Opinion
No. 3-456 / 03-0616.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, L. Vern Robinson, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h) (2003). AFFIRMED.
W. Eric Nelson of the Nelson Law Office, Coralville, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Deborah F. Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Lars Anderson, Iowa City, for father.
Karen Egerton of Stein, Moreland, Moore Egerton, L.L.P., Iowa City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Sally Peck of the Peck Law Firm, Iowa City, guardian ad litem for mother.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h) (2003). We affirm.
Amanda became pregnant when she was just thirteen years old. While pregnant, she was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA). Her daughter, Zahara, was born on November 8, 2001, and on February 21, 2002, Zahara was removed from Amanda's family home. Prior to Zahara's removal, Amanda had been consistently uncooperative with the Department of Human Service's (DHS) attempts to provide support. Her behavior culminating in a tantrum in which she threatened to kill her daughter.
Amanda stipulated to Zahara's adjudication as CINA, and Zahara was placed in foster care. Amanda was offered and utilized numerous services, including psychiatric counseling and classes on parenting skills and anger management. DHS further recommended an inpatient psychological evaluation and treatment at a facility in Toledo, Iowa, and made arrangements for Amanda and Zahara to reside together at House of Mercy, a residential care facility in Des Moines, but Amanda refused. By December 2002, Amanda had made great progress, and it seemed reunification was likely. However, in December, Amanda again began exhibiting the behavioral problems which had initially led to Zahara's removal. Instead of being expanded substantially at Christmas, Amanda's visitation was severely restricted as service providers feared for Zahara's safety.
In February 2003, the State petitioned to have Amanda's parental rights terminated. Trial was held March 12-14, 2003, and the juvenile court terminated Amanda's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h). Amanda appeals. She contends the State failed to provide reasonable efforts to achieve reunification and the juvenile court erred by overruling her attorney's motion to withdraw.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Our review of the district court's decision regarding counsel's motion to withdraw is for abuse of discretion. See State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995). We find an abuse of discretion only upon a showing the court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 1997).
Our de novo review of the record convinces us that the State did make reasonable efforts to achieve the reunification of Amanda and Zahara. Amanda specifically contends the State should have followed through with her placement at House of Mercy. Our review of the record indicates that it was Amanda who refused to take advantage of the House of Mercy program. When Amanda's behavior deteriorated again in December 2002 and the House of Mercy program was offered to her as the only way to salvage the situation, she refused to consider the move to Des Moines. Given these circumstances, we conclude the State made reasonable efforts at reunification, and the decision of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Amanda also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her attorney's motion to withdraw. The State contends error was not preserved because Amanda's attorney did not renew his motion at the trial. The motion to withdraw was filed on March 12, and the hearing on the motion was held and the motion denied on March 13. Trial began on March 14. We find no merit to the State's contention that Amanda's counsel needed to renew his motion during the course of the trial after the motion had been unequivocally denied the day before. We will, therefore, address the merits of Amanda's claim.
Based on our review of the record available, including Amanda's letter to the court, her attorney's written motion, and the juvenile court's written ruling, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw. This was the second time Amanda had attempted to fire an attorney for nearly identical reasons. The motion to withdraw was made on the eve of trial and granting the motion would have resulted in further delay of a matter already delayed beyond the statutory timeline. Additionally, we find no evidence in the trial record that Amanda's attorney did not adequately represent her at the trial. The juvenile court noted its familiarity with Amanda's case and made its decision accordingly. We affirm.