Opinion
No. 3-672 / 03-1277
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sylvia A. Lewis, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to one child. AFFIRMED.
L. Jay Stein of Stein, Moreland, Moore Egerton, Iowa City, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Deborah Farmer Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Amy Evenson of Larson Evenson, Iowa City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
K.J. is the mother of a girl, R.A.J., born in November 1995, and R.A.J.'s two half-brothers, C.J., born in January 1980, and B.J., born in August 1981. K.J. appeals from a July 29, 2003 juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to R.A.J. pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (i) (2003). K.J. contends certain findings by the juvenile court, including ultimate findings regarding statutory elements for termination, are not based on clear and convincing evidence. We conclude that facts supporting termination are proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore affirm.
The juvenile court also terminated R.A.J.'s father's parental rights. He consented to termination, and does not appeal.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
Relevant facts, events, and prior proceedings involved in this case are set forth in substantial detail in our recent opinion affirming a juvenile court order in the underlying child in need of assistance (CINA) case which modified prior dispositional orders and waived reasonable efforts toward reunification based on aggravated circumstances. See In re R.A.J., No. 3-597/03-0622 (Iowa Ct.App. Sept. 24, 2003). We will therefore not repeat in great detail what was said in our earlier opinion.
As of early December 2000 C.J. and B.J. were young adults but continued to reside with K.J. and R.A.J. C.J. and B.J. had been adjudicated CINA years earlier, and K.J. had been provided with numerous and extensive services to help her in parenting her children. The evidence strongly indicates that K.J. was unable or unwilling to take reasonable advantage of those services. Both C.J. and B.J. had extensive records of juvenile delinquency and criminal activity, including acts of violence and sex offenses perpetrated on children. Each had a history of substance abuse. C.J. had been convicted of a sex offense, had failed on probation, and had spent time in prison. In or about early December 2000 B.J. sexually abused R.A.J. R.A.J. reported B.J.'s abuse to K.J., but K.J. did nothing.
C.J. apparently became aware of B.J.'s sexual abuse of R.A.J. and reported it. On December 8, 2000, law enforcement officials removed R.A.J. from K.J.'s custody. The removal was confirmed by a juvenile court order which placed R.A.J. in the temporary custody of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) for foster family care or relative care. On January 17, 2001, the juvenile court adjudicated R.A.J. a CINA pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (6)(c)(2), and (6)(d). The order provided that R.A.J. remain in DHS custody for foster family care pending disposition. A March 12, 2001 dispositional order continued R.A.J. in DHS custody for foster family care.
The juvenile court ordered that C.J. and B.J. have no contact with R.A.J. K.J. was again provided with services, as well as regular supervised visitation with R.A.J. R.A.J. remained in foster family care. On March 13, 2002, the juvenile court authorized the DHS to begin trial home placement and R.A.J. was returned to K.J.'s home shortly thereafter. B.J. was convicted of sexually abusing R.A.J. Both C.J. and B.J. are required to register as sex offenders.
By the time of a September 2002 review hearing there were rumors that C.J. had returned to K.J.'s home. K.J. denied the rumors. The juvenile court admonished K.J. concerning the need to protect R.A.J. from C.J. and B.J., that no contact between them and R.A.J. was permitted, and that severe consequences would result if K.J. permitted such contact. K.J. acknowledged that she understood.
Soon thereafter R.A.J. reported that C.J. was staying at K.J.'s home, and that he and his girlfriend had been sleeping in R.A.J.'s bed. K.J. acknowledged she was allowing C.J. and his girlfriend, as well as others who presented a risk to R.A.J., to stay in her home. On September 26, 2002, with K.J.'s agreement, R.A.J. was again placed in family foster care, with the same family with which she had resided for about one and one-half years when first removed from K.J.'s custody.
Following a late January 2003 hearing the juvenile court modified prior dispositional orders, and waived reasonable efforts toward reunification, finding that aggravated circumstances existed. After that hearing K.J. moved to Missouri, to live near a sister. She stated a reason for the move was so that C.J. and B.J. would not know where she is. In terminating K.J.'s parental rights the juvenile court found in part:
There is no reason to believe that [K.J.'s] move to Missouri provides any protection for [R.A.J.], and [K.J.'s] reliance on this choice is nave at best. [K.J.'s] inability to control her adult son's access to her home is not the only failure to exercise judgment. Other members of the family have also been identified as presenting high risks for [R.A.J.], yet [K.J.] is unable to enforce boundaries and doesn't seem to really comprehend the likelihood of harm these individuals present for [R.A.J.]. [K.J.'s] willingness to protect [R.A.J.] from these persons is externally motivated. Indeed, during the period when [R.A.J.] had returned to the home, [R.A.J.] was enlisted to hide the return of [C.J.] to the home.
Reasonable efforts were waived in January of 2003. The primary change since that time is [K.J.'s] move to Missouri. There is no reason to believe that the move to Missouri provides for the protection of [R.A.J.] such that she could safely return to her mother's care.
We fully agree with these findings and this analysis. C.J., B.J., and others whom K.J. has allowed to have contact with R.A.J., pose a continuing threat to R.A.J. K.J. has received years of services designed to enable her to appropriately parent and protect her children. She knows of the harm certain persons have caused R.A.J., and the threat that they pose to R.A.J. She was aware of the juvenile court order that no contact be allowed between certain persons and R.A.J. The juvenile court had admonished her concerning serious consequences that would result from allowing prohibited contacts and failure to protect R.A.J. K.J. has nevertheless continued to acquiesce in the wishes of others and allowed contacts that violate court orders and clearly put R.A.J. at risk. She has been unable or unwilling to put R.A.J.'s interests at the forefront and prevent persons that are serious threats to R.A.J. from continuing to have contact with R.A.J.
Upon our de novo review we find that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's findings relevant to termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(i). We further find, as the juvenile court did, that the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence the elements for termination of K.J.'s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(i), that (1) R.A.J. meets the definition of a child in need of assistance based on a finding of sexual abuse or neglect as a result of the acts or omissions of one or both parents, (2) there is clear and convincing evidence that the abuse or neglect constituted imminent danger to R.A.J., and (3) there is clear and convincing evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the conditions which led to the abuse or neglect of the child within a reasonable period of time. We need not determine whether termination was also appropriate under section 232.116(1)(f). See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (holding that we only need to find grounds to terminate under one of the statutory provisions relied on by the district court in order to affirm).
In its response to K.J.'s petition on appeal the State argues that termination of K.J.'s parental rights was in R.A.J.'s best interests. Although our review of K.J.'s petition on appeal does not reveal a claim that termination was not in R.A.J.'s best interest, we nevertheless briefly address the question.
R.A.J. is a developmentally delayed, special needs child who is doing well in foster care. Her foster family, with whom she has now twice resided for extended periods of time, has indicated they would welcome her as a permanent member. R.A.J. would again be at serious risk if returned to K.J., who has repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to do the things necessary to protect R.A.J. Upon our de novo review, we find termination of K.J.'s parental rights to be in R.A.J.'s best interests.