We are aware, as Appellants argue, that some courts are not in agreement with this analysis of Dewsnup. See Yi v. Citibank, 219 B.R. 394, 319 (E.D.Va. 1998) (Chapter 7 debtor's proceeding — "Because Citibank's lien is wholly unsecured, by definition it cannot be an `allowed secured claim.' From this it inexorably follows that the lien is void." (citing Howard, 184 B.R. at 644)); In re Smith, 247 B.R. 191 (W.D.Va. 2000); Farha v. First American Title Ins., 246 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.

The bankruptcy court therefore distinguished Dewsnup from this case, holding that Dewsnup prohibited only a "strip down" of an undersecured claim, and not a "strip off" of a wholly unsecured claim. See In re Hoekstra, 253 B.R. 193, 195 Consequently, the bankruptcy court found that Yi v. Citibank (Maryland), N.A., 219 B.R. 394 (E.D.Va. 1998), was the proper case under which to evaluate Debtors' effort to avoid the federal tax lien against the Townhouse. "Strip down" refers to decreasing a creditor's lien to a judicially-determined value of the collateral, to the extent that the fair market value of the collateral is less than the claim, while still maintaining the lien.

While it is true that "[u]pon default, the Court is generally required to deem as true the well pleaded allegations of a Complaint . . . it is not required to agree that the pleaded facts constitute a valid cause of action." In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394, 396 (E.D.Va. 1998) (quoting 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7055.02[2], at 7055-5 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. Rev. 1997)).

However, contrary to Blankenship's attempt to distinguish these cases on this basis, the Court finds this distinction irrelevant. Blankenship contends that facts here are more similar to the facts inIn re Howard, 184 B.R. 644 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995), and Yi v. Citibank (Maryland), N.A., 219 B.R. 394 (E.D.Va. 1998) (Ellis, J.). Howard involved a non-consensual judgment lien, and the court held that a non-consensual judgment creditor takes his or her chances when attempting to secure the judgment. However, a more important distinction from this case and Howard, is that in this case, as in Dewsnup, there was value remaining in the property (based on the $100 valuation).

For instance, in Crossroads of Hillsville, the court determined that the Supreme Court's decision applied to both consensual and nonconsensual liens. 179 B.R. at 490; but see In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394, 400 (E.D.Va. 1998) (emphasizing that a judgment creditor takes chances when attempting secure the judgment); Howard v. National Westminister Bank, 184 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing Dewsnup from a case where the debtor was attempting to avoid a nonconsensual judgment lien). The precedent in the Western District is to apply the Dewsnup holding to both consensual and non-consensual liens; however, courts in other districts have recognized a distinction between bargained for liens and liens resulting from judgments.

For instance, in Crossroads of Hillsville, the court determined that the Supreme Court's decision applied to both consensual and nonconsensual liens. 179 B.R. at 490; but see In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394, 400 (E.D.Va. 1998) (emphasizing that a judgment creditor takes chances when attempting secure the judgment); Howard v. National Westminster Bank, 184 B.R. 644, 647 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing Dewsnup from a case where the debtor was attempting to avoid a nonconsensual judgment lien). The precedent in the Western District is to apply the Dewsnup holding to both consensual and non-consensual liens; however, courts in other districts have recognized a distinction between bargained for liens and liens resulting from judgments.

The courts refer to the avoidance of under-secured liens as "stripping down" the lien and the avoidance of wholly unsecured liens as "stripping off" the lien. See, e.g., Yi v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 397 n. 6 (E.D. Va. 1998). All the Courts of Appeal to address this issue hold that a chapter 7 debtor may not strip off a wholly unsecured lien. See, e.g., Talbert v. City Mortgage Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2003); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 782 (4th Cir. 2001).

Farha v. First Am. Title Ins. (In the matter of Farha), 246 B.R. 547 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 2000); Zempel v. Household Finance Corp. (In re Zempel), 244 B.R. 625 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1999); Yi v. Citibank (Maryland), N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394 (E.D.Va. 1998); Howard v. National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995). See Laskin v. First Nat'l Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998); In re Fitzmaurice, 248 B.R. 356 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2000); In re Virello, 236 B.R. 199 (Bankr.D.S.C. 1999); In re Willis, 157 B.R. 617 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1993); Wise v. Diamond Sav. Loan Co. (In re Wise), 151 B.R. 116 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992).

It has been noted that "`[s]tripping off' a lien occurs when the entire lien is avoided, whereas `stripping down' occurs when an undersecured lien is bifurcated and the unsecured portion is avoided." Yi v. CitiBank (Maryland) N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 397 n. 6 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36, 37 n. 2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)). I.

E.D.Ark. 1994) ( Dewsnup prohibition on stripping tax lien) and Matter of Windham, 136 B.R. 878 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1992) ( Dewsnup prohibition applies to personal and real property). Recently, two cases, In re Howard, 184 B.R. 644 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1995) and In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394 (E.D.Va. 1998) have held that the Dewsnup prohibition does not apply to an allowed secured claim if at that time there is no value in the collateral to cover any part of the subject lien and therefore § 506(d) may operate to "strip off" the lien. In Dewsnup, the Chapter 7 debtor was attempting to "strip down" a mortgagee's lien on real property to a judicially determined value of the collateral, where the claim was secured by a mortgage lien and allowed under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code.