Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County.No. 08CEJ600543-2 Brian M. Arax, Judge.
Carey D. Gorden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Rhodes and Jesse Witt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
INTRODUCTION
After a contested adjudication hearing, the Fresno County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, found 17-year-old V.D. committed first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), and resisted a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). At the dispositional hearing, the court declared V.D. a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and committed him to the Juvenile Justice Campus for 140 days. The court ordered him to pay $150 in restitution and $88,272.67 in victim restitution.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal V.D. argues that the evidence does not support the finding that he committed first degree residential burglary. We reject this argument and affirm.
FACTS
On July 3, 2009, Stephanie and Robert Glandon, and their son Corey, returned from an hour and forty minute trip to Starbucks and discovered their home had been broken into. The sliding glass door in the back of the house had been pried open.
Every room of the house was ransacked, including the garage. Mrs. Glandon's jewelry box had been taken apart and every piece of jewelry in the house was stolen, about 60 items. Many other items were missing, including another jewelry box and a rare penny worth $86,000.
V.D.'s palm print was lifted from the top of a jewelry box in the northeast side bedroom. Footprints were found on garbage cans in the backyard, indicating the burglar climbed over the six foot fence to enter the backyard. Although the Glandons did not know V.D. personally, Mrs. Glandon had seen him around the neighborhood before. She and her husband testified they never gave V.D. permission to enter their home and he had no reason to be there.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The court must review the entire record in a light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.) The judgment of the trial court can only be set aside when it clearly appears there would be, upon no hypothesis, sufficient substantial evidence to support it. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) The same standard of review applies when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a juvenile proceeding. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
Fingerprint Evidence
“[F]ingerprint evidence alone may, under certain circumstances, support a conviction. [Citation.]” (Mikes v. Borg (1991) 947 F.2d 353, 356 (Mikes).) The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that fingerprints are ordinarily sufficient by themselves to identify the perpetrator of the crime. (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1588.) However, when a case is supported solely by fingerprint evidence, the record must contain sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the fingerprints were in fact impressed at the time of the offense and not at some earlier date. (Mikes, supra, at pp. 356-357.)
Sufficiency of Evidence
V.D. claims the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that his palm print on the jewelry box was imprinted while committing the burglary. The People argue there is no innocent, rational explanation for the presence of V.D.'s palm print on the jewelry box because V.D. was never invited into the Glandon’s home. Thus, they contend, the facts show beyond a reasonable doubt that V.D. could only have placed his palm print on the jewelry box during the burglary. (Ibid.)
V.D. argues the prosecution must establish when the jewelry box was brought into the house, whether it was brought out of the house, and whether the son ever invited V.D. into their home. However, case law sets forth a different standard: “[i]n fingerprint-only cases in which the prosecution's theory is based on the premise that the defendant handled certain objects while committing the crime in question, the record must contain sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the fingerprints were in fact impressed at that time and not at some earlier date.” (Mikes, supra, 947 F.2d at pp. 356-357.) To meet this standard, the prosecution must present evidence sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the object on which the fingerprints were found was inaccessible to the defendant prior to the time of the commission of the crime. (Id. at p. 357.) However, the prosecution need not exclude all inferences or reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. (Ibid.)
V.D. relies on three cases as authority establishing that the evidence against him was not substantial. We find all three cases distinguishable.
First, V.D. relies on Mikes, supra, 947 F.2d 353. In Mikes, the court found the evidence insufficient even though the defendant's fingerprints were found on a three-foot post, which was used as the murder weapon, lying near the victim's body in the victim’s basement. (Id. at pp. 356-359.) However, none of the prints found anywhere else on the premises, including those found on empty jewelry boxes and the stair rail down to the basement, were identified as the defendant’s. (Id. at p. 356.) The court evaluated the circumstances surrounding the custody and location of the post, its function, its accessibility to Mikes, and the extent to which it was or could have been handled by others, to determine whether the fingerprint evidence was sufficient. (Mikes, supra, 947 F.2d at pp. 357-358.) The victim had purchased the post at a local hardware store. (Id. at p. 355.) Expert testimony disclosed that fingerprints may last indefinitely and, in fact, Mikes' fingerprints were found on similar posts in stores and other public places. (Id. at p. 358.) The court concluded the evidence was insufficient to preclude the reasonable possibility that the post was accessible to Mikes during the period prior to the victim purchasing it. (Id. at p. 361.) To the contrary, the evidence established that the posts were fully accessible to the general public, including Mikes, during that period and that his fingerprints could well have been placed on the posts prior to the victim's purchase of them. (Id. at p. 359.)
