Opinion
No. 2-759 / 01-1750
Filed November 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, GERALD W. MAGEE, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights on a variety of grounds. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Schoeberl of Story, Schoeberl Kowalke Law Firm, Cresco, for appellant father.
Judith O'Donohoe and W. Patrick Wegman of Ellwood, O'Donohoe, O'Connor Stochl, Charles City, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, M. Elise Pippin, Assistant Attorney General, and Marilyn Dettmer, County Attorney, for appellee state.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith Schuknecht, Charles City, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Dennis and Michelle are the parents of Paul, born in 1993, and Denise, born in 1995. The children were removed from the parents' home in 1998 following suspicious illnesses suffered by Denise. In three unpublished opinions, our court affirmed the juvenile court's temporary removal, adjudicatory, and dispositional review orders. Meanwhile, the juvenile court terminated Dennis's parental rights to both children pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (1999) (absence of significant and meaningful contact) and (e) (child cannot be returned to home). In this fourth appeal, Dennis claims: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support termination, 2) the guardian ad litem failed in her statutory duties, 3) his trial should not have been bifurcated from the mother's, 4) certain pretrial motions were improperly denied, 5) federal law and Iowa Code section 232.116 violate substantive and procedural due process, and (6) termination is not in the children's best interests.
Those provisions have since been renumbered. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e), (f) (Supp. 2001).
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Under 232.116(1)(e). The district court determined the children could not be returned to Dennis. The court stated:
Dennis has a history of sexually abusing children. He claims to have received adequate treatment. He has not and he has so far avoided specific treatment to address his risk to reoffend. . . . Multiple assessments recommend against placement with Dennis and multiple providers recommend termination.
On our de novo review, we find sufficient evidence to support this determination. Dennis's adult daughter testified she was sexually abused by Dennis as a child. A family therapist opined the children could not be safely returned to Dennis based on Dennis's volatility and aggression and an assessment he was at high risk to sexually reoffend. A Department social worker testified she attempted to arrange sex abuse therapy for Dennis with several service providers, including two suggested by Dennis, but Dennis refused to participate with those that were willing to provide the service. Given this evidence, termination was warranted under section 232.116(1)(e). As we may affirm if we find sufficient evidence to support any of the grounds on which the termination ruling is based, we find it unnecessary to address Dennis's challenge to termination under section 232.116(1)(d). See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
II. Guardian Ad Litem. Dennis claims the guardian ad litem, who was also the guardian ad litem in the child in need of assistance proceedings, failed to fulfill her statutory duties. See Iowa Code § 232.2(22). Dennis raised this issue in his appeal from the juvenile court's dispositional review order. Our court considered and rejected the challenge, stating, "our review of the record indicates the trial court had good cause to relieve the guardian ad litem of certain duties." In re D.C.-B. and P.C.-B., No. 00-0905/1-820 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan. 9, 2002). We see no reason to revisit the issue.
III. Bifurcation. Dennis next takes issue with the juvenile court's decision to bifurcate the termination proceedings for the parents and proceed to hearing only with respect to Dennis. The guardian ad litem and State respond that Dennis failed to preserve error. We agree with them. When the State, guardian ad litem and mother presented the court with their joint motion to bifurcate the mother's case from Dennis's case, Dennis's attorney responded, "[a]s far as the father's position regarding this postponement for mother, Your Honor, I don't think he necessarily disagrees or objects to that." Dennis, therefore, waived error on his present challenge to bifurcation.
IV. Pretrial Motions. Dennis next asserts the court should not have denied his motion to continue the proceedings. Our review of the continuance ruling is for an abuse of discretion. In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
We find no abuse. Dennis filed his motion on the eve of trial. In denying the motion, the court noted that discovery was essentially complete and the case was ready for trial. The court further stated, "[t]he children are alleged to have been adjudicated more than two years ago and in foster care for many months. Permanency is critical for them. Continuing this hearing would not be in their best interests." Our court has upheld the denial of a continuance motion on virtually identical grounds. Id. Therefore, we affirm.
The same reasoning supports the court's denial of Dennis's application for an updated assessment of the parent-child relationship.
V. Due Process. Dennis maintains that the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and resulting amendments to Iowa Code section 232.116 violate his procedural and substantive due process rights. Our highest court recently rejected this argument. See In re K.M., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2002). That opinion is controlling.
VI. Best Interests. Dennis finally argues termination is not in the children's best interests. We believe the reasons supporting termination also reveal why the children's' best interests would be served by termination. See In re D.D., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2002).