Opinion
No. 11-04-00077-CV
October 14, 2004.
Appeal from Taylor County.
Panel consists of: ARNOT, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., and McCALL, J.
Memorandum Opinion
Brenda Borrego appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her two-year-old daughter, B.T. We affirm.
The trial court found that Borrego (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child and (2) engaged in conduct or placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Borrego brings two issues on appeal in which she argues that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings.
Borrego does not challenge the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002).
A court may order involuntary termination of parental rights only if the court finds (1) that a parent has committed a predicate act or omission harmful to the child and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353-54 (Tex. 2003). The court must ensure that these findings are made by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.L.D., supra. Any complaint that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the findings necessary for termination is analyzed by a heightened standard of appellate review. In re B.L.D., supra.
In a legal sufficiency review, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). A reviewing court must assume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., supra. In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations. In re C.H., supra. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., supra at 266.
B.T. was removed from Borrego on August 20, 2002, when Borrego left her with a friend at a motel. Borrego's friend had to leave for work and left B.T. with another friend. That friend was also unable to care for B.T., and the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (DPRS) was called to come for B.T.B.T. was returned to Borrego on February 12, 2003. B.T. was again removed from Borrego on March 31, 2003, after Borrego did not pick B.T. up from day care.
Section 161.001(1)(E) allows for termination of parental rights if the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Under subsection (E), the cause of the danger to the child must be the parent's conduct alone, including the parent's actions or omissions or failures to act. In the Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 83-84 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Endanger means to expose to loss or injury — to jeopardize. Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury. Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, supra. The specific danger to the child's well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but may instead be inferred from parental misconduct. In the Interest of J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, writ den'd).
The record shows that Borrego has a pattern of drug use. While participating in services provided by DPRS, Borrego tested positive for cocaine on December 2, 2002, for marihuana on December 13, 2002, and for methamphetamine on April 1, 2003, the day after failing to pick B.T. up from day care. After B.T. was removed for the second time, Borrego again tested positive for methamphetamine on September 17, 2003. The record also shows that Borrego failed to comply with numerous requests for drug testing. Charrisse Brown, a licensed chemical dependency counselor with Prevention Strategies, testified that she believes Borrego is "in denial of her drug problem." Brown further stated that, based upon her counseling sessions with Borrego, she believes Borrego is a drug user and that she will continue to use drugs.
The record further shows that Borrego has a history of being involved in abusive and un-healthy relationships. Borrego's daughter, Leslie, testified that Borrego had lived with four men, all of whom were abusive to Borrego. Further evidence was presented that Borrego was involved in a relationship with the man who killed B.T.'s father. Borrego was also involved with a man who had a history with DPRS and who had had his parental rights terminated for physically abusing his children.
Leslie was 20 years old at the time of trial and did not live with Borrego after B.T.'s birth.
Borrego has a history of leaving the children without adequate care and without providing contact information. Leslie testified that Borrego would leave Leslie and two of her other children with Randy Hamrick, who was not the father of the children. Leslie said that Borrego would be gone for one or two days and that they would not know Borrego's whereabouts. Leslie said that Borrego often left the children in Leslie's care. Borrego would be gone overnight while Leslie was left to care for the children. Leslie testified that many times she would not have any way to get in contact with Borrego should an emergency arise. B.T. was removed from Borrego on two occasions: (1) when Borrego left the child with someone who could no longer care for her after Borrego failed to return and (2) when Borrego did not arrive to pick up B.T. from day care.
Borrego has four daughters and one son. Borrego's son resides in a treatment camp for sex offenders. Borrego's parental rights have been terminated to one of her daughters, and she does not have custody of another daughter.
Dr. Stephen M. Osborn testified that he conducted a psychological evaluation of Borrego. Dr. Osborn diagnosed Borrego with dysthymia, a type of depression, and with a personality disorder. Dr. Osborn stated that the stress of caring for a child would increase the effects of Borrego's personality disorder. Dr. Osborn stated that leaving children with others, being involved in abusive relationships, and denying a drug abuse problem are consistent with Borrego's personality disorder. Darla Swanner, a licensed professional counselor, testified that she has counseled Borrego and that she agrees with Dr. Osborn's evaluation. Swanner stated that it is not in B.T.'s or Borrego's best interest for B.T. to live with Borrego.
The record shows that Borrego has a pattern of drug use, a history of abusive relationships, and a pattern of leaving her children without adequate arrangements for their care. We find that there is probative evidence to support the trial court's finding that Borrego engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. We additionally find that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegation that Borrego engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Borrego's second issue on appeal is overruled. Because we have concluded that there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding under Section 161.001(1)(E), we need not address Borrego's first issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding under Section 161.001(1)(D). Only one finding alleged under Section 161.001(1) is necessary for a judgment of termination. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet'n); In re S.F., 32 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet'n); see also TEX.R.APP. P. 47.1.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.