Opinion
W.C. No. 4-637-254.
April 15, 2010.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mottram (ALJ Mottram) dated August 28, 2009, that determined the claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on September 4, 2007 and denied the claims for ongoing Botox injections and a functional capacity examination (FCE) as medical treatment. We affirm.
The respondents admitted liability for an injury to the claimant's left shoulder that occurred in 2004. The claimant was treated over the years by a number of physicians. On March 7, 2006, Dr. Pyle, a treating physician, placed the claimant at MMI and provided the claimant with an upper extremity rating. The respondents filed an admission based on Dr Pyle's report. The claimant underwent a Division-sponsored independent medical examination (DIME) with Dr. Gray who opined that the claimant was not at MMI and made various recommendations including a surgical consultation for treatment of her thoracic outlet syndrome (TOS).
The claimant's medical care was subsequently transferred from Dr. Pyle to Dr. Levine. Dr. Levine referred the claimant to Dr. Isser-Sax. Dr. Isser-Sax recommended continued physical therapy, biofeedback and Botox injections. The respondents objected to the treatment from Dr. Isser-Sax and the matter was heard before ALJ Martinez. ALJ Martinez issued an order dated May 22, 2008 and found that the Botox injections were reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the claimant from the effects of her industrial injury. The claimant received Botox injections.
Dr. Isser-Sax placed the claimant at MMI as of August 7, 2008 and recommended continued Botox injections every 3 months with ongoing physical therapy. The claimant could not be returned to Dr. Gray for a follow-up DIME so the claimant was seen by Dr. McLaughlin as the new DIME physician. Dr. McLaughlin opined that the claimant had a left shoulder disorder related to her 2004 industrial injury but did not have TOS. Dr. McLaughlin opined that the claimant was at MMI as of September 4, 2007 and recommend that the claimant discontinue the Botox injections. Dr. McLaughlin provided the claimant with a PPD rating of nine percent of the upper extremity that converted to a five percent whole person impairment rating. The respondents filed an admission based upon the opinions of Dr. McLaughlin.
The matter was set for hearing before ALJ Mottram. ALJ Mottram found that the claimant had not overcome the DIME physician's opinion that she did not have TOS. ALJ Mottram further found that the claimant had failed to overcome the DIME physician's opinion regarding MMI by clear and convincing evidence. ALJ Mottram credited the opinion of Dr. McLaughlin that the ongoing Botox injections recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax were not reasonable and necessary to prevent further deterioration as maintenance medical treatment. ALJ Mottram also found that the claimant had failed to show that an FCE was necessary to prevent further deterioration of her medical condition.
The claimant brings this appeal. As we understand the claimant's brief, in challenging the opinion of the DIME physician the claimant hopes to achieve two objectives. The first is to obtain additional temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The claimant seeks additional TTD from September 4, 2007 (the date the DIME physician placed the claimant at MMI) to August 7, 2008 (based on the opinion of Dr. Isser-Sax). The second objective of challenging the opinion of the DIME physician is to obtain Grover type medical benefits in the form of Botox injections and an FCE.
The claimant has raised the doctrine of "issue and fact" preclusion in seeking to prohibit re-litigation of the issue of the existence of TOS. The claimant has not raised the issue of claim preclusion. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that it uses the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" instead of "res judicata" and "collateral estoppel." Gallegos v. Colorado Groundwater Commission, 147 P.3d 20, 24, n. 2 (Colo. 2006).
The supreme court has also observed that issue preclusion is an equitable doctrine that bars relitigation of an issue that has been finally decided by a court in a prior action. Bebo Construction Co. v. Mattox O'Brien, 990 P.2d 78, 84 (Colo. 1999). Its purpose is to relieve parties of the burden of multiple lawsuits, to conserve judicial resources, and to promote reliance upon and confidence in the judicial system by preventing inconsistent decisions. Id. Although issue preclusion was conceived as a judicial doctrine, it has been extended to administrative proceedings, where it "may bind parties to an administrative agency's findings of fact or conclusions of law." Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44, 47 (Colo. 2001). There, the supreme court stated that:
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to an issue actually determined in the prior proceedings; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted has been a party to or is in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
Sunny Acres Villa, Inc., 25 P.3d at 47.
I.
We first address the claimant's argument that the ALJ erred in his determination of MMI, which determines the issue of entitlement to the additional TTD sought by the claimant. The claimant argued before ALJ Mottram that ALJ Martinez had found that the claimant suffered from TOS and ordered payment for the Botox injections, which was a specific treatment for the TOS. The claimant argued that because the order issued by ALJ Martinez was final, she had overcome Dr. McLaughlin's opinion that the claimant did not have TOS. The claimant argued that the appropriate date of MMI must be August 7, 2008 as opined by Dr. Isser-Sax rather than September 4, 2007 date of MMI as opined by Dr. McLaughlin. ALJ Mottram was not persuaded by these arguments.
