Opinion
355760
06-17-2021
In re A. W. TYLER, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2019-001031-NA
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Cavanagh and Letica, JJ.PER CURIAM.
Respondent, the legal father of minor child AWT, appeals as of right the trial court's order authorizing petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS), supplemental petition and continuing placement of AWT with DHHS. On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was necessary to continue AWT's placement in foster care. We affirm.
This case arises from the temporary removal of AWT from the care and custody of his mother. After AWT's mother was arrested and jailed, the DHHS filed a petition asking the trial court to take jurisdiction over her children and to make the children temporary court wards. AWT was removed from his mother's home and placed in the temporary care of the DHHS. At that time, the DHHS had identified respondent as AWT's putative father, but was unsuccessful in locating respondent. The trial court notified respondent by certified mail that a preliminary hearing concerning the placement of his putative child would take place in June 2019. But respondent did not respond, nor did he appear at the subsequent preliminary hearing. After the preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition and placed AWT in foster care.
AWT's mother is not a party to this appeal.
About a month after the preliminary hearing, the trial court held a trial and, with regard to the petition involving AWT's mother, exercised jurisdiction over AWT. As AWT's case progressed to the dispositional phase, the trial court ordered that AWT remain in foster care. About six months later, respondent appeared at a dispositional review hearing. Respondent stated that he wanted to establish paternity of AWT. The DHHS referred respondent for DNA testing, which later established that respondent was AWT's biological father. The trial court subsequently determined that respondent was the child's legal father.
Thereafter, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting the trial court to continue jurisdiction over AWT as to respondent and to continue AWT's placement in foster care. The DHHS argued that it would be contrary to AWT's welfare to be in respondent's care because respondent was homeless, had a history of domestic violence, and had abandoned AWT. The DHHS alleged that AWT's mother had obtained three personal protection orders (PPOs) based on the prior domestic violence and had a PPO currently in effect. The domestic violence included respondent repeatedly punching AWT's mother in the face in front of her children, leading to Children's Protective Services becoming involved with the family.
The trial court held a preliminary hearing on the supplemental petition. AWT's foster care supervisor testified that AWT had just met respondent for the first time a few days before the hearing. Additionally, the supervisor testified that AWT's mother had reported that respondent was homeless and the supervisor was not able to verify whether respondent had suitable housing because he did not allow the DHHS to inspect his purported residence. The supervisor further reported that respondent had engaged in domestic violence with AWT's mother in AWT's presence.
The trial court authorized the supplemental petition and ordered that AWT remain placed with the DHHS for care and supervision. On the basis of respondent's alleged domestic violence incidents, the trial court held that placing AWT with respondent would present AWT with a significant risk of harm. Next, the trial court found that the DHHS had made reasonable efforts to prevent AWT's removal from respondent because the DHHS held a family team meeting, ordered DNA testing for respondent, offered to assess the suitability of respondent's home for AWT, and referred AWT for services to address his special needs. Finally, the trial court held that it would be contrary to AWT's welfare to be placed with respondent because respondent had just become AWT's legal father and had no relationship with him, respondent was unemployed and had no means to support AWT, and respondent had a history of domestic violence. This appeal followed.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred because there was insufficient evidence to find that respondent's custody of AWT would present a substantial risk of harm to AWT. We disagree.
We review a trial court's factual findings for clear error. In re Beers, 325 Mich.App. 653, 680; 926 N.W.2d 832 (2018). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 408; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich. 1, 14; 934 N.W.2d 610 (2019).
In this case, the court ordered AWT's continued placement in foster care under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2), which both state:
The court may order placement of the child into foster care if the court finds all of the following:
(a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental well-being.
(b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from the risk as described in subrule (a).
(c) Continuing the child's residence in the home is contrary to the child's welfare.
(d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.
(e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the child's health and welfare. [MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2). See also In re Williams, 333 Mich.App. 172, ___; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 351081); slip op at 5-6.]
When applying this statute and court rule, "the trial court must make a record of its findings as to each and every factor sufficient for this Court to conduct a meaningful review." Id. at ___; slip op at 6 (citation omitted).
Although respondent makes a passing reference to the requirement that a trial court must make contrary to the welfare findings when a child is placed in foster care, MCR 3.965(C)(3), respondent only argues that there was insufficient evidence that respondent's custody of AWT presented a substantial risk of harm to the child, MCL 712A.13a(9)(a); MCR 3.965(C)(2)(a). Thus, respondent has abandoned any challenges to the other factors in MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). Berger v Berger, 277 Mich.App. 700, 712; 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008) ("A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningful argument in support of its position."). Moreover, we note that MCR 3.965(C)(3) merely requires the trial court to make contrary-to-the-welfare findings in writing or on the record-whether there is sufficient evidence that a child's continued residence in the home is contrary to the child's welfare is properly brought under MCR 3.965(C)(2)(c).
At the preliminary hearing, the foster care supervisor testified that AWT's mother obtained three PPOs against respondent for domestic violence incidents. She also testified that one or more of these incidents occurred in front of AWT. The supervisor also testified that respondent had no relationship with AWT and had no source of income to provide for AWT. The DHHS was also unable to verify whether respondent had a safe home for AWT. On the basis of respondent's history of domestic violence and failure to demonstrate suitable housing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that AWT's residence with respondent would present a substantial risk of harm to AWT's life, physical health, or mental well-being. Contrary to respondent's assertion, there need not have been evidence that respondent physically abused AWT directly for the trial court to make this finding. Indeed, risk of harm to a child's mental well-being is sufficient to establish that placement in foster care is warranted. MCL 712A.13a(9)(a); MCR 3.965(C)(2)(a).
Further, even if respondent had properly presented arguments concerning the remaining factors, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that they were satisfied. AWT's continued placement in foster care safeguarded the child from the risks posed by respondent, it would be contrary to AWT's welfare to reside with respondent because he would not permit the DHHS to verify whether his residence was suitable, and the conditions in the foster care home adequately safeguarded AWT's health and welfare. MCR 712A.13a(9)(b), (c), and (e); MCR 3.965(C)(2)(b), (c), and (e). Finally, the DHHS made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal. MCR 712A.13a(9)(d); MCR 3.965(C)(2)(d). Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in any of its findings that AWT should remain in foster care.
Affirmed.