Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ09012359
RIVERA, J.
T.T. appeals from an order continuing him as a ward on electronic monitoring. He contends that he was denied the statutory right to appointed counsel at the May 29, 2009, hearing on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 601, subdivision (b) (§ 601(b)) truancy petition. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2009, a section 601(b) truancy petition was filed alleging that the minor was a habitual truant. On May 29, 2009, the court held a hearing on the petition. The minor appeared with his grandmother. The court advised the minor of the petition’s allegations and explained his rights. As pertinent here, with respect to the right to counsel, the court stated: “You have the right to be represented by an attorney, I cannot refer you to the public defender because they [sic] do not represent habitual truants. However, I can give you time to hire an attorney, if you and your grandmother would like to do so. If you want to spend money on an attorney, I would give you a date to return here with an attorney and we would proceed. [¶] I can tell you that 99.9 percent of the students here in this court choose not to be represented by an attorney. Instead they represent themselves. You can choose to do so if you want to. Whether you are represented by an attorney or you choose to represent yourself, you have the right to have a jurisdiction hearing. That is a trial. [¶] At that trial the district attorney, who is not here today, would bring in witnesses... to prove to the court by [a] preponderance of the evidence that you have not been attending school on a regular basis and that you are a habitual truant.” The court proceeded to inform the minor of his rights and the consequences of an admission—that if it found he was a habitual truant, either by his admission or after a trial, the disposition would be the same, and he would be placed on probation with conditions. After eliciting his admission that he understood his rights, the court asked him if he wanted to hire an attorney or to represent himself. The minor stated that he would represent himself. The following colloquy occurred: “The Court: Okay. In representing yourself do you understand that you have the right to have a trial? [¶] The Minor: Yes. [¶] The Court: Do you want to have a trial, or do you want to admit today? [¶] The Minor: There’s no need for a trial. I am a truant.”
The court accepted the minor’s admission, found him to be a ward of the court within the meaning of section 601(b), and placed him on probation on conditions including that he attend school and classes daily and that he attend summer school.
The minor failed to attend school; consequently a bench warrant issued on July 24, 2009. A hearing was held on September 15, 2009, following the minor’s arrest. The minor was represented by Deputy Public Defender Michael Alexander. The court ordered the minor to enroll in school and released him to his grandmother on home supervision.
The minor then failed to appear at a review hearing on October 23, 2009; the matter was continued to November 13, 2009. The minor again failed to appear. The court issued a bench warrant.
The minor was taken into custody on the warrant on December 13, 2009. He appeared with Deputy Public Defender George Arroyo at a hearing on December 15, 2009. The court stated the probation officer’s report showed that the minor failed to appear for a pretrial on July 30, 2009, on a section 602 petition alleging a felony receiving stolen property allegation. Counsel for the minor informed the court that a negotiated disposition on that petition had been made, and that the minor would admit the receiving stolen property charge as a misdemeanor. After waiving his right to a jurisdictional hearing on the petition, the minor admitted the petition as a misdemeanor. In calculating the maximum period of confinement, the court noted that the minor had admitted a felony grand theft from the person on March 4, 2009, in San Joaquin County. The court, therefore, set three years and four months as the maximum period of confinement. The court released the minor on electronic monitoring.
On January 4, 2010, the minor was arrested based on a warrant issued from San Francisco. On January 6, 2010, the court continued the minor as a ward under section 601(b), and directed that he be released for transfer to San Francisco County for proceedings on a purchase or possession of cocaine for sale and resisting arrest case. Over the objection of the minor’s counsel, the court continued the minor on electronic monitoring. This appeal followed. On February 4, 2010, the court dismissed the section 601(b) wardship and terminated probation.
The court also accepted transfer of the San Francisco County delinquency petition in which the minor admitted he was an accessory to a felony. The court set the matter for disposition. On March 15, 2010, the court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation. On June 17, 2010, the court had before it a new section 602 petition alleging that the minor committed numerous new charges. The matter was continued to July 1, 2010, for further proceedings.
II. DISCUSSION
The minor contends that the January 6, 2010, order continuing his truancy wardship should be vacated because he was not advised that he was entitled to appointed counsel prior to his admission of the section 601(b) petition on May 29, 2009. As the Attorney General argues, the appeal is moot because the minor’s section 601(b) wardship has been dismissed.
While the court has “discretion to decide otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition” yet may evade review (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1), this case is an inappropriate vehicle to address the issue of appointed counsel on truancy petitions. As the minor’s truancy petition has been dismissed, there is no relief this court can afford him. “It is settled that ‘the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, ... an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court... to grant [the appellant] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]’ ” (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132.)
We also note that the minor’s notice of appeal is from the court’s January 6, 2010, order; he did not appeal the court’s May 29, 2009, order nor did he appeal several subsequent orders made at hearings in which he was represented by appointed counsel. The minor’s notice of appeal addresses only the court’s order placing him on electronic monitoring; it does not encompass or identify the May 29, 2009, order. (See In re Miracle M. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 834, 846 [parent cannot appeal from an order or finding that was not even mentioned in her notice of appeal].) Hence, the minor’s claim is not properly before this court.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.