The claimant argues that under the doctrine of issue preclusion ALJ Mottram erred in finding that the claimant had failed to overcome the opinion of Dr. McLaughlin as the DIME physician on the issue of MMI. We are not persuaded that ALJ Mottram committed reversible error.
Even if we assume ALJ Martinez's order precluded ALJ Mottram or the DIME physician from concluding that the claimant did not have TOS we are not persuaded that ALJ Mottram committed reversible error. This is because we do not accept the claimant's premise that the DIME physician's opinions on MMI or the need for Botox injections were dependent upon whether or not the claimant suffers from TOS. Therefore, we do not accept the argument that because ALJ Martinez found the claimant had TOS that ALJ Mottram erred in failing to find that the opinion of the DIME physician on MMI had been overcome.
Here, ALJ Mottram made the following findings of fact, with record support, relevant to the DIME physician's reasoning that the claimant was at MMI as of September 4, 2007. Dr. McLaughlin did express the opinion that the claimant did not have TOS. Exhibit X. However, in reaching his opinion that the claimant reached MMI on September 4, 2007 Dr. McLaughlin made the following observations. Dr. McLaughlin used the date of September 4, 2007 because that was the date the claimant saw Dr. Levine and a range of motion test was performed that showed the claimant's condition to be stable. The DIME range of motion was significantly worse than what was found by Dr. Pyle originally on the first date of MMI. Dr. Schakaraschwili had counted well over 100 visits of physical therapy in 2007 and Dr. McLaughlin noted that the claimant most likely experienced 200 physical therapy sessions by the time he saw her. In spite of over a year of continued physical therapy, Botox injections and counseling there had been no improvement functionally and no objective measurable improvement on the range of motion. Dr. McLaughlin saw the treatment from September 4, 2007 on to be focused on pain management "as opposed to [MMI] care." Exhibit X at 106-07.
The DIME physician further noted that the claimant's range of motion, as measured during his examination, was worse than the range of motion as measured by Dr. Levine on September 4, 2007, even though the claimant had continued with over a year of physical therapy and had undergone two Botox injections. The DIME physician noted that the claimant's physical therapy had consisted primarily of passive physical therapy without significant emphasis on active physical therapy. In discussing this with the claimant, the DIME physician noted that the claimant "just feels she cannot engage in active therapy." The DIME physician noted that the Botox injections were not recommended pursuant to the medical treatment guidelines for the treatment of ongoing myofascial pain.
Dr. McLaughlin further noted that MMI exists when the underlying condition causing the disability becomes stable and no further treatment was reasonably expected to improve the condition. Dr. McLaughlin then opined that the claimant's condition was stable. Exhibit X at 108. Dr. McLaughlin also opined that the medical treatment was not improving her condition and that there were no further medical interventions that would improve her condition. McLaughlin Depo. at 12. It was on this basis that Dr. McLaughlin found the claimant to be at MMI.
In our view, the DIME physician, Dr. McLaughlin, expressed the following two significant opinions. The DIME physician noted that even if one were to consider that the claimant had TOS, Botox injections into the scalene as performed by Dr. Isser-Sax had no therapeutic role in the treatment of TOS. Dr. McLaughlin was specifically asked if it were assumed that the claimant had TOS would she still be at MMI. Dr. McLaughlin answered that in his opinion she would still be at MMI and that the date of MMI would not change from September 4, 2007. McLaughlin Depo. at 55, 57.
Therefore, in our view, the issue of when the claimant reached MMI was not dependent on whether or not the claimant had TOS. Therefore, whether or not the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to ALJ Martinez's determination that the claimant suffered TOS, it does not control the resolution of the current contested issue of when the claimant reached MMI and thus entitlement to TTD ended. Rather, the issue of the claimant's entitlement to TTD is dependent in this case on the usual rules involving MMI. Because we read the order as revealing the essential disputed issue in the case before ALJ Mottram to be whether the claimant was at MMI, and not whether the claimant had TOS, we look to § 8-42-107(8)(b), C.R.S.
The determination of MMI for purposes of TTD benefits is governed by § 8-42-107(8)(b), which provides that the initial determination of MMI shall be made by an authorized treating physician. Blue Mesa Forest v. Lopez 928 P.2d 831 (Colo. App. 1996). In case of a DIME, the opinion of the DIME physician concerning MMI is presumptively correct and can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Section 8-42-107(8)(b)(III).
