Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 33161-J
Kline, P.J.
The Sonoma County District Attorney (appellant) appeals after Yesenia F. (respondent) admitted a felony vandalism allegation and the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment and placed her on probation in a juvenile wardship proceeding held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. On appeal, appellant contends the court erred when it failed to make a restitution award to the victim of the vandalism. We shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 11, 2006, a juvenile wardship petition was filed in Sonoma County Juvenile Court, pursuant to section 602, alleging that respondent had unlawfully damaged a 2004 Chevrolet Impala belonging to Sonia Vega. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).)
On February 7, 2007, respondent admitted that she had violated Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), and the matter was referred to the probation department for a deferred entry of judgment program suitability report.
On March 5, 2007, the juvenile court ordered judgment deferred, with probationary conditions imposed.
On June 28, 2007, following a restitution hearing, the juvenile court denied restitution to the victim.
On September 27, 2007, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
These facts are taken from the probation report.
On October 4, 2006, Sonia Vega reported to Santa Rosa police that her car had been vandalized. She told police that she had bought the car for Brenda Ramirez, but that the two women had argued about the car and she had decided to reclaim it. When she went to Ramirez’s home to get the car, she saw scratches on the driver’s and passenger’s doors. Inside the car, there was red sauce spilled on the carpets and the front and rear seats had been slashed with a sharp object and marked on with a marker.
Officers went to Ramirez’s house and interviewed Ramirez and her younger sister, respondent. Both admitted to having vandalized the car because they were angry.
DISCUSSION
Sonia Vega, the victim in this case, submitted a restitution request to the probation department for $11,041.07 for the damage to her car. At a June 28, 2007 restitution hearing, defense counsel informed the court: “I had the victim here earlier. I have service of the subpoena and she’s voluntarily left the courthouse without testifying today. This is the second time I’ve had her subpoenaed to come. The first time she just simply failed to come.” Defense counsel further stated that Vega had not brought any documents with her to assist in determining the restitution amount and that she had probably left because she had small children with her. The prosecutor said she had information from the insurance company indicating it had paid the victim $5,397.62 for the damage claim. Ultimately, the court declared “the restitution in this criminal process to be zero based on the victim’s not providing sufficient information to allow the Court to make an order.”
Appellant contends the court erred when it failed to make a restitution award to Vega. Appellant is incorrect.
Appellant’s claim rests on the mandatory language of section 730.6, which provides in relevant part: “(a)(1) It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.
“(2) Upon a minor being found to be a person described in Section 602 , . . . the court shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, . . . :
“. . . .
“(B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any . . . .” (Italics added.)
Section 730.6 is, however, inapplicable to the present case, in which respondent was never found to be a person described in section 602, but instead received deferred entry of judgment. (See In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1308 [“statutes [§ 790 et seq.] creating this procedure [deferred entry of judgment] . . . empower the court, under specified conditions, and upon the minor’s admission of the allegations of the petition, to place the minor on probation without adjudging him or her to be a ward of the court”].) When entry of judgment is deferred, unlike with a wardship finding, the juvenile court is not required to order restitution. Instead, under section 794, “[t]he minor may also be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of this code.” (Italics added.)
Thus, contrary to appellant’s contention, a restitution order was not mandatory in this case, and the juvenile court’s refusal to order restitution, based on the victim’s failure to provide sufficient information, was not an abuse of discretion. (See In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.