Opinion
No. 12-1042
03-12-2013
In re: Z.J., C.J., T.Y., A.Y., J.Y., & H.W.
(Clay County 11-JA-105, 106, 107, 108, 109 & 110)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Mother filed this appeal, by counsel Wayne King, from the Circuit Court of Clay County which terminated her parental rights by order entered on August 2, 2012. The guardian ad litem for the child, Barbara Harmon-Schamberger, has filed a response supporting the circuit court's order. The Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR"), by its attorney Lee Niezgoda, also filed a response in support of the circuit court's order.
This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DHHR filed the petition in this case in September of 2011. The petition alleged that the subject children were abused and neglected by Petitioner Mother's failure to protect them. The petition discussed, for instance, an occasion in July of 2011 when Petitioner Mother drove on a suspended license and under the influence of alcohol while the children were in the car with her. Throughout the course of the proceedings, the circuit court ordered services for Petitioner Mother; however, Petitioner Mother failed to substantially comply. The circuit court ultimately terminated Petitioner Mother's parental rights without post-termination visitation. Petitioner Mother appeals this termination.
Petitioner Mother argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights. She argues that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by evidence in the record. In support, Petitioner Mother asserts that she attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, found suitable housing, and obtained employment for a period of time. The children's guardian ad litem and DHHR respond and argue that the circuit court did not err in terminating Petitioner Mother's parental rights. They both argue that although Petitioner Mother was offered help and services, she refused to take advantage of them. For instance, she left a six-month rehabilitation program after only five days.
The Court has previously established the following standard of review:
"Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon theSyl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety." Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
Upon our review, the Court finds no error in the circuit court's termination of Petitioner Mother's parental rights. The Court finds that the circuit court was presented with sufficient evidence upon which it based findings that there was no reasonable likelihood to believe that conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and that termination was necessary for the children's welfare. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a)(6), circuit courts are directed to terminate parental rights upon such findings.
This Court reminds the circuit court of its duty to establish permanency for the children. Rule 39(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires:
At least once every three months until permanent placement is achieved as defined in Rule 6, the court shall conduct a permanent placement review conference, requiring the multidisciplinary treatment team to attend and report as to progress and development in the case, for the purpose of reviewing the progress in the permanent placement of the child.Further, this Court reminds the circuit court of its duty pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings to find permanent placement for the children within twelve months of the date of the disposition order. As this Court has stated,
[t]he [twelve]-month period provided in Rule 43 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedures for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings for permanent placement of an abused and neglected child following the final dispositional order must be strictly followed except in the most extraordinary circumstances which are fully substantiated in the record.Syl. Pt. 6, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Moreover, this Court has stated that
[i]n determining the appropriate permanent out-of-home placement of a child under W.Va.Code § 49-6-5(a)(6) [1996], the circuit court shall give priority to securing a suitable adoptive home for the child and shall consider other placement alternatives, including permanent foster care, only where the court finds thatSyl. Pt. 3, State v. Michael M., 202 W.Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177 (1998). Finally, "[t]he guardian ad litem's role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child is placed in a permanent home." Syl. Pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard , 185 W.Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991).
adoption would not provide custody, care, commitment, nurturing and discipline consistent with the child's best interests or where a suitable adoptive home can not be found.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order terminating petitioner's parental rights to the subject children.
Affirmed.
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin
Justice Robin Jean Davis
Justice Margaret L. Workman
Justice Menis E. Ketchum
Justice Allen H. Loughry II