The question whether the claimant has overcome the DIME by clear and convincing evidence is one of fact for the ALJ's determination. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1995). This is true despite the elevated standard of proof required to overcome a DIME: "[I]rrespective of whether the standard of proof at the administrative adjudicatory level of proceedings is clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt, or merely a preponderance of the evidence, it is solely for the trier of fact to determine the persuasive effect of the evidence and whether the burden of proof has been satisfied." Metro Moving Storage Co., 914 P.2d at 414. Therefore, the standard of review remains whether the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id; § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co., 914 P.2d at 414. This standard of review is deferential and the scope of our review is "exceedingly narrow." Id.
In our view, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's determination that the DIME physician's opinion on MMI had not been overcome. The opinions of Dr. Pyle and Dr. Schakaraschwili support this determination. In addition, ALJ Mottram made extensive findings, with record support, outlining the failure of continued physical therapy, Botox injections and counseling over a lengthy period of time to make functional improvement. This supports ALJ Mottram's decision that the opinion of the DIME physician on MMI had not been overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
In our view the record evidence constitutes substantial evidence supporting the DIME physician's opinion that the claimant had reached MMI regardless of whether the DIME physician or ALJ Mottram were precluded from finding that the claimant did not have TOS. Therefore, we perceive no reason to remand the matter to ALJ Mottram.
II.
In addition to the analysis set forth above, there are further reasons why we are persuaded that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to the present case. In our view, it is significant that the claimant has framed her argument in the form of issue preclusion as opposed to claim preclusion. Here, there were differences in the degree of proof in the two proceedings. In the proceeding before ALJ Martinez the claimant bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical treatment recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax was reasonable and necessary. However, at the hearing before ALJ Mottram the issues were whether the claimant had overcome the opinion of MMI from the DIME physician by clear and convincing evidence and, also, Grover type medical benefits.
We view the decision in Holnam, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 159 P.3d 795 (Colo. App. 2006) as instructive on the effect of different burdens of proof on issue preclusion. The Holnam court rejected the claimant's argument that because there were differences in the degree of proof in the two proceedings preclusive principles should not apply. In the first proceeding in Holnam the claimant was required to overcome the DIME opinion on causation by clear and convincing evidence, while in the second she was only required to establish the existence of an occupational disease by a preponderance of the evidence. The court conceded that the differences in the respective burdens might be significant if issue preclusion were applicable, but that those differences were not significant where claim preclusion applied. Holnam, Inc. 159 P.3d at 799.
Here, there were different burdens of proof in the hearing before ALJ Martinez (preponderance) and before ALJ Mottram (clear and convincing). As we understand Holnam these differences in the burden of proof may prevent the application of issue preclusion as argued by the claimant here. Therefore, we are not persuaded that ALJ Mottram erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion and disregard the DIME physician's opinion on MMI and the resulting denial of TTD benefits beyond those at the date of MMI as found by the DIME physician.
In addition, we agree with ALJ Mottram that there was no identity of issues which prevents the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion. Here, ALJ Mottram found that the disputed issue before him was whether the DIME physician's opinion on MMI had been overcome. ALJ Mottram reasoned that the disputed issue at the first hearing before ALJ Martinez was whether the claimant was entitled to the medical treatment recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax. Following ALJ Martinez's order, the claimant was provided with this course of treatment. ALJ Mottram noted that MMI was not an issue determined at the prior hearing, and therefore the issue before him was not identical to the one previously litigated in front of ALJ Martinez.
In the proceeding before ALJ Martinez the claimant bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical treatment recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax was reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the claimant from the effects of her work-related injury. Exhibit FF at 122. In contrast, at the hearing before ALJ Mottram the issue was whether the claimant had overcome the opinion from the DIME physician on MMI by clear and convincing evidence. The resolution of whether the claimant has reached MMI affects the claimant's request for additional TTD benefits. The claimant argues for TTD to be extended to August 7, 2008 based on the opinion of Dr. Isser-Sax rather than the date TTD would be terminated by the opinion of the DIME physician who placed the claimant at MMI on September 4, 2007.
ALJ Martinez credited the following opinions of Dr. Isser-Sax. As a result of the work related injury, the claimant developed TOS. TOS is usually diagnosed by a diagnosis of exclusion. For cure and relief from TOS the claimant needs Botox injections to relax her muscles in order to obtain relief from the TOS. Since multiple methods of treatment have failed, Botox injections should be tried to provide a cure and relief from the TOS. Exhibit FF at 3.
