Opinion
No. 3-424 / 03-0769.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, John G. Mullen, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the juvenile court's termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey M. Johnson, Muscatine, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Phillips, County Attorney, and Korie L. Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
William J. Creasey of Goedken Creasey, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellee-mother.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
Appellant-father, Chad, appeals the decision of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to Elijah and Kaleb under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (2003), 232.116(1)(f) [Elijah], 232.116(1)(h) [Kaleb] and 232.117 (2003). On appeal Chad argues that even though the statutory criteria for termination were met, the juvenile court erred in failing to consider that the children were in their grandmother's custody and that there was a close parent-child relationship between the children and Chad. We affirm.
At the time of the April 10, 2003 termination order, Elijah, whose birth date is March 19, 1999, was four years old, and Kaleb, whose birth date is July 5, 2000, was two years old. On December 24, 2001 Elijah and Kaleb were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) following Chad's confessions to sexually abusing another child living in the home. We affirmed the juvenile court's CINA adjudication finding Elijah and Kaleb were also at risk of being sexually abused by Chad. In re E.H. and K.H., No. 02-0453 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 15, 2002).
In the February 28, 2002 dispositional hearing, the court stated the primary dispositional need was for Chad to participate and complete sex offender treatment successfully. According to DHS caseworker Jennifer Blake, Chad was required to obtain a sex offender evaluation within ten days of the dispositional order, which he did not do. Ms. Blake testified Chad initially refused to participate in any such treatment, but in June of 2002 he asked for her assistance in arranging it. Chad then faced several problems in obtaining the evaluation, including scheduling an interpreter and securing the money necessary for the evaluation. He finally obtained the evaluation on October 7 and November 11, 2002. The results of that evaluation were that Chad was to seek sexual offender treatment. Ms. Blake testified she informed Chad that sex offender treatment from Psychology Associates was not available in Muscatine, but was available in Davenport, and that he would need individual sessions because of his need for an interpreter. She also told him the cost would be thirty-five dollars per session.
Chad is hearing-impaired.
Both Ms. Blake and the district court voiced concerns about Chad's mental and emotional stability. Chad has attempted suicide multiple times in his past, and he has been charged twice with public intoxication.
At the termination hearing Chad defended his failure to pursue sex offender treatment in Davenport following the evaluation, testifying that he did not have transportation to pursue those services, nor did he have the money to pay for them. Chad also indicated that he is in therapy for his depression and his public intoxication charges were likely due to his drinking a small amount of alcohol which, in combination with his depression medication, caused an exaggerated reaction.
Part of the case permanency plan provided for the adoption of Elijah and Kaleb by Peggy, Chad's mother. Elijah has been in Peggy's care since July of 2001, and Kaleb has been in her care since February of this year. Both children have significant medical conditions, and Peggy has reportedly done an excellent job caring for them.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993). Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993). The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 1993). When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Chad argues under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) and (c) that the juvenile court erred in failing to consider that Elijah and Kaleb live with Chad's mother and are very attached to Chad.
We recognize that termination is not mandatory, even if statutory requirements are met, if the children are in the legal custody of a relative or if termination would be detrimental to the children due to a close parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3). In this case, however, the juvenile court recognized both that (1) the children were living with their grandmother, and (2) Chad was interested in his children and was an active participant in the significant events of their young lives. The court nevertheless determined it was in the best interests of Elijah and Kaleb to terminate Chad's parental rights because he had taken no responsibility in seeking resolution for his sexual abuse problems. We agree with the juvenile court. Given Chad's delays in seeking sexual offender treatment, he continues to present a significant risk to his children. Because Elijah and Kaleb are at continued risk when in his care, we do not believe it is detrimental to them to terminate Chad's parental rights, even if the children do enjoy a close relationship with him. Furthermore, because the children are enjoying a stable life with Chad's mother and should not "languish in parentless limbo" for the indeterminate time it will take Chad to address his sexual abuse problems, we are not convinced their placement with Chad's mother should disqualify them from having a permanent family structure. See In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's decision to terminate Chad's parental rights to Elijah and Kaleb.