Opinion
No. 3-348 / 03-0576.
Filed May 29, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, MARK EVELOFF, District Associate Judge.
A father and mother appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Chad Primmer, Council Bluffs, for appellant father.
Drew Kouris, Council Bluffs, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and J. Joseph Narmi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Roberta Megel, Council Bluffs, for minor children.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and VOGEL, JJ.
Chad and Carol appeal the termination of their parental rights to their children, B.W., age three; H.W., age five; A.W., age six; and C.W., Jr., age eight. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On April 11, 2000, B.W. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(o) (illegal drug present in child) (Supp. 1999) because B.W. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth.
On June 19, 2000, H.W., A.W., and C.W., Jr., were adjudicated children in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections (c)(2) (child is likely to suffer harm due to parent's failure to exercise care in supervising child) and (g) (parent fails to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter). The dispositional order entered the same day left the children in Chad and Carol's custody subject to supervision by the Department of Human Services (DHS). The dispositional order also provided for a variety of services intended to improve Chad and Carol's parenting skills. Chad and Carol were also ordered to complete substance abuse evaluations and recommended treatment.
At a September 2000 review hearing the court determined Chad and Carol were not in compliance with the dispositional orders. The children were consequently placed with DHS for foster care. By the time of the next review hearing in February 2001, Chad and Carol's circumstances had sufficiently improved to permit the children's return to their custody.
In June 2001 the children were removed from Chad and Carol's custody because of the risks posed by their continued drug abuse and failure to improve their parenting skills. After a review hearing in August 2001 the court continued the children's foster placement. The court also ordered Carol to abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, to attend at least one AA/NA meeting per week with written proof to the department, and submit to urinalysis drug screenings. Chad was ordered to complete an aftercare substance abuse program and attend at least one AA/NA meeting per week with written proof of attendance to the department, abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, and submit to drug screenings.
The record of the January 2002 review hearing indicates Chad and Carol were separated. The court found Carol had not completed drug screens or attended AA or Alanon. Despite her consistency with visitation, the court found she still lacked adequate parenting skills and housing. Chad, however, completed inpatient drug treatment, and his subsequent drug screens were negative. At the time of the hearing he was living with his father and had temporary employment. Because of Chad's history of relapses the court nevertheless declined to place the children with him. Chad and Carol were granted an additional six months to establish a safe, stable, and drug-free home for the children. The court therefore ordered continued services and left the children in foster care.
The permanency hearing record in April 2002 indicates Carol was then incarcerated in a Missouri prison. Chad, however, was making satisfactory progress. The court found termination was not in the children's best interests as long as Chad maintained employment, sobriety, and adequate housing.
Following an October 2002 review hearing the court found Chad had failed to maintain sobriety. Carol had been paroled two days before the hearing and her circumstances prevented her from assuming custody of the children. The court determined that the parents' chronic substance abuse and instability left them unable to care for their children without court supervision and the children's need for a permanent home necessitated the filing of termination of parental rights proceedings. The court also ordered completion of a home study of the paternal grandmother's home to determine if it was a suitable permanent placement for the children.
On January 24, 2003, the State petitioned to terminate Chad and Carol's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (CINA for physical or sexual abuse or neglect, circumstances continue despite receipt of services) (2003), (e) (CINA, child removed for six months, parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child), (f) (child four or older, CINA, removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, and child cannot be returned home), (h) (child is three or younger, CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home), and (l) (CINA, parent has substance abuse problem, child cannot be returned within a reasonable time).
The juvenile court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered after the termination hearing state:
The Court finds none of the children could be returned to their parents at this time. Carol is heading to prison and [Chad] is living between several people at this time. The Court finds it has been over three years since the initial child in need of assistance Petition was filed involving [B.W.] and the children's need for permanency is paramount.
Based on these findings the juvenile court terminated Carol's parental rights on each of the grounds alleged. Chad's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (h).
Iowa Code §§ 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), (h), (l).
On appeal Chad claims he was denied due process of law in the proceedings below. He also claims the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children and the evidence is not sufficient to support termination of his parental rights. Lastly, he argues the court should have considered terminating only Carol's parental rights.
Carol also appeals. She claims the juvenile court failed to allow enough time for her rehabilitation.
II. Standard of Review.
Our review in termination of parental rights cases is de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993).
III. Chad's Parental Rights.
There is nothing in the record indicating Chad raised a due process issue in the trial court. He has accordingly failed to preserve this issue for our review and we decline to consider it. In re C.D., 508 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993).
Next Chad claims reasonable efforts were not made to reunify him with the children. Specifically, he alleges a personality conflict with the Department of Human Services worker interfered with his progress. We disagree. The State has the burden to show reasonable efforts at family reunification were made as part of its ultimate proof that a child cannot be safely returned to parental custody. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). A parent is required to object to the services provided or request additional services as early as possible so timely and appropriate changes can be made to accomplish reunification prior to commencement of termination proceedings. Id. at 493-94 (citing J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d at 791). Failure to do so may result in waiver of appellate review on this issue. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). Our review of the record fails to disclose Chad's objection to the adequacy of services provided or request for additional services. He has accordingly failed to preserve this issue for our consideration. Even if we were to conclude otherwise, the record indicates the State met its reasonable efforts burden in this case. As the earlier recited findings indicate, Chad received a number of services designed to result in reunification.
Chad also argues the State failed to meet its burden of proof in the termination proceeding. His failure to identify how the State was deficient in meeting its burden on any of the grounds upon which termination was granted waives the argument. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(1)(c) (party's failure to state, argue, or cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue). Even if we were to conclude that Chad identified any deficiency in the termination findings, we believe termination was appropriate pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (h). The children meet the age requirements, have been adjudicated as children in need of assistance, have been removed from the home for the requisite amount of time, and cannot be returned home. Iowa Code §§ 232.116(1)(f), 232.116(1)(h). Chad failed to follow through with the court's orders regarding drug screens and other efforts designed to help Chad stay sober. The children cannot be returned to Chad's care because of his inconsistent substance abuse treatment when the risk of relapse is so high. Because we believe termination was appropriate for these reasons, we do not need to consider the other ground upon which Chad's parental rights were terminated. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Finally, Chad maintains the juvenile court did not give adequate consideration to terminating the parental rights of just one parent, rather than both. The termination order acknowledges the progress Chad had made at various times, but also is clear that Chad's sobriety was a paramount consideration in his potential reunification with the children. It was Chad's failure to follow through with the measures designed to help him stay sober that resulted in the termination of his parental rights, not the court's failure to consider terminating only the parental rights of Carol while preserving his.
IV. Carol's Parental Rights.
Carol argues she was not given enough time to rehabilitate herself. Carol had approximately two and a half years between the time the children were first removed from her care and the date of the termination hearing. These children should not be forced to wait any longer while their parents attempt to create a stable home. See In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems). Furthermore, children should not be forced to suffer the parentless limbo of foster care endlessly. In re D.J.R., 454 N.W. .2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990). The children are doing well in foster care, and one set of foster parents expressed interest in adopting all four children. At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parents. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating the parental rights of Chad and Carol.