ALJ Mottram noted that at the first hearing on March 11, 2008 the claimant was found to be entitled to the medical treatment recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax. ALJ Mottram found that the claimant had been provided with this course of medical treatment. The issue before ALJ Mottram was whether the claimant overcame the opinion of the DIME physician that the claimant reached MMI on September 4, 2007.
In our view, the issues before ALJ Mottram and ALJ Martinez were not the same and therefore issue preclusion does not apply. This is not a case where the first ALJ granted the claimant's request for certain medical treatment and later a second ALJ denied the same treatment. Rather, here the claimant was provided with the ordered Botox treatment, but was later declared by both the DIME physician and her treating physician to be at MMI, although at different times. When the claimant unquestionably reached MMI the question then became to what type of Grover medical benefits the claimant was then entitled. Therefore, we are not persuaded that ALJ Mottram committed reversible error.
We are mindful of Lockhart v. Tetra Technologies, W.C. No. 4-725-760 (May 21, 2009) cited by the claimant. In Lockhart the Panel inferred from Grand County v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, No. 07CA0424 (Colo. App. April 24, 2008) (not selected for publication) that the doctrine of issue preclusion may be applicable even where the second dispute involves overcoming a DIME report as a prerequisite to proving entitlement to medical benefits. In Lockhart, the first order from the ALJ had found that the claimant had proven entitlement to a certain limited period of TTD because he had shown a temporary aggravation of his left shoulder, but after April 19, 2007 the TTD was due to underlying and independent complex left shoulder conditions. The DIME physician opined that the claimant was not at MMI and needed to be treated for his ongoing shoulder complaints. The second order from the ALJ determined that the DIME physician's opinion implicitly overturned the original order and concluded that the DIME opinion had been overcome and that the claimant had reached MMI on April 19, 2007. The Panel affirmed the order of the ALJ rejecting the claimant's argument that the issue at the second hearing was not identical because the first hearing involved the threshold finding of compensability while the second hearing involved the respondents' burden to overcome the presumptive weight of the DIME physician's opinion.
However, here the determinative issue was not whether the claimant had TOS as found by ALJ Martinez. Rather the issues were when the claimant reached MMI and whether she was entitled to Grover medical benefits. The resolution of these issues were not dependent on whether she had TOS.
III.
The claimant next contends that the ALJ erred by failing to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. The claimant further argues that the ALJ's findings of fact are not sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review. The claimant contends that although there was substantial evidence supporting a finding that the claimant does or does not have TOS she argues that the ALJ must set forth solid reasons for "reversing" a prior ALJ's findings on TOS.
We first note the ALJ's order does not alter the validity of ALJ Martinez's previous decision. Moreover, the ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is sufficient for the ALJ to enter findings concerning the evidence he considers dispositive of the issues, and evidence and inferences inconsistent with the order are presumed to have been rejected. Magnetic Engineering Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo. App. 2000).
In our opinion ALJ Mottram's findings are sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review. Among other things ALJ Mottram made the following findings. Even though the claimant had continued with over a year of physical therapy and had undergone two Botox injections her condition had not improved. The Botox injections under the facts of this case were not recommended pursuant to the medical treatment guidelines. Botox injections into the scalene as performed by Dr. Isser-Sax had no therapeutic role in the treatment of TOS. ALJ Mottram reviewed the report and the transcript of the deposition of Dr. McLaughlin and found the opinion of the doctor to be credible. In addition, ALJ Mottram also credited the reports of Dr. Pyle and Dr. Schakaraschwili, which supported his determination. ALJ Mottram was not persuaded by the opinions of Dr. Isser-Sax. ALJ Mottram's decision was based in part on these credibility determinations. We have no trouble determining the basis of ALJ Mottram's decision.
IV.
The claimant argues that the ALJ erred in denying her claim for an FCE as medical treatment because the claimant met her burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that an FCE is reasonably necessary treatment.
As we read the claimant's brief she concedes that she bears the burden of establishing entitlement to medical treatment. See Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1997); Sims v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 797 P.2d 777 (Colo. App. 1990). Here, it was undisputed that the claimant was at MMI at least by August 7, 2008 and the ongoing medical benefits must be pursuant to Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988). The burden of proof was on the claimant to establish entitlement to Grover medical benefits. Grover v. Industrial Commission, supra; Cordova v. Foundation Builders Inc., W. C. No. 4-296-404 (April 20, 2001). In order to be entitled to receive Grover medical benefits the claimant must present, at the time permanent disability benefits are determined, substantial evidence that future medical treatment is or will be reasonably necessary to relieve the claimant from the effects of the injury or to prevent deterioration of the claimant's condition. See Hanna v. Print Expediters Inc., 77 P.3d 863 (Colo. App. 2003); Stollmeyer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 1995). The question of whether the claimant met the burden of proof to establish an entitlement to ongoing medical benefits is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Holly Nursing Care Center v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 992 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1999); Renzelman v. Falcon School District, W. C. No. 4-508-925 (August 4, 2003).
