[Citation.]" (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 253; accord, In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 801-802 (X.V.).)

When a case is remanded to the juvenile court for the purpose of curing ICWA notice defects and the parent is represented by counsel at the postremand compliance hearing and counsel raises no objection to new ICWA notices, an exception to the general rule against forfeiture may apply. ( In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 893] ( X.V.); In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 874] ( Amber F.); In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 138] ( N.M.).

The Department argues, however, that this general principle should not apply when the issue of ICWA compliance was raised in a prior appeal. Citing In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 893] ( X.V.) and In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 874] ( Amber F.), the Department contends that appellant forfeited any argument regarding proper ICWA notice because she failed to object at the hearing on remand. In essence, the Department's position is that at some point the burden must be placed on the parents to establish that their child is an Indian child.

[Citation.]" (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 253; accord, In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 801-802 (X.V.).)

Such an approach cannot be reconciled with the statutory scheme, and we hereby disapprove In re Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 183, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 819. The Court of Appeal also said, “The principles enunciated in [In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 ] support our conclusion that a dependent child's interest in permanency and stability requires that there be a time limit to a parent's right to raise the issue of ICWA compliance.” But In re X.V. is distinguishable.

Such objection was equivalent to no objection at all, since there was no indication as to what was objectionable or what should be corrected. Under procedural facts similar to those in the instant case, the court in In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 (X.V.) addressed the issue of whether the parents could challenge "the adequacy of ICWA notice a second time when they failed to raise any objection at the special hearing on remand." (Id. at p. 801.)

Mother has thus forfeited these claims on this, her second appeal. In In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 (X.V.), the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, determined, “As a matter of respect for the children involved and the judicial system, as well as common sense, it is incumbent on parents on remand to assist the Agency in ensuring proper notice is given.” (Id. at p. 804.)

At this juncture, allowing Michelle to raise these issues on appeal for the first time opens the door to gamesmanship, a practice that is particularly reprehensible in the juvenile dependency arena. An almost identical situation was confronted in In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 893]. There, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to X.V. and selected adoption as the permanent plan.

Nevertheless, where, as here, a case is remanded to the juvenile court for the sole purpose of curing ICWA inquiry and notice defects, the parents are represented by counsel at the post-remand compliance hearing, and counsel does not raise the specific objections in the juvenile court that are subsequently asserted on appeal, an exception to the general rule applies and a second round of appellate attacks on ICWA compliance is not permitted. Congress did not intend to allow successive appeals raising issues for the first time in the appellate court. (In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 804-805.) At some point the rules of error preservation must apply to avoid delay of permanence for children.

We now conclude that where, as here, the parent of a dependent child attempts to challenge for a second time on appeal the inadequacy of ICWA notice without having raised the issue in the juvenile court on remand when the subject of notice was directly at issue, the parent will be found to have forfeited the issue. The situation in the present appeal is similar to what occurred in In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794 (X.V.). There, in a previous appeal, the appellate court had conditionally reversed a judgment terminating parental rights and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of complying with ICWA notice requirements.