Opinion
No. 338450
12-12-2017
In re M. VYHNANEK, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Kent Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 16-050771-NA Before: MARKEY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals by right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, MV, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody) and (j) (reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.
The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHS) removed MV from mother's care on March 15, 2016, because of concerns regarding mother's mental health, parenting skills, and the possible sexual abuse of MV. Throughout the 13-month duration of this case, mother refused to cooperate with the DHHS or participate in any services. The trial court terminated mother's parental rights on April 19, 2017.
First mother argues that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with MV. We disagree.
Whether reasonable efforts for reunification were made is reviewed for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). This Court is "obliged to defer to a trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).
"When a child is removed from a parent's custody, the agency charged with the care of the child is required to report to the trial court the efforts made to rectify the conditions that led to the removal of the child." In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 273; 817 NW2d 119 (2011); see also In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 542. Therefore, "a [trial] court is not required to terminate parental rights if the State has not provided to the family of the child . . . such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home." In re Rood, 483 Mich at 105 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the DHHS "has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
Mother asserts that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts for reunification because her caseworker refused to meet at a neutral location. The caseworker, however, testified that she wanted to meet mother at a safe location, such as the courthouse, for their first meeting. After mother showed some emotional stability, the caseworker stated that she was willing to meet with mother in other places.
The record shows that this request was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Mother had made threats toward the previous caseworker; she told her current caseworker that she "want[ed] to punch [her] face in," and she was eventually arrested for posting a threatening message about a Child Protective Services (CPS) caseworker. Furthermore, the caseworker's request to meet with mother at the courthouse was also reasonable considering that mother met with her attorneys at the courthouse and attended every hearing in this case. This suggests that mother was indeed able to meet with the caseworker at the courthouse. The trial court also told mother that she was required to meet with her caseworker in a place chosen by the caseworker. Furthermore, as noted by the DHHS, the location was not the issue in this case. The caseworker also met with mother when she was incarcerated. But those meetings were unproductive, and mother refused to discuss the treatment plan or to undergo a psychological evaluation to begin services. Thus, the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with MV. The trial court did not clearly err. In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 542-543.
Mother also contends that she was unable to improve her parenting skills because the agency did not allow her to have parenting time. Mother did not make this argument in the trial court. As a result, this issue is unpreserved. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). This Court reviews unpreserved issues for "plain error affecting substantial rights." Id.
First, the trial court's order entered after the preliminary hearing granted mother supervised parenting time. The foster-care supervisor attempted to schedule parenting time for mother over the phone; however, mother would hang up on her before a day and time could be set. Second, after attempts to have productive contact with mother failed, the caseworker recommended that mother participate in mental health services for 30 days before starting parenting time; however, mother refused to cooperate. Third, mother was incarcerated from August 2016 until February 2017, making parenting time visits difficult if not impossible. Lastly, after mother was released from jail in February 2017, she continued to refuse to cooperate with her caseworker. In fact, she refused to complete a psychiatric evaluation in order to even begin services. The record shows that contrary to mother's contention that the agency withheld parenting time from her, she actually refused to complete any of the steps necessary to begin parenting time. As a result, the trial court did not plainly err in finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with MV. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.
Finally, mother claims that because of her mental health issues, the DHHS should have offered her additional services. Mother also failed to make this argument in the trial court; thus, this issue is unpreserved. Id.
As discussed above, mother refused to cooperate with any services. Both the foster-care supervisor and the caseworker testified that mother should take a psychological evaluation first so she could be referred to the services that would be the most beneficial. Mother refused to undergo a psychological evaluation. In fact, the caseworker obtained extra funding for mother to complete the evaluation in jail, but mother refused to sign the necessary release. Because of mother's refusal to even have one productive meeting with her caseworker to discuss the treatment plan or service referrals, the evidence does not support the contention that mother would have benefited from additional services even if they were offered. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248 (holding that the respondent has the responsibility to participate and benefit from offered services). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error affecting mother's substantial rights in concluding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts for reunification. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.
Next, mother contends that the trial court erred in determining that termination was in the child's best interests. We disagree.
"[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews the trial court's decision whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest for clear error. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40. When the trial court considers a child's best interests, the focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The trial court must weigh all available evidence when determining the child's best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). A trial court can also consider the length of time the child "was in foster care or placed with relatives[,]" and whether it was likely that "the child could be returned to [the parent's] home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249.
In this case, the trial court recognized that there was a strong bond between mother and the child. Still, the trial court noted mother's refusal to comply with services and court orders, including her refusal to take a psychological evaluation in order to begin services. The trial court opined that MV was making progress in therapy, and that her current foster-care home was preadoptive. It also concluded that MV, who was nine years old at the time of termination, required stability and age-appropriateness in the home. According to the trial court, the agency investigated relative placement, but no relatives were interested. Finally, the trial court considered that it could not compare mother's home with the foster-care home because mother had failed to provide any information about her current living situation. Based on the testimony and the Legislative mandate for permanency, the trial court found that it was in MV's best interests to terminate mother's parental rights.
The record supports the trial court's determination. Although MV clearly had a strong bond with mother, mother refused to comply with the parent-agency agreement or participate in any services. She also declined to address her mental health issues or the sexual abuse of MV. Mother also did not provide any information regarding her housing or employment. Further, MV was making progress in therapy and doing well in her foster-care home. MV, who was nine years old at the time of termination, required stability and the caseworker testified that it would be at least a year before MV could be returned to mother even if mother immediately started participating in services. Finally, the foster-care home was preadoptive. Based on the record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in MV's best interests. In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause