Opinion
No. 2-608 / 02-0703.
Filed July 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, JOHN G. MULLEN, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child. AFFIRMED.
J.E. Tobey, III, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Murray W. Bell, Davenport, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katherine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Gerda Lane, Assistant County Attorney for appellee-State.
Carrie E. Coyle, Davenport, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and ZIMMER, JJ.
Virginia is the mother of Steven. Steven was born in May of 1994. On January 25, 2002, the State filed a petition to terminate Virginia's parental rights and the parental rights of Steven's father. A hearing was held on March 22, 2002, and on April 9, 2002, the juvenile court granted the State's petition. Virginia has filed a petition on appeal contending that (1) the State failed to prove that the behavior leading to Steven's removal from parental care continued to exist, and (2) she showed the ability to parent the child. She asks that the termination be reversed or that further briefing be ordered. Steven's father filed a notice of appeal but filed an untimely petition. His appeal has been dismissed by order of the supreme court. We affirm the termination of the mother's rights.
We review the termination de novo . In re W.G., 349 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 1984), cert. denied sub nom. J.G. v. Tauke, 469 U.S. 1222, 105 S.Ct. 1212, 84 L.Ed.2d 353 (1985). However, we give weight to the juvenile court's findings of fact, especially the credibility of the witnesses. W.G., 349 N.W.2d at 491-92. The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 1993). A parent has the right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights . See In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992); see also Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D.Iowa 1975). A parent's right to have custody of his or her child should be terminated only with the utilization of the required constitutional safeguards . See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923 ); In re T.R., 460 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected . Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1972).
In December of 1997 Virginia relinquished her parental rights to Steven, but this relinquishment never led to the termination of her parental rights. Since that time, Steven has at times been in her care, but rarely. Prior to relinquishing her parental rights to Steven and his younger brother, Virginia lived with Leroy. Steven and his younger brother exhibited bruising. Steven was removed from Virginia's care, and she and Leroy both pled guilty to child endangerment. Steven was placed with his father about a year later. Steven's father is mentally challenged and apparently had little or no money. In April of 2000 Steven was removed from his father's care. Steven appeared to be malnourished, and his father's housing was inadequate. The child was again placed in foster care. Placement with Virginia was rejected because she was married to Leroy, among other reasons. Leroy not only had been implicated in the abuse of her children, but there also was evidence Leroy had abused Virginia.
It was not until the fall of 2001 that Virginia showed any interest in Steven. At that time she requested the opportunity to visit with the child. She did have some visits with Steven. She contended that at the time of the termination hearing she was in a new stable relationship and capable of assuming Steven's care.
Virginia's evidence was that she had established a new relationship in February of 2001 and that she had earned a degree in truck driving. She was driving a truck for the Disabled American Veterans Thrift Store of Iowa. She testified she had been living in a $400-per-month apartment for a little over a month at the time of the hearing. She said her current boyfriend would be a responsible parent to Steven. She further stated that she had helped her brother, who like Steven has special needs.
Prior to the termination hearing, Virginia had attended one court hearing after Steven was removed. She contended she was told she had no rights because she had relinquished them. She also admitted another reason she had no rights was that she lived with Leroy for about three months in 2002. She admitted Leroy had abused her children. She was still married to him, although she had filed divorce papers and apparently was unable to serve them. Her current boyfriend also remained married but apparently had not lived with his wife for several years.
While we find, as did the juvenile court, that Virginia has made some improvements in her life, the record does not support her contentions that she is able to assume Steven's custodial care. Steven has been out of her care for most of his life. Steven has been identified as a special-needs child. Virginia consented to termination of her parental rights at the time he was removed from her care. She made no effort to contact him or help with his care during the time he was in his father's custody, or even after he was removed from his father's care and placed in foster care.
While there is evidence that Steven loves his father, there is no such evidence he has any relationship to Virginia. In the past she has put relationships with men before her children. Even if her current boyfriend could assist her with Steven's care, there is no guarantee of stability in that relationship. While they had been together for a year at the time of the termination hearing, they both remained married to other people. Furthermore, a review of Virginia's history indicates that she has slipped in and out of relationships with ease. She pled and was found guilty of child endangerment. The child has special needs, and there is no showing she can meet them. We affirm the termination of her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.