This case is distinguishable from Mikes. Here, there was no evidence V.D. came into contact with the jewelry box before the commission of the crime. While no evidence was presented regarding the whereabouts of the jewelry box before the Glandons purchased it, there was substantial evidence to support an inference that V.D. came into contact with it only during commission of the crime. Because all of the jewelry in the home was stolen, it is reasonable to infer the burglar touched the jewelry box.
Second, V.D. argues that because a jewelry box is a moveable object, it is more likely that his palm print was placed on it outside of the Glandon's home. We disagree. V.D. cites Birt v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 934 (Birt) as analogous. In Birt, the victim returned home to find items missing from his home and a rental van parked on the grass beside his house. (Id. at p. 936.) He approached the van and as he opened the passenger door, two males ran out of the back of the van. (Id. at pp. 936-937.) A sheriff investigating the theft, found a lighter in the van with the defendant's fingerprints on it. (Id. at p. 937.) Other unidentifiable fingerprints were found in the van, on the burglarized premises, and on the stolen goods, but none of them belonged to the defendant. (Id. at pp.937-938.) The lighter was not stolen from the victim. (Id. at p. 938.) The court found that the lighter only showed that “at some unknown time and place, [the defendant] had been inside the van; but there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to indicate when and where that had been.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, “the mere presence of [the defendant’s] fingerprints on the lighter found in the van would be insufficient to support [the defendant’s] conviction of the crime charged.” (Id. at p. 937.)
V.D. reasons that a jewelry box is like a cigarette lighter because it is readily moveable. Again we disagree. A jewelry box is distinguishable because it is not an object ordinarily carried on one's person, making it unreasonable to infer that V.D. had come in contact with it outside of the Glandon’s home. In addition, unlike the rental van, the burglarized home was not open to the public. In Birt, there was a possibility that the defendant had left the lighter in the van at a time other than during the commission of the crime. That possibility is absent here. V.D’s palm print was on a jewelry box in the master bedroom of the burglarized house from which numerous items of jewelry were taken. Further, V.D. had never been invited into the house so the only reasonable inference was that his print was left during the burglary.
Finally, V.D. attempts to analogize his case to People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 (Trevino), where fingerprints found in the victim's home were held insufficient to support a murder conviction. In Trevino, a witness testified that she saw defendants Rivas and Trevino near the victim's home when the murder occurred. (Id. at p. 677.) However, the witness could not positively identify Rivas in lineups. (Ibid.) The only other evidence to indicate Rivas had a part in the murder was his fingerprint, which was found on an unopened dresser drawer in the victim's home. (Id. at p. 678.) Both Trevino and Rivas were friends of the victim, visited him on occasion, and were close enough to the victim to refer to him by a nickname. (Ibid.) The expert could not estimate the age of Rivas' fingerprint. (Ibid.) The court found the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 696.) The court reasoned that the fact that his print was found on a dresser drawer in the victim's home was open to various interpretations and there was no reason to presume that it was made the day of the murder and not on a previous occasion. (Id. at pp. 696-697.) The court found such evidence was “fraught with uncertainty, leaving the triers of fact to speculate as to how and when the print was made.” (Id. at p. 697.)
Trevino is distinguishable because, unlike V.D., Rivas had been a guest in the victim's home on prior occasions. (Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 697.) The time V.D.'s palm print originated is substantially more certain because the only reasonable inference is that V.D.'s palm print was made the day of the burglary. Unlike Rivas, V.D. had never been a guest in the Glandon’s home. A reasonable trier of fact could infer, based on the evidence, that V.D. must have left the palm print during the commission of the burglary.
We find the instant case analogous to People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 934, where the California Supreme Court held that a defendant's print found on a pair of sunglasses next to a murder victim was sufficient evidence to uphold a murder conviction. Bean admitted to owning the sunglasses found near the victim’s body. (Id. at p. 933.) Also, a neighbor of the victim said she had seen Bean sitting in the bushes in the park across the street from her home -- indicating that Bean was possibly observing the victim's house. (Id. at p. 932.) The court also considered that Bean lived nearby and was familiar with the shortcut from the scene of the murder to where the victim's wallet, purse, and car were discarded. (Id. at p. 934.) Accordingly, the court concluded “the evidence was such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant was the perpetrator of the assault which led to the death [of the victim].” (Ibid.) Bean establishes that such circumstantial evidence, along with the presence of a solitary fingerprint, can be sufficient to uphold a conviction.
Here, there is similar circumstantial evidence in addition to the fingerprint evidence. V.D. lived in the area and Mrs. Glandon had seen him in the neighborhood before. Further, he was five feet 11 inches tall and weighed 150 pounds, and thus was capable of jumping the backyard fence where the burglar's footprints were found on the trash cans. Therefore, ample evidence supports the court's finding that V.D. committed the burglary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.