276 Ga. App. 666 (624 SE2d 251 ) (2005). 8

OCGA § 15-11-40 (b). See In the Interest of J. W., 293 Ga. App. 408, 411 ( 667 SE2d 161) (2008) (argument that child "has made positive changes in his behavior, has improved his grades, and is progressing toward receiving his high school diploma" was one that "changed circumstances so require in the best interest of the child"); In the Interest of J. V., supra, 282 Ga. App. at 321; In the Interest of S. S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 624 SE2d 251) (2005). Further, the evidence adduced at the hearing was consistent with the grounds alleged in K. F.'s motion.

OCGA § 15-11-40 (b). See In the Interest of J. V., 282 Ga. App. at 321; In the Interest of S. S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 667-668 ( 624 SE2d 251) (2005) (juvenile court had no authority to amend its commitment order once the Department has assumed physical custody of the child); In the Interest of B. D. T., 219 Ga. App. at 804-805. However, P. S. argues that because his motion for modification was based on grounds other than changed circumstances, the trial court had authority to modify his sentence under OCGA § 15-11-40 (b) and In the Interest of J. V. We find this argument unpersuasive.

See In the Interest of S. S.In the Interest of S. S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 624 SE2d 251) (2005). "Well-established principles of statutory construction require that the literal meaning of the words of a statute must be followed unless the result is an absurdity, contradiction, or such an inconvenience that it is clear that the legislature must have intended something else.

" (Footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of S. S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 624 SE2d 251) (2005). Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-70 (a), an order of disposition "continues in force for two years or until the child is sooner discharged by the Department of Juvenile Justice."

See also, e.g., In the Interest of S. S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 624 SE2d 251) (2005); In the Interest of W. P. B., 269 Ga.App. 101, 102 (2) ( 603 SE2d 454) (2004). 2.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the oral statements made by the judge during the hearing show that the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing R.W. in restrictive custody. In the Interest of S.S., 276 Ga.App. 666, 667, 624 S.E.2d 251 (2005) (footnote omitted). (c) R.W. also claims that in its written commitment order the juvenile court drew unwarranted conclusions from the evidence, failed to properly address the five factors set forth by OCGA § 15–11–63(c), and relied on facts not in evidence.

Moreover, any discrepancy between any oral statement by the court and court's written order must be resolved in favor of the written order. See In the Interest of S.S., 276 Ga.App. 666, 667, 624 S.E.2d 251 (2005). (b) S.F. also complains that the court failed to make a specific finding regarding the fifth factor: the age and physical condition of the victim.

Applying this statute, we have previously held that an order committing a child to the custody of the Department for a designated felony act could not be modified to change the terms of confinement once the Department has taken physical custody of the child. See In the Interest of S.S., 276 Ga.App. 666, 667, 624 S.E.2d 251 (2005) (juvenile court could not, amend its dispositional order to increase term of confinement in youth development center after child had been in custody of Department for a year); Dept. of Human Resources v. J.R.S., 161 Ga.App. 262, 263-264, 287 S.E.2d 713 (1982) (decided under previous Code section) (“the trial judge can neither terminate nor extend the disposition, and after the division has physical custody under the order he is also prevented from changing, modifying, or vacating the order on the ground that changed circumstances so require in the best interests of the child" ) (punctuation omitted); compare In the Interest of B.D.T., 219 Ga.App. 804, 804-805, 466 S.E.2d 680 (1996) (juvenile court could modify its order of commitment when child had not yet been transferred to physical custody of Department). We note that none of these cases addressed the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-63 .