Opinion
No. 2-1056 / 02-1877
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Brian L. Michaelson, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor children. AFFIRMED.
Joseph Flannery, Le Mars, for appellant father.
William Binkard, South Sioux City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, and Cindy Weber, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Marchelle Denker, Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P. J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor children pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (g), (h), and (i) (Supp. 2001). He contends the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to their father. Our review is de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
The father claims the sole reason the State refused to return the children to his care was because he failed to admit his role in the sexual abuse of another child, which he alleges is a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated when the State requires a parent to admit to sexual abuse in order to regain custody of a child. See id. at 149. However, the father's case permanency plan and the court merely required him to seek sexual perpetration treatment. Neither required him to admit his guilt to be eligible to gain custody of his children. The father attempted to receive treatment at one program, which required him to admit his guilt. There is no evidence he sought treatment from any other program. The father's failure to complete treatment because he was exercising his Fifth Amendment rights does not lessen this failure. See id. We find the father failed to prove the State's case permanency plan effectively constituted a requirement that he incriminate himself. See id. Moreover, the requirement that the State prove the children cannot be returned only applies to terminations under section 232.116(1)(h). The father does not appeal the termination pursuant to sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (g), and (i).
We need only find termination was proper under one ground to affirm. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Here, termination was proper pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g). Termination is warranted if the court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.
The father previously had his parental rights to another child terminated after sexually abusing his stepdaughter. He has never received a sexual perpetrator assessment or treatment. The father also has a history of neglecting his children, placing them in imminent danger. The father has failed to show improvement despite being provided the opportunity to receive services. Based on his past performance, additional time will not change the father's conduct. See In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000) (finding the future can be gleaned from a parent's past performance.).