counselors at law. That was an appeal from an order of the General Term denying a motion to admit the applicant as an attorney and counselor at law, and several questions were settled. It was held that the application to the court to admit an attorney was a judicial question to be determined by the court upon the evidence before it, and it was also decided that such an application was a special proceeding.

Field's Provincial Courts of New Jersey, p. 250. In the case of Henry W. Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67, Prof. Dwight, in his learned and elaborate brief (page 79), quotes this same language which was found in the royal commission to Lord Cornbury as the colonial governor of New York, and states that the New York governor "doubtless derives his power" to appoint attorneys at law from this clause. I can see no reason to doubt the truth of this statement, although the Supreme Court of New York in an early case stated that before the Revolution the power of appointing attorneys was exercised by the Governor, and that such power was recognized by the courts, but whether such power was exercised "justifiably or not" the court deemed it "immaterial to inquire."

Other courts reason to the contrary result. Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 535; In the Matter of Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67; Ex parte Cashin, 128 Miss. 224, 232, 90 So. 850.Illinois considers that the power and jurisdiction of its Supreme Court with respect to the admission of attorneys are inherent in the judiciary under the constitution of the state, which provides, Article III, for the traditional distribution of the powers of government. Smith-Hurd Illinois Anno. Statutes, Constitution, p. 394; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 82, 54 N.E. 646. Attorneys are officers of the court, answerable to it for their conduct.

The Summers doctrine is not new. As long ago as 1866 the Supreme Court said, in discussing the admission of attorneys, "Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases." Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 378-379, 18 L.Ed. 366. The Court cited with approval Matter of Cooper, 1860, 22 N.Y. 67, 81, in which the New York Court of Appeals held that a trial court's order denying an application for admission to the bar was appealable, found error, and reversed. In Carver v. Clephane, 1943, 78 U.S. App.D.C. 91, 137 F.2d 685, the District Court, after a hearing, had dismissed a complaint that sought to require its Committee on Admissions and Grievances to certify Carver for admission to the District Court's bar. Carver appealed to this court.

But it is competent for the Legislature of a state, unless restricted by the Constitution, to confer that power upon the Supreme Court of the state. Cooper's Case, 22 N.Y. 67, 90. Attorneys are officers of the court, and, generally speaking, they are admitted as such upon its orders, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. Ex parte Garland, supra. 'It has been,' says the court (4 Wall. 378, 18 L.Ed. 366), 'the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. ' So the court declares, in Ex parte Robinson, supra, 19 Wall.p. 512, 22 L.Ed. 205: 'Parties are admitted to the profession only upon satisfactory evidence that they possess fair private character and sufficient legal learning to conduct causes in court for suitors.'

Instead, the majority misinterprets a provision of the Rivers Act – an Act that itself says the most restrictive conditions found in law must prevail to protect our wilderness areas – to scuttle the statutorily required amendment process. We do not interpret legislation to render provisions of other legislation meaningless unless there is no other option (see e.g.Matter of Gonzalez v. Annucci, 32 N.Y.3d 461, 117 N.E.3d 795 [2018] ; In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 88 [1860] ; Hernandez v. Barrios–Paoli, 93 N.Y.2d 781, 787 n 2, 698 N.Y.S.2d 590, 720 N.E.2d 866 [1999] ; Brown v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 517, 693 N.Y.S.2d 475, 715 N.E.2d 479 [1999] ; Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 459, 12 N.E.2d 544 [1938] ). Here, particularly given the overall interrelationship of the Rivers Act and APA Act, and the state's long, visionary and steadfast commitment to the protection of our forest preserve in its pristine condition, the majority errs in allowing DEC to abrogate the terms of the Master Plan in violation of the statutory requisites. Indeed, it is precisely because the Forest Commission did not heed the legislature's directives that the "forever wild" clause of our Constitution exists, namely, to prevent incursions such as this.