Opinion
NO. 01-1608
January 29, 2002
This matter comes before the Court on second motion to dissolve the restraining order filed by claimants Rudolph Washington and Debra Washington. Having considered the record, the memoranda of counsel and the law, the Court has determined that the motion should be granted for the following reasons.
The petitioners, American Commercial Lines, LLC and American Commercial Barge Lines, LLC, argue that the stay should not be lifted because neither the "single claimant" nor the "sufficient fund" exception applies. They further argue that the stipulations proposed by the movers is insufficient to warrant application of the single claimant exception.
The petitioners initially argued that the Washingtons' original stipulation was deficient because it does not focus on the vessel owner's alleged right to have the issue of exoneration tried in this Court, because it focuses only on the Washingtons' state court suit, because it does not provide for maintenance of federal jurisdiction over the limitation and exoneration proceeding, and because it does not include an agreement to stay execution of any state court judgment received. The petitioners argued in supplemental memorandum that additional stipulations are not adequate because of alleged potential claims of indemnity and contribution between the two petitioners, and between the petitioners and the employer Maritrend, Inc. ("Maritrend") and the vessel. They also argued that the plaintiff wife did not allow for the "irrevocable priority" of her husband's claim and that the intervenor Landmark Insurance Company ("Landmark") seeks damages in addition to subrogation.
The only other claimant in this matter is intervenor Landmark Insurance Company, which has signed a stipulation that it will not seek judgment for costs or attorney's fees from the petitioners, but seeks only subrogation. Maritrend has filed a similar stipulation. Rudolph and Debra Washington have filed stipulations waiving any claims of res judicata concerning limitation of liability from any state court judgment, agreeing that this Court retains jurisdiction to decide the limitation of liability issues, acknowledging that the claims of Rudolph Washington claims will have "irrevocable priority" over the claims of Debra Washington, and agreeing that any state court judgment will not be enforced until the limitation of liability issue is resolved in this Court.
The record reflects that Maritrend, Inc. is not a party to this litigation.
Many of the petitioners' objections have been mooted by subsequent stipulations and the passage of the deadline for filing claims. With regard to the allegedly potential for claims of indemnity and contribution, the record reflects that no such claims have been filed. unlike Odeco Oil Gas Co., Drilling Division, v. Bonnette, 1994 WL 202383 (E.D. La), the petitioners have had the opportunity to file any claims for indemnity or contribution and have not shown that there are realistic potential claims for indemnity and contribution here. Therefore, this situation is akin to In re: M/V MISS ROBBIE, 968 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. La. 1997), wherein Judge Fallon found:
In this instance, where there are currently no third parties involved in any suit, state or federal, and no potential third parties known to the claimant, the stipulations made by claimant [I are inadequate to protect the vessel owner's limitation rights. To find otherwise would allow the vessel owner to literally hold the claimant's savings to suitors rights hostage with the cry of potential threats to its limitation rights in the form of third party claims of contribution and indemnity which do not yet exist and in all actuality may never be asserted.
The remaining arguments in opposition to the motion focus on the petitioners' alleged right to litigate the issue of exoneration in this Court. It appears that the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue. However, this Court again agrees with Judge Fallon who, in Matter of Falcon Inland, Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d 835, 837 (E.D.La. 1998), found that exoneration is not reserved exclusively to the federal court. This conclusion is buttressed by the more recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Lewis Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 453 (2001), that the Limitation Act does not give the petitioner a right to obtain exoneration from liability in federal court where limitation of liability is not at issue: "We have explained that `[t]he Act is not one of immunity from liability but of limitation of it.' . . . The Act and the rules of practice, however, do not create a freestanding right to exoneration from liability in circumstances where limitation of liability is not at issue." (citation omitted)
Instead, the central determination of this Court is whether the stipulations provided adequately protect the right of the petitioners to seek limited liability in federal court. This Court is satisfied that this right is adequately protected by the stipulations submitted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the second motion to dissolve the restraining order filed by claimants Rudolph Washington and Debra Washington is GRANTED.