Opinion
No. 2-1020 / 02-1814
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Susan Flaherty, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Mother and father appeal from the order terminating their parental rights to their daughter. AFFIRMED.
Christopher Clausen of the Boliver Law Firm, Marshalltown, for appellant-father.
Daniel Rathjen of Willett Rathjen, P.L.C., Tama, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent Heeren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Patrick Wilson, Marshalltown, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Wendie S. and Dean P. are the parents of Adrienne S., who was born on January 8, 2001. The Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the family immediately following Adrienne's birth, after medical staff informed DHS Wendie allegedly threatened both her life and her baby's life, and asked doctors to "cut the baby out." On the day of her birth, the district court entered an order removing Adrienne from her parents' custody, and she was placed in foster care. The parties subsequently stipulated that Adrienne was in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (2001).
On January 10, 2002, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of both Wendie and Dean. Following a trial, the court granted the State's request, and terminated their parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) (Supp. 2001). The court expressed particular concern with the parties' mental health status, the unsanitary nature of their home, and their lack of progress in gaining parenting skills despite services. Wendie and Dean appeal.
We review termination of parental rights orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child . In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
On appeal, Wendie and Dean contend: (1) the State did not sustain its burden of proof to establish all the elements under section 232.116(1)(h), (2) the court applied an incorrect standard in assessing the likelihood of future harm, (3) the State failed to show additional time would not allow them to correct their problems, and (4) termination was not in Adrienne's best interests.
On our de novo review of the record, we affirm the termination as to both Wendi and Dean. The parents, who met while residents at a psychiatric facility, both have mental health challenges that we believe will continue to impact the level of care and attention they will afford Adrienne. See In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993) ("A parent's mental disability, while not alone sufficient to terminate parental rights, can be a contributing factor to the parent's ability to perform essential parenting functions, and termination can be appropriate where a parent lacks the capacity to meet the child's present and future needs."). Wendie's mental health status is particularly troubling because she has been diagnosed at various times with depression, panic disorder, personality disorder with histrionic and narcissistic features, oppositional defiant disorder, dysthmia, and attachment disorder. Her unpredictable and defiant behavior throughout the course of DHS's involvement in this case gives credence to these diagnoses. Although Dean had previously been committed to a mental health facility for suicidal ideations, no serious psychopathologies were noted at the time of trial.
Termination under section 232.116(1)(h) requires clear and convincing proof that the child is three or younger, has been adjudicated CINA, has been removed from the parents' home for six of the last twelve months, and cannot be returned to their home.
Despite numerous services, in-home visits, and frequent guidance from providers, neither Wendie nor Dean was able to exhibit the skills, knowledge, or motivation necessary to assume full-time care of Adrienne. Wendie and Dean's relationship remained tumultuous and a constant source of insecurity for Adrienne. Both frequently were either obstinate toward providers or appeared lacking in simple household skills. For instance, on several occasions Dean used visitation time to sleep. Wendie and Dean failed to consistently practice basic nutritional techniques taught to them by Linda Henderson-Farley, a representative of Iowa State University's Extension Services. Their apartment was frequently unsanitary, often due to dog hair, urine or feces they failed to timely clean up. For a two-week span while Dean was performing his military obligation, Wendie did not take out the garbage from the kitchen.
We, like the juvenile court, believe Wendie's and Dean's limitations preclude either of them from assuming custody of Adrienne at this time. Although we believe both might develop the capacity to some day care for her, that day is not today, nor is it any time in the foreseeable future. The period of time we allow parents to prove their ability to parent must be reasonably limited because patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate into intolerable hardship for the children. In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parents. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We believe this case has reached that point. Termination is clearly in Adrienne's best interests.