Opinion
No. 3-457 / 03-0687.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. AFFIRMED.
Scott Bandstra of Bandstra Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Christopher Coppola of Coppola, Sandre, McConville Carroll, P.C., Des Moines, for father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer Galloway, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Kimberly Ayotte of Youth Law Center, for minor child.
Considered by Zimmer, P. J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. She contends the district court erred in concluding clear and convincing evidence supports termination pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h) (2003). We review her claims de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
We first address the mother's argument that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h). She does not dispute that the first three elements of this section have been met, but instead argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the children could not be returned to her care. We disagree. At the time of termination, the mother was residing in her father's two-bedroom home with an adult sister. The mother did not maintain regular visits with her child during the course of proceedings and did not fully participate in services offered to reunify her with her child. Although her child had been adjudicated in need of assistance in July 2002, the mother waited until March 15, 2003 to obtain a psychological evaluation. The mother was defensive and evasive during the evaluation. As a result, the evaluator was unwilling to recommend unsupervised visits, let alone reunification. The mother had previously been involved with the Department of Human Services concerning another child who now resides with his father. During those proceedings, the mother underwent a psychological evaluation that determined her predominant personality feature consists of histrionic traits. She also showed evidence of antisocial-like, narcissistic, and aggressive traits. However, after undergoing four counseling sessions in the month prior to this termination, the mother does not believe she needs additional counseling.
At the termination hearing, the mother's testimony conflicted with previous reports. Although she had told a service provider that her sister was under "house arrest," at the hearing she denied knowledge of any criminal charges against her sister. It was also not until her testimony at the termination hearing that the mother acknowledged that her child should be protected from her husband, the child's father, who is a known sex offender. The mother had previously told a service provider that she was considering separating from her husband in order to regain custody of her child, but was planning to reunite with her husband after her child was returned to her. It is the danger of exposure to a known sexual offender and the mother's inability to understand this danger and protect her child that prevents reunification.
At the termination hearing, the mother attempted to emphasize that her recent actions warranted reunification, or additional time to reunify. As the service provider who conducted the mother's most recent psychological evaluation noted, the mother "appeared to be interested in making a last ditch effort to maintain her parental rights." The district court likewise found "Heather Bickle's last ditch attempt to maintain her parental rights is simply too little-too late." While the law requires a "full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills," this patience has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494. Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. Id. At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Because the statutory requirements of section 232.116(1)(h) have been met, we affirm the district court's order terminating the mother's parental rights.
We need only find termination proper on one ground to affirm. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Accordingly, we need not address the mother's argument regarding termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(d).