Favoring Brown’s reading, New York courts have held that agreements involving payments to induce a party to stay silent regarding sexual relationships and other intimate information bespeak extortion and are hence void for illegality. In Yao , for example, the plaintiff, a lawyer who had had an intimate relationship with a wealthy financial executive, threatened to expose that the executive was gay and that he had previously been in a relationship with an individual with AIDS. SeeMatter of Yao , 250 A.D.2d 221, 680 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (1st Dep't 1998) (per curiam); Matter of Yao , 231 A.D.2d 346, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (1st Dep't 1997) (per curiam). The plaintiff alleged that he and the executive had entered into an oral agreement in which the executive promised to pay the plaintiff $10,000 per month, in exchange for the plaintiff’s promise not to publicize that personal information.

People v. Hubble, 81 Ill. App. 3d 560, 564, 401 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (1980). While Jordan does not argue that the alleged agreement is extortionate in the criminal sense, he argues that it is extortionate because the agreement involves the exchange of money for silence, which is inherently coercive and exploitive. He relies on the case of in re Yao, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199, 231 A.D.2d 346 (1997), for support. In Yao, an attorney brought a breach of contract action against Mr. Bult, a wealthy financial executive with whom he had a brief, intimate relationship.

Respondent opposes summary adjudication of the charges and alternatively requests a hearing in mitigation. Petitioner seeks to find respondent guilty of professional misconduct pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a procedural concept that is not entirely foreign to attorney disciplinary matters before the Appellate Division of this State ( see, e.g., Matter of Babigian, 247 A.D.2d 817, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 813, cert denied 525 U.S. 1003; Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346; Matter of Sylvor, 225 A.D.2d 87; Matter of Morrissey, 217 A.D.2d 74; Matter of Ryan, 189 A.D.2d 96; Matter of Slater, 156 A.D.2d 89). In Matter of Cohn (M-5696 unpublished order), the First Department, citing Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx ( 24 N.Y.2d 65), unequivocally endorsed the application of common-law collateral estoppel in disciplinary proceedings provided that the prerequisites for invocation of the doctrine were satisfied. Although the Court declined to apply the doctrine in that case, Matter of Cohn confirmed that civil findings of courts in this State may be preclusively applied in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

Furthermore, he was counseled and filed opposition briefs in the state court action. See, e.g., Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346, 348 (1st Dep't 1997) (noting that litigant who had opportunity to oppose motion to dismiss had full and fair opportunity to litigate). Salvador was able to oppose the motion to dismiss, and he received the benefit of a full appellate process.

See N.Y. Penal Law § 155.15(2) (providing that the good-faith defense is available only "[i]n any prosecution for larceny by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime").See Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200-201 (N.Y.App.Div., 1st Dept., 1997) (attorney's demand that wealthy financial executive, with whom he had previously had an intimate relationship, agree to pay large sums of money in exchange for attorney not revealing publicly embarrassing information about executive's personal life was extortion under N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05[2][e][v]); U.S. v. Jackson, 986 F.Supp. 829, 832-835, n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (woman's conduct of sending to Bill Cosby an unsigned contract with publisher to print her claim that she was Bill Cosby's child born out-of-wedlock as a result of an extramarital affair, along with demand for $40 million from Cosby, whose reputation was threatened by that conduct, was extortion under N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05[2][e][v]), vacated on other grounds, 180 F.3d 55, 66-73 (2d Cir. 1999) (setting aside defendant's conviction of, inter alia, traveling interstate to facilitate extortion in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05[2][e][v] and 18 U.S.C. § 875(d), because trial court's jury instruction was incorrect by faili

. In any event, in disciplinary matters such as this, we may, in the exercise of our discretion, grant collateral estoppel effect to findings made in earlier actions, which need not be criminal in nature (see e.g. Matter of Taylor, 113 AD2d 56, 57-58 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of Yao, 231 AD2d 346 [1st Dept 1997]). Here, our ruling is amply justified by respondent's having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the findings made in the custody trial, as well as his history of employing abusive litigation tactics and the likelihood that he would have done so again, in an effort to delay both the appeal of Supreme Court's custody decision and the instant disciplinary proceeding, had this Court not entered its order.

Respondent cannot bring suit against all of the members of this Court and then claim conflicts of interest on the part of its members warranting transfer of this disciplinary matter to another Judicial Department. In any event, in disciplinary matters such as this, we may, in the exercise of our discretion, grant collateral estoppel effect to findings made in earlier actions, which need not be criminal in nature (see e.g. Matter of Taylor, 113 A.D.2d 56, 57–58 [1st Dept. 2013]; Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199 [1st Dept. 1997] ). Here, our ruling is amply justified by respondent's having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the findings made in the custody trial, as well as his history of employing abusive litigation tactics and the likelihood that he would have done so again, in an effort to delay both the appeal of Supreme Court's custody decision and the instant disciplinary proceeding, had this Court not entered its order.

In the instant petition, the Committee contends that pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by this Court, that respondent proffered a forged lease as evidence establishes that he violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5), and 7-102(A)(1), (2) and (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is well settled that in order to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the legal issues raised and resolved in the underlying Supreme Court action must be identical to those which would be decided by the Committee and this Court in a disciplinary proceeding and respondent must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues before the Supreme Court ( see Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65; Matter of Kramer, 235 A.D.2d 87 appeal denied 91 N.Y.2d 805; Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346). The underlying Supreme Court action and its related litigation clearly satisfy these requirements. Contrary to his contentions, respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues herein in the Supreme Court action and on its subsequent appeal. Similarly unavailing is respondent's assertion that the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inappropriate, at this time, since his various appeals have not yet been exhausted ( see Matter of Yao at 348).

The Hearing Panel rejected respondent's argument that there was no identity of issues, and determined that respondent was collaterally estopped from relitigating her failure to supervise FMG employees engaging in fraudulent practices. We agree with the Hearing Panel's collateral estoppel determination ( see, Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71; Matter of Kramer, 235 A.D.2d 87, 89, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 805) The issue of respondent's failure to supervise salespersons acting under her broker's license was identical in each action, and respondent had ample opportunity to contest the allegations in the Nassau County action ( see, Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346, 348). However, she allowed a default judgment to be entered against her, failed to persuade the Supreme Court to vacate said default and did not pursue her appeal.

Respondent, Richard Yao, was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on February 27, 1985. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent resided and conducted business, but did not actively practice law, within the First Judicial Department. In a prior order and decision entered July 17, 1997 ( Matter of Yao, 231 A.D.2d 346), this Court granted a petition for collateral. estoppel against respondent, finding, on the basis of a prior decision and order of the Supreme Court, New York County, that respondent committed extortion in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (A) (3) ( 22 NYCRR 1200.3 [illegal conduct involving moral turpitude]) and engaged in frivolous litigation in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (1) and (2) ( 22 NYCRR 1200.33 [filing a lawsuit to harass or maliciously injure another and knowingly advancing a claim that is unwarranted under the law]). Furthermore, this Court suspended respondent on an interim basis pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.4 (e) (1) (ii) and (iii).