Opinion
No. 3-698 / 03-1315
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Brian L. Michaelson, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three children. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
Patrick Tott, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Dewey Sloan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Marchelle Denker of the Sioux City Juvenile Office, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Starla is the mother of three children: Tessandra, born March 16, 1992; Miranda, born November 24, 2000; and Cody, born March 28, 2002. Harley Jr., the father of Miranda and Cody, is a registered sex offender, listed as posing a high risk to children with several sexual abuse reports and convictions against him. When the Department of Human Services (DHS) learned of Starla's relationship with Harley Jr. in February 2002, Tessandra and Miranda were removed from Starla's care, and Cody was removed as soon as he was born a month later. Although Starla denied having any recent contact with Harley Jr., the address at which Starla and the children were located was the same address listed on the sex offender registry as Harley Jr.'s residence. Tessandra was placed with her paternal grandparents, and Miranda and Cody were placed in foster care.
Harley Jr.'s parents lived at this address as well. Notably, Harley Jr.'s father, Harley Sr., also has founded sexual abuse reports against him.
Harley Jr. is not Tessandra's father.
Tessandra and Miranda were adjudicated children in need of assistance on April 4, and Cody was adjudicated on May 21, 2002. DHS emphasized to Starla that the most crucial component of the plan for her reunification with her children was for her to terminate her relationship with Harley Jr. and discontinue any contact with him. DHS also recommended Starla find employment and independent housing.
During her visits with her children, Starla demonstrated she had a close bond with her children and had appropriate parenting skills. She secured an apartment separate from Harley Jr.'s family home. However, DHS received reports from Starla's landlord and neighbors that Starla was not actually living in the apartment. When providers inspected the apartment to determine if Starla could have visits at her home, Starla had difficulty producing furniture for the children. Various providers observed Starla coming out of Harley Jr.'s family home and being dropped off for her service appointments by Harley Jr.'s mother. Another time, providers visited Starla's apartment and discovered Starla's sister and an unidentified man in the apartment, who indicated that Starla was not there and had not been there. When confronted with these observations by the eyewitnesses, Starla vehemently denied the allegations.
Starla has also been seen making deliveries for the delivery service owned by Harley Jr.'s family. Starla is otherwise unemployed, and when asked where she gets money to pay her expenses, she testified that her mother and sister give her cash. However, her mother and sister both testified that they do not give money to Starla.
The State filed a petition to terminate Starla's parental rights to her three children on March 20, 2003. After the termination hearing, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Starla's parental rights to all three children pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2003). Starla appeals.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Starla first argues, and the State concedes, the grounds for termination as to Tessandra pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h) and termination as to Miranda and Cody pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f) were not proven because of the children's ages. We agree and reverse that portion of the order terminating Starla's parental rights as to Tessandra pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h) and as to Miranda and Cody pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f).
We turn, then, to Starla's contention that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to her care, as required by subsections 232.116(1)(f)(4) (as to Tessandra) and 232.116(1)(h)(4) (as to Miranda and Cody). Starla contends that because none of the providers has actually seen her in the presence of Harley Jr., the State could not prove Starla was continuing contact with Harley Jr. and that she would not protect her children from sexual abuse. Starla maintains the issues which caused DHS to remove her children have been resolved by her participation in parenting skill development, therapy, and moving into her own apartment.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the State did meet its burden. Although Starla completed parenting skill development, the evidence indicates she has not internalized the concepts introduced. At the termination hearing, Starla testified that she didn't know if her children would be at risk for sexual abuse if they were exposed to Harley, Jr. She has been consistently evasive with her providers and has clearly lied about her whereabouts and contacts. In fact, her therapy was terminated because she was untruthful with her therapist and continued to be in contact with Harley Jr. and his family. Because of Starla's continued involvement with a person and family posing a severe risk to her children, we agree with the juvenile court's finding that the children could not be returned to Starla's care as of the time of the hearing. We therefore affirm the juvenile court's termination of Starla's parental rights as to Tessandra pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f) and as to Miranda and Cody pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h).
Starla also argues that the juvenile court erred in its determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. At the time of the hearing, these children had been out of Starla's care for roughly a year and a half. Cody has never been in his mother's custody. Despite Starla's professions of love for her children, she refuses to interact honestly with service providers in an attempt to regain her children. Instead she demonstrates a stronger allegiance to a relationship which poses a serious threat to her children. Tessandra, Miranda, and Cody are flourishing in their current placements and deserve permanency. We agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate Starla's parental rights, and we affirm.