Opinion
No. 2-974 / 02-1519.
Filed December 30, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, GREGORY D. BRANDT, District Associate Judge.
Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey T. Mains of Benzoni Mains, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jon Anderson, Assistant County Attorney for appellee-State.
Bryan Tingle, Des Moines, for mother.
Victoria Meade, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
C.R. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children, C.R., Jr. and E.R., who are four and two years of age respectively. We affirm.
C.R. and T.R. are the married parents of C.R., Jr. and E.R. T.R. is also the mother of S.D., who was five years of age at the time of the termination hearing.
On May 24, 2001, the children were removed from their parents' home on the grounds they were being neglected in the home where illegal drugs were being used and the children were not supervised. The juvenile court's May 24, 2001 order placed the children in the legal custody of C.R.'s mother and they have remained in her care since then. On July 17, 2001, the children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code sections 232.12(6)(c)(2) (child has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harm due to parent's failure to exercise care in supervising child) and 232.2(6)(n) (parent's mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care) (2001). Following a June 18, 2002 hearing the juvenile court terminated T.R.'s parental rights to the three children and terminated C.R.'s parental rights to his two children, C.R., Jr. and E.R. The juvenile court terminated C.R.'s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c), (d), (e) (as to C.R., Jr.), (g) (as to E.R.), and (k) (2001). C.R. appeals.
An August 30, 2001 order provides that "effective June 1, 2001 the children are placed in DHS custody for purposes of foster care placement. This does not effectuate a change in physical placement as the current relatives have become licensed foster parents as of 6-1-01."
These provisions have been renumbered as sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), (h), and (l) respectively in the 2001 Code Supplement.
T.R.'s parental rights are not involved in this appeal.
Our scope and standards of review are well established.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
The juvenile court terminated C.R.'s parental rights pursuant to several statutory provisions, including section 232.116(1)(k). It provides the juvenile court may order the termination of parental rights if it finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child's parents for placement pursuant to section 232.102.
(2) The parent has a severe, chronic substance abuse problem, and presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent's prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to be returned to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and need for a permanent home.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(k) (2001). C.R. claims the juvenile court erred by finding sections 232.116(1)(k)(2) and (3) had been proven.
Section 232.116(1)(k)(2). The record is replete with evidence of C.R.'s approximately nine-year history of severe and chronic substance abuse and the dangers this has presented to T.R. and the children in recent years. C.R. began using methamphetamine in 1993, sometimes using daily for months at a time. He received substance abuse treatment in 1993, but relapsed within a few months. In about 1994 he got treatment again, but did not successfully complete it and relapsed and began using right away. He next went into treatment in 1997, but after maintaining sobriety for a period of time used again. In April 1998 C.R.'s probation was revoked on his prior convictions for driving while barred and second degree theft and he served thirteen months in prison followed by five months in a residential correctional facility. He thereafter relapsed and began using methamphetamine again.
In late February 2001 C.R. was arrested at home and charged with child endangerment and numerous methamphetamine-related offenses. T.R. reported she had known since January that C.R. had relapsed, and that domestic abuse had been escalating with his usage. In late January 2001 C.R. had pled guilty to and been convicted of a charge of domestic abuse. A founded report of child abuse of S.D., C.R., Jr. and E.R., by C.R., was placed on the child abuse registry as a result of his denial of critical care for failure to provide proper supervision in April 2001. At the June 2002 termination hearing C.R. testified he had not used methamphetamine for over a year. However, he had been in jail or a residential facility for most of that year.
C.R.'s testimony indicates he did not abuse alcohol when he began using methamphetamine, and does not believe he is an alcoholic. Although both may be true, the evidence does show that C.R. now has a chronic, severe alcohol abuse problem.
In late September 2001, after the children had been removed and adjudicated CINA, C.R. got drunk and committed domestic abuse of T.R. He spent time in jail from then until March 4, 2002, when he was released from jail but required to reside in a residential correctional facility as a condition of probation he was on. On April 1, 2002 he was apparently unable to refrain from alcohol use and drank, in violation of terms and conditions of probation or facility rules. Then on June 11, 2002, just one day before his required time at the residential correctional facility was to end, and just eight days before the termination hearing was scheduled to be held, he remained unable to refrain from alcohol consumption and drank again. This incident resulted in him having to re-start an alcohol abuse program and delayed the end of his required residence in a residential correctional facility until at least September 4, 2002.
C.R.'s long struggle with methamphetamine use, and his more recent abuse of alcohol and inability to refrain from its consumption, clearly and convincingly show he has a severe, chronic substance abuse problem. The founded report of his abuse of the three children and his reported domestic abuses of T.R., all occurring during times when he was abusing drugs, alcohol, or both, clearly and convincingly show he presents a danger to others as evidenced by prior acts. Upon our de novo review we find, as the juvenile court did, that the element contained in section 232.116(1)(k)(2) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 232.116(1)(k)(3). As discussed above, C.R. has struggled, largely unsuccessfully, to deal with his drug and alcohol abuse problems. At the time of the termination hearing C.R. was attending alcohol abuse meetings and was on a waiting list to attend an intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. C.R. was required to continue residing in a residential correctional facility for at least two and one-half more months. He remained on probation, and acknowledged he was in no position to assume custody and care of C.R., Jr. and E.R. He asserted he would be able to have full custody of the two children in about six months. He acknowledged, however, that he was at risk of having his probation revoked. Further, assuming his probation would be continued rather than revoked following his release from the residential correctional facility, he testified he had plans to live in Salvation Army housing for eighteen months and that while children could visit him there they could not reside with him there.
C.R.'s prognosis, his current circumstances, and his known and anticipated circumstances for the foreseeable future show that C.R., Jr. and E.R. cannot be placed in his custody now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. C.R., Jr. is four years of age and E.R. is two years of age. As a result of C.R.'s incarceration he has had regular contact with them somewhat less than one-half of each of their lives. Their mother's parental rights have been terminated. By reason of their ages, the chaotic condition that existed in their home until their removal, and their lack of a permanent home and family for over one year, they now need and deserve a permanent home. Based on our de novo review of the record we find, as the juvenile court did, the element contained in section 232.116(1)(k)(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Where the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we only need to find grounds to terminate under one of the statutory provisions to affirm. In re A.J., 535 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). On our de novo review we find clear and convincing evidence supports termination of C.R.'s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(k). We therefore affirm without addressing the several additional grounds for termination found by the juvenile court.