Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0602053
Sepulveda, J.
Trent G. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and committing him to a stayed six-month program at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (the Ranch). His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436). After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
The petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that the minor committed a residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). Evidence adduced at the contested jurisdictional hearing showed that the minor, a tenth grade student at Ygnacio Valley High School, was seen by a neighbor jumping out of a window at the home of Linda Silva, the aunt of the minor’s friend. The minor was carrying a cloth bag. Silva later noticed that items were missing from her home and contacted this neighbor, who told her what he had seen. Silva showed the neighbor a yearbook from the high school, and the neighbor picked out the minor’s photograph as the person he had seen in front of Silva’s home.
A police officer testified that the witness said he saw a boy standing outside of the window, rather than jumping out of the window.
Silva contacted the police, who responded to the minor’s house and conducted a consent search of the minor’s room. None of the stolen items was located. The police transported the minor to the victim’s home and conducted an in-field show-up; the neighbor identified the minor as the individual he had seen outside of the victim’s home. The minor was interviewed, after waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), and denied any knowledge of the burglary. The minor’s mother and one of his neighbors testified that they did not see the minor leave his home the morning of the burglary.
The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true, and later declared the minor to be a ward of the juvenile court and committed him to a six-month program at the Ranch, which was stayed. He was placed in the custody of his mother, ordered to be on electronic monitoring for 120 days, and ordered to serve five weekends in juvenile hall. This timely appeal followed.
The minor has filed a supplemental letter to the court, which we have considered. In that letter, he basically challenges the sufficiently of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the allegations of the petition were true. “In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [the allegations true] beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Here, the prosecution relied upon the testimony of the victim’s neighbor, Alex Szuski, who identified the minor as the individual he observed jumping out of the victim’s window, carrying a cloth bag that had some articles in it. The minor climbed out of the window, turned around, and went back to attempt to replace a window screen that had been removed from the window. The neighbor testified that he later identified the minor when the police brought him to the scene; the minor was dressed in the same manner (including pajama bottoms) as the individual he had seen leaving the victim’s residence. None of the minor’s arguments demonstrates that Szuski’s testimony was “so inherently untrustworthy that a conviction based upon it would violate due process of law.” (People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 579.) His arguments challenging the reliability of Szuski’s identification of him were properly addressed to the trier of fact, and rejected. Those arguments are not grounds for this court to conclude that his testimony was so inherently improbable or unreliable that it could not, if credited by the juvenile court, constitute substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings. “If it can be accepted as true, testimony which establishes all the elements of a crime must necessarily constitute substantial evidence of ‘solid value’ that such crime was committed.” (Id. at p. 577.) The court specifically found Szuski to be a credible witness, stating “I’m going to also state that the Court finds and—found and finds Mr. Szuski completely credible. A completely credible witness.” Szuski’s testimony was thus sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s findings.
The minor was represented by counsel and received a fair jurisdictional hearing. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the allegation of the petition was true (that the minor committed a residential burglary). There was no error in the disposition. There are no meritorious issues to be argued on appeal.
The orders declaring the minor a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the ranch, placing him with his mother under electronic monitoring, and ordering him to serve five weekends in juvenile hall, are affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P. J., Rivera, J.