Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ14199. Robert Ambrose, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
Appellant T. P. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued by the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 finding true the allegation that appellant committed the offense of attempted second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211.) We affirm.
CONTENTIONS
Appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in sustaining the petition because there was insufficient evidence of appellant’s identity; there was insufficient evidence that appellant participated in the attempted second degree robbery; and, alternatively, the evidence only established attempted grand theft person.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Viewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below as we must (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138-1139), the evidence established the following. On June 20, 2006, appellant and three other girls, who are all African-American, were involved in three incidents where they took, or attempted to take, money or personal belongings from three Hispanic women. The third incident is the subject of this appeal.
At 1:00 p.m., appellant stood with three other minor girls on a street corner near a bus stop. Appellant wore a white shirt, one girl wore a black shirt, and one a red shirt. The color of the last girl’s shirt was not identified. Appellant and the girl wearing the black shirt approached a Hispanic woman at a bus stop, while the other two acted as lookouts. Appellant made a hand gesture indicating that she wanted money from the woman. When the woman pulled her purse closer to her body, one of the girls who had approached her, pushed her. The woman fell and let go of her purse. The girl in the black shirt took money out of the purse, then they all ran away toward a shopping center.
Fifteen minutes later, appellant and the girl in the black shirt returned to the bus stop and approached a Hispanic girl seated at the bus stop. One of the girls made a gesture for money, and the Hispanic girl indicated she did not have anything. The other two girls began to approach the bus stop. Appellant took the girl’s purse while the other girls stood around her. The girls took out money and threw the purse on the ground. The girl in the black shirt went through the pockets of the victim, who was crying. The four girls then went to the 98 Cent store for a while, then went to a nearby McDonald’s and asked for water.
The four girls returned to the bus stop. Appellant and the girl in the black shirt approached a Hispanic woman seated at the bus stop while the other two girls sat outside the 98 Cent store, which was right behind the bus stop. Appellant and the other girl tried to pull the woman’s purse away. A man driving by got out of his car to help the Hispanic woman, and appellant and the girl in the black shirt tried to hit him. The four girls ran to the 98 Cent store. Appellant yelled at M. J., a cook at McDonald’s who had witnessed all three incidents, “Why are you looking at me, bitch?”
When two police officers entered the McDonald’s, M. J. reported the incidents, described the girls, and told the officers that the girls were at the 98 Cent store. The girls were detained by the officers, and M. J. identified them as the perpetrators. Los Angeles Police Officer Bertha Durazo testified that appellant wore a white shirt when she was detained.
At trial, M. J. testified that one of appellant’s coperpetrators wore the white shirt. She then realized that she had been confused because one of the four girls was not in the courtroom. She then identified appellant as the one who wore the white shirt. Later, she stated that she did not believe the girl who wore the white shirt was in the courtroom. She consistently identified the girl who wore the red shirt as one of the codefendants.
DISCUSSION
There Was Sufficient Evidence to Sustain the Petition against Appellant
1. There was sufficient evidence of appellant’s identity
Appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition with respect to the attempted second degree robbery because her identity was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
“The role of an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is limited. The court must ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp.1138-1139.) The uncorroborated evidence of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment, even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions. (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366.)
We do not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529.) Even if the circumstances “might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding[, this] would not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (Ibid.)
Appellant contends that the evidence establishing her identity was equivocal. She urges that a cashier at McDonald’s was unable to recall what appellant wore during the second incident, although she identified appellant as one of the three girls who harassed the Hispanic girl during that incident. She also points out discrepancies and contradictions in M. J.’s identifications, complaining that M. J. was confused in her testimony about which girl wore which colored shirt.
The record shows only three of the four girls showed up at the adjudication. Initially, M. J. identified one of appellant’s coperpetrators as the one who wore the white shirt. But, she then indicated that appellant wore the white shirt, explaining that she did so because she was confused until she realized that one girl was not present. Although M. J. later testified that the girl wearing the white shirt was not in court, she also testified that she was certain that appellant and the other two girls present at trial were participants in all three incidents. And, she testified that when she pointed the girls out to the police officers at McDonald’s, she was certain that those were the girls who were involved in all three incidents. Moreover, Officer Durazo testified that when she detained the girls, appellant was wearing a white shirt.
It is the exclusive province of the trial court or jury to weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and appellant’s attempt to have us reweigh the evidence fails.
2. There was sufficient evidence that appellant was a direct participant, or at the very least, an aider or abettor
Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence that she was a direct participant who aided and abetted the other girls in the third incident. We disagree.
Here, M. J. and Officer Durazo testified that appellant was wearing a white shirt at the time of the incidents and when she was detained. M. J. testified that one of the girls who was a direct perpetrator in the third incident wore a black shirt and the other girl wore a white shirt. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant was one of the direct perpetrators of the third incident.
An aider and abettor acts with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator; has the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging the offense; and by act or advice aids the commission of the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.)
At the very least, even if appellant was just one of the girls sitting outside of the 98 Cent store at the time of the third incident, the evidence supports the finding that she was an aider and abettor of the crime. Appellant was one of the four girls present at the scene of the third incident, and if she were not a direct perpetrator, she acted as a lookout. Moreover, the girls acted in concert. The four girls stood together on the corner; ran to the 98 Cent store after the second and third incidents; entered the McDonald’s together; and were detained together.
3. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the attempted robbery allegation was true
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the attempted robbery allegation true because there was no evidence that the girls used force or fear during the commission of the third offense. Again, we disagree.
Robbery is the taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (Pen. Code, § 211.) In order to establish attempted robbery, the defendant must have the specific intent to commit robbery and have committed a direct overt act toward its commission. (People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861.) Force, for purposes of a robbery, is more than that needed merely to take the property from the person of the victim, and is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury taking into account the physical characteristics of the robber and the victim. (People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203.) All the force that is required to make the offense a robbery is such force that is sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. (People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 487