Opinion
No. 2-213 / 01-1279.
Filed July 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, CONSTANCE COHEN, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two of their children. AFFIRMED.
Tiffany Koenig and Christopher Kragnes, Sr., Des Moines, for appellant mother.
J. Michael Mayer, Des Moines, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Martha Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Amy Kepes of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, for minor children.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two children. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Debra and Dean married and together had two children, L.O. and C.O., born in 1995 and 1997 respectively. Also living in the household was J.O., Debra's daughter from a prior relationship.
When J.O. was eight years old, she reported to her teacher that Dean made her look at pornographic movies and magazines, touched her vaginal area over her clothes, and asked her to engage in oral sex, which she refused. Dean was ordered to have no contact with the family.
Within a month, J.O. reported to school officials that Dean was "sneaking" to see the family. All three children were placed in foster care and subsequently adjudicated in need of assistance.
Eventually, the State petitioned to terminate both parents' rights. The juvenile court partially granted the petition. As to Debra, the court granted the petition only with respect to L.O. and C.O. The court relied on Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c) (1999) (physical or sexual abuse or neglect and circumstances continue to exist despite receipt of services) and (e) (child four or older cannot be returned to home). The court did not terminate her rights with respect to J.O., whose custody was placed with her biological father. Dean's rights were terminated pursuant to sections 232.116(1)(c), (e), (d) (absence of significant and meaningful contact), and (h) (child in imminent danger and services would not correct conditions).
The court entered a nunc pro tunc order adding sections (d) and (h) as grounds for termination. As the State did not plead these grounds with respect to Debra, we will not consider them.
On appeal, the parents contend the State failed to meet its burden of proof under all the cited provisions. Debra also contends it was not in the two children's best interests to terminate her rights. Our review of these issues is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Where the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find one ground on which to affirm. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). Accordingly, we will only address the parties' arguments under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (child cannot be returned to home).
II. Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e)
A. Mother . Debra contends the children could have been returned to her at the time of the termination hearing. She points out she was no longer involved with Dean and had complied with services. We are not persuaded.
After the sex abuse allegations came to light, Debra allowed Dean to have contact with J.O., in violation of the no-contact order. A court appointed special advocate expressed concern that she had "not taken any responsibility for her role in the removal of her children." A counselor who performed a psychosocial evaluation stated "it was positive" that Debra was voicing a desire to be protective of her daughter, but expressed concern that her passivity and dependency on Dean "might make it more difficult to be adequately protective of the girls." Although Debra was in the process of divorcing Dean at the time of the termination hearing, her counselor doubted whether she was willing to progress with therapy.
At supervised visits, Debra and the children appeared happy to see each other, but Debra responded aggressively to their tumultuous behaviors, "hitting, biting, and pinching" them in front of the service provider and the court appointed special advocate. While Debra's interaction with the children improved over time, the service provider opined that she still lacked the necessary skills to take the children back. A foster care worker seconded this opinion, stating there were still some parenting issues Debra needed to work on. We conclude the State proved that L.O. and C.O. could not be returned to Debra's care.
B. Father . Dean maintains the Department did not make a "credible effort" to reunite him with his children, a precursor to termination under section 232.116(1)(e). See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). We believe the Department satisfied its statutory mandate.
A Department worker testified that, even as a "non-admitting perpetrator," Dean would have been entitled to individual therapy. She stated she provided Dean's attorney with the name of a therapist who could furnish this service. There is no indication that Dean followed up.
Dean stated he was not referred for individual therapy services and did not recall being told that therapy services would be provided if he found a provider he could work with.
In light of Dean's history of drug and alcohol abuse, the Department also referred Dean to a program on the effects of drugs on domestic life, a program that he successfully completed.
As an added measure, the Department screened Dean for drug use. Initially, Dean failed to provide urine samples and each failure was deemed a positive test. He later asked the Department to allow him to provide samples on specified days rather than randomly. The Department agreed. Although these non-random samples were technically negative, they contained a low level of methamphetamine.
The juvenile court surmised that Dean had learned to circumvent the drug testing system by only providing samples when the methamphetamine he was taking had been all but cleansed from his body.
Finally, the Department recommended a psychosocial evaluation. Dean initially did not agree to participate. He consented nearly nine months after the children were adjudicated in need of assistance. The Department immediately made this service available. The evaluator noted that the assessment test could not be validly interpreted "because Dean indicated strong tendencies to deny personal problems and responded to the test with a defensive response set." The evaluator cited as an example the fact that he "did not endorse any symptoms associated with alcohol abuse and/or dependence." She suggested a number of therapeutic goals, including individual therapy. As noted, Dean did not follow through with this service.
We conclude the State met its burden of proving that the children could not be returned to Dean's care.
III. Best Interests
Debra also contends termination was not in L.O. and C.O.'s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981). We disagree.
Although L.O., in particular, experienced significant problems in foster care, problems that Debra maintained were less pronounced when he was at home, a professional who dealt with L.O. felt his behavior was improving and opined that his mother was triggering anger in L.O. Additionally, the professionals who worked with Debra felt she was unable to cope with L.O.'s problems despite a year of services.
C.O.'s therapist recommended against returning the child to Debra. She noted that C.O. had been severely damaged and needed time to heal. C.O.'s foster mother stated she had known the family for several years and this child's problems predated the removal.
We conclude it is in these two children's best interests to affirm the termination of their mother's parental rights.
AFFIRMED.