Opinion
No. 5-820 / 05-1460
Filed November 23, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha M. Beckelman, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son. AFFIRMED.
Barbara A. Connolly of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katherine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Kelly Kaufman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Henry Keyes of Keyes Law Offices, Cedar Rapids, for father.
H. Nick Gloe of Gloe Quint, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2005). She contends termination was not in the child's best interest, arguing the child should be returned to her care or be placed in long-term foster care. We review her claim de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
Termination under section 232.116(1)(f) is appropriate where there is clear and convincing evidence of the following:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.
There is no dispute the first three elements of this section have been met. The only issue is whether the child could be returned to the mother's care as provided in section 232.102.
We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned to the mother's care. The child was adjudicated in need of assistance in December 2002. He was removed along with a half sister from his mother's home in September 2003. She was not providing a safe, clean environment for the children to live and there were concerns she was not providing adequate food for the children. The mother has a history of becoming romantically involved with men who physically abuse her. She is mildly mentally retarded with the diagnoses of borderline personality disorder with a possibility of bipolar disorder, depression impaired cognitive ability, and anxiety.
In June 2004, the mother sought help from Crest Services. With their help, the mother has made great progress in maintaining a clean home, employment, and paying her bills. However, her involvement with Crest Services is voluntary and can be terminated at any time. The mother has threatened to quit the program in the past. Despite her involvement with the organization, the mother continued to allow inappropriate men into her home and around her child. The trial court noted the general opinion of services providers that the mother cannot care for the child full time because of her emotional, mental health, and cognitive disabilities. We agree with these opinions.
We likewise conclude termination is in the child's best interest. The evidence presented shows the child is negatively affected by the lack of permanency in his life. The child's teacher, whom the court found particularly credible, testified the child cried harder, had a more difficult time focusing, and was more distracted during the periods of time he had visitation with his mother. Other difficulties the child experienced when the mother was allowed unsupervised visitation ceased when the visitations returned to being supervised.
Because the State proved the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interest of the child, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Vogel, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., concurs specially.
The mother is disabled and I question whether the services offered were tailored to accommodate her disability. But there is no showing that issue has been raised at any point in the proceeding, therefore, I have no choice but to affirm.