Opinion
No. 3-468 / 03-0885
Filed July 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, James A. Weaver, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her two children. AFFIRMED.
Roland Caldwell of the Muscatine Legal Services, Muscatine, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Neva Rettig-Baker, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Heather is the mother of two children, H.W., born February 18, 1999, and D.W., born March 29, 2000. On September 21, 2001, while investigating a 911 call placed from Heather's home, police discovered that Heather's fifteen-year-old paramour had severely physically abused both Heather and A.W. Both A.W. and D.W. were removed pursuant to an emergency removal order.
The case permanency plan required Heather to participate in substance abuse treatment, receive and internalize instruction concerning parenting skills, and receive support and counseling regarding domestic violence. She was also to notify DHS of any changes in her family situation.
Heather successfully completed substance abuse treatment, although her counselor opined that Heather's continued abstinence depended on her selection of male partners who did not use drugs. Heather also utilized parenting skills classes. Her visitation with her children was increased to fourteen hours a week, before it was reduced due to the discovery of Heather's relationship with Arturo. This relationship began just nine days after the children were removed from Heather's care, but Heather did not inform DHS and was evasive about it once it was discovered. DHS learned Arturo had been convicted of serious domestic assault and willful injury and required any visit that included him to be supervised.
Arturo became angry about the restrictions imposed by DHS and physically assaulted Heather. He was arrested, convicted of aggravated domestic assault, and incarcerated for three months. Heather continued her relationship with Arturo, but lied to DHS about it. Shortly after he was released, Heather was accused of, and pled guilty to, assaulting Arturo. Heather continued to lie about her relationship with Arturo, and because DHS doubted her veracity, Heather's visitation with her children was again substantially reduced to only two hours per week, supervised.
In August of 2002, Heather finally admitted she had continued a relationship with Arturo, but claimed to have now ended the relationship permanently. This was again a lie, and at the trial, in October of 2002, Heather and Arturo both testified about their intent to marry. Arturo testified that they had gone so far as purchasing a marriage license.
Heather's case worker testified that despite Heather's participation in parenting skills and domestic abuse classes, she was not making progress or internalizing the concepts she learned. The caseworker referred to reports from Heather's domestic violence counselor which indicated Heather withheld information and minimized the level of violence she had experienced. One report also noted that Heather had stated to her counselor that she did not believe her children would be adversely affected by the domestic violence they observed and experienced because they were too young to know what happened. The domestic violence counselor believed that Heather did not understand the impact domestic violence has on children and would continue to allow it into her children's lives.
Heather's case worker further opined that Heather would not place the children's safety above her own desires, citing Heather's inability to protect H.W. from her fifteen-year-old paramour, Heather's continuing relationship with Arturo, despite the resulting restrictions placed on her visitation, the results of Heather's psychological evaluation, and Heather's repeated lies to DHS.
Heather testified that she planned to continue her relationship with Arturo and that she believed he was sincerely changing his life. She said she would protect herself and her children should Arturo or anyone else become violent toward them. Arturo testified that he was attending a batterer's education program and that he was learning how to control his anger. He admitted he had merely gone through the motions before, but that his attitude changed now that Heather had recently given birth to his child.
This child has been removed from the care of Heather and Arturo.
The court terminated Heather's parental rights to A.W. and D.W. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (Supp. 2001). Heather appeals, alleging the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Heather did not make reasonable efforts to resume care of her children as required under section 232.116(1)(e)(3) or that the children could not be safely returned to her care as required by section 232.116(1)(h)(4).
The fathers of both children have had little, if any, contact with their children. They have both been incarcerated during the majority of the events described above. The court also terminated their parental rights, and neither has appealed.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Heather contends that her relationship with Arturo, despite the fact that he physically assaulted her in the past, is not sufficient to establish she did not make reasonable efforts to resume care of her children or that the children could not be returned to her care safely.
After a de novo review of the record, we conclude there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Heather's parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h). Our decision is not based merely on the fact that Heather has chosen to maintain a relationship with someone who formerly abused her, but on the range of factors mentioned by her case worker. Heather consistently lied to DHS about her relationship with Arturo, and continued the relationship despite the resulting reduction in her visitation with her children. This demonstrates her inability to put her children's needs ahead of her own desires and her inability to deal with the problem of Arturo's violent tendencies. The State introduced evidence that Heather has not improved her parenting skills and has not internalized the concepts she's learned about the effect of domestic abuse on children. We do not have confidence in Heather's ability or willingness to protect herself or her children should Arturo or anyone else become violent toward them. Although Arturo expressed an interest in reforming his behavior, this is a recent development and one which has not been demonstrated by his past behavior. Arturo's commitment can only be proven in time, something A.W. and D.W. can little afford. While patience is allowed parents to remedy their deficiencies, that time must be limited because the delay may translate into intolerable hardship for the children. In re E.B.L. 501 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Iowa 1993). "A parent cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). Although Arturo is not the father of A.W. and D.W., Heather has expressed, in no uncertain terms, her intent to be with him. Thus, Arturo has parental obligations to the children similar to Heather's. His failure to embrace his responsibility and comply with the requests of DHS until the eve of trial has grave consequences. We accordingly conclude the children can not safely be returned to Heather's care at this time.
Because we have found clear and convincing evidence supporting Heather's termination of parental rights under 232.116(1)(h), we do not need to determine if substantial evidence supported her termination under 232.116(1)(e).