Opinion
No. 2-650 / 00-2016
Filed November 15, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, RICHARD D. MORR, Judge.
An individual involuntarily hospitalized as seriously mentally impaired appeals from an order which approved a periodic report, ordered continued hospitalization, and did not schedule a hearing on his application for a review hearing. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Bryan Tingle and Jolie Juckette of Tingle, Knight, Webster Juckette, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mary Benton, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and MILLER, JJ.
David, involuntarily hospitalized as seriously mentally impaired, appeals from an order approving a periodic report and ordering continued hospitalization. He contends: "The district court's failure to conduct a hearing to determine the question of serious mental impairment upon [David's] writ of habeas corpus was a violation of [David's] 14th Amendment due process rights." We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for possible further proceedings.
An application requesting David's involuntary hospitalization was filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 229.6 (1999). The judicial hospitalization referee held a hearing on September 19, 2000, and on the same date found David seriously mentally impaired and ordered him hospitalized at the Mental Health Institute at Clarinda for psychiatric evaluation and appropriate treatment. David did not appeal.
The chief medical officer or designee prepared a report to the court on November 8, 2000, pursuant to section 229.15(1). The report was filed November 17. It reported that David's condition remained unchanged, he remained seriously mentally impaired and in need of full-time custody, care, and treatment in a hospital, and he was considered likely to benefit from treatment.
On November 27 David filed what he denominated an "Application for Review Hearing." In it he stated that he "requests a review hearing before . . . the Judicial Hospitalization Referee, for the following reasons: I am not a danger to myself or others."
The periodic report filed November 17 was apparently brought to the trial court's attention on November 27, as was David's November 27 application. Iowa Code section 229.15(5) required the trial court to examine the periodic report and take the action it deemed appropriate. It did so on November 27, noting the contents of the report, making findings consistent with the report, and ordering a further periodic report to be filed later. In its written order the trial court also acknowledged David's application and ordered that upon receipt and review of the next periodic report the court would determine when a review hearing should be set.
On December 5 David filed a document stating that he appealed the November 27 ruling. On December 11 the trial court ordered that David's appeal be transmitted to our supreme court and appointed counsel to represent him.
Our review is for correction of errors of law. In re Melodie L., 591 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1999); B.A.A. v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps., 421 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1988).
The test of whether an involuntary mental patient suffers from "serious mental impairment" is the same for continued involuntary commitment as it is for the patient's initial commitment. See generally B.A.A., 421 N.W.2d at 118. To be "seriously mentally impaired' and thus subject to continued involuntary commitment and treatment one must be, among other things, a danger to oneself or others. See Iowa Code § 229.1(15)(a), (b), (c); B.A.A., 421 N.W.2d at 125-26. David's application alleged he was no longer a danger to himself or others, thus implicitly alleging he was no longer subject to involuntary commitment.
An earlier case decided by our supreme court is instructive. Following involuntary hospitalization for serious mental impairment, periodic reports and continued hospitalizations, and later inpatient group home treatment, Melodie L. filed an application seeking an order that she be released from inpatient treatment and ordered to participate in outpatient treatment. See Melodie L., 591 N.W.2d at 5-6. Our supreme court noted that other than the habeas corpus process under section 229.37 and commission of inquiry proceedings under sections 229.31-.36 there is no specific procedure which enables a patient so committed to initiate a review of the commitment. Id. at 9. It stated: "These procedures entitle a patient to challenge the commitment process at any stage, with some limitations on the commission proceedings, and are independent of the medical reporting process." Id. It went on to conclude, "The application filed by Melodie in this case was actually a petition for habeas corpus," citing Halverson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 532 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Iowa 1995) for the proposition that a label attached to a motion does not determine its legal significance.
David asserts the district court's failure to conduct a hearing to determine the question of serious mental impairment was a violation of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. He requests that we vacate the trial court's November 27 order and remand for a hearing to determine the question of serious mental impairment. However, for the reasons that follow we conclude that, while the trial court should have treated David's application as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, only part of the order should be vacated and relief should be somewhat more limited than David requests.
The portion of the trial court's November 27 order approving the recent periodic report and implicitly ordering continued hospitalization is consistent with the contents of the report and is appropriate under section 229.15(5). We conclude that portion of the order should be affirmed.
Under our supreme court's analysis in Melodie L. the trial court should have viewed David's application as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and taken action accordingly. It did not do so. The remaining question is what relief should be afforded.
When presented with a petition for writ of habeas corpus a court or judge must in the first instance decide whether the writ should be allowed and issued, or should be refused. See generally Iowa Code §§ 663.1-.9. Because the trial court did not view the application as a petition for writ of habeas corpus it neither allowed nor refused the writ and we have no allowance or refusal to review. We conclude we should vacate only the part of the trial court's order which deals with David's application and remand for the trial court to consider David's application as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and proceed accordingly.
In summary, we affirm the part of the trial court's November 27 order that approves the recent periodic report and orders further hospitalization. We vacate the part of the order which provides that upon receipt of the next periodic report the court will determine when a review hearing should be set. We remand for the trial court to consider David's application as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and proceed accordingly. We recognize that events subsequent to David's notice of appeal may have rendered, or may yet render, further proceedings moot. Our order for further proceedings is therefore necessarily contingent upon David remaining involuntarily committed at the time of remand.