We must uphold the ALJ's factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. The substantial evidence standard requires that we view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Thus, the scope of our review is "exceedingly narrow." Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 2003). This narrow standard of review also requires that we defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo. App. 2003).
Here, ALJ Mottram found the claimant had failed to establish how an FCE establishing her permanent work restrictions would prevent further deterioration of her physical condition. The claimant argues that ALJ Mottram's unenlightened attitude that an FCE has no medical benefits in helping a claimant maintain her medical condition should not be permitted to prevail.
We note that while the claimant cites certain favorable portions of Dr. McLaughlin's testimony the doctor also testified that he was not sure that an FCE would prevent deterioration. McLaughlin Depo. at 66. Moreover, in determining the facts, the ALJ is not required to accept testimony which is unrefuted or uncontroverted medical evidence. Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 34 (1970); Savio House v. Dennis, 665 P.2d 141 (Colo. App. 1983). ALJ Mottram was not persuaded that an FCE was reasonably necessary to relieve the claimant from the effects of the injury or to prevent deterioration of her condition. We are not persuaded that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.
We also note that the ALJ is presumed to possess special expertise and competence in dealing with medical evidence. Thus, we presume that the ALJ is competent to evaluate evidence in cases of this character. Wierman v. Tunnell, 108 Colo. 544, 120 P.2d 638 (1941). ALJs are familiar with FCEs and are in a position to determine whether one would be necessary as a part of maintenance medical benefits.
V.
The claimant argues that the ALJ erred in denying her claim for ongoing Botox injections recommended by Dr. Isser-Sax because ALJ Martinez found the claimant to have suffered TOS and found the Botox injections to be reasonable and necessary. Therefore, the claimant argues that the respondents should be estopped from asserting that the injections are not necessary and reasonable.
ALJ Mottram also determined that even assuming the claimant was to prevail on the issue of MMI and she was found to have reached MMI on August 7, 2008, there would still be the issue before him of post-MMI treatment. ALJ Mottram noted that maintenance medical treatment is not identical to the issue of medical treatment necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the industrial injury that was in front of ALJ Martinez. ALJ Mottram found that the issue litigated at the prior hearing before ALJ Martinez was the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment, not the existence of the claimant's alleged TOS.
The claimant again argues that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to the finding that the claimant has TOS. Therefore, the claimant argues the opinions of Dr. McLaughlin on the issue of the Botox injections were overcome and the ALJ erred in relying on them. However, following the reasoning above, we are not persuaded that the order of ALJ Martinez precluded consideration by ALJ Mottram of the issue of the reasonableness and necessity of the Botox treatment. Here the issue was whether after the claimant had undergone Botox treatment and had reached MMI the claimant was entitled to ongoing Botox treatment as a Grover medical benefit.
Because it is undisputed that the claimant was at MMI the claimant bore the burden of demonstrating entitlement to ongoing Botox injections pursuant to Grover. The question of whether the claimant met the burden of proof to establish an entitlement to ongoing medical benefits is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Holly Nursing Care Center v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. In our opinion substantial evidence supports the determination by ALJ Mottram to deny continued Botox injections. The opinions of Dr. McLaughlin and Dr. Schakaraschwili support ALJ Mottram's determination and constitute substantial evidence.
VI.
We also note that the claimant, in arguing the issue of claim preclusion and the nature of TOS, has referred to the National Institute of Health's website. However, parties are expected to submit their evidence at the time of the hearing. Frank v. Industrial Commission, 96 Colo. 364, 43 P.2d 158 (1935). The claimant's representations and attachments to her brief may not substitute for that which must appear of record. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Gallegos, 746 P.2d 71 (Colo. App. 1987). Therefore, we have not considered the references made by the claimant to the website of the National Institute of Health.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated August 28, 2009 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ John D. Baird
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
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DENISE BRAUN, 501 S MADISON, CORTEZ, CO, (Claimant).
VISTA MESA, Attn: ADMINISTRATOR, CORTEZ, CO, (Employer).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D FLEWELLING, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
DAWES AND HARISS, PC, Attn: ELIOT L. BLOODSWORTH, ESQ., DURANGO, CO, (For Claimant).
RITSEMA LYON, PC, Attn: CAROL FINLEY, ESQ., GRAND JUNCTION, CO, (For Respondents).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: JASON TRUJILLO, DENVER, CO, (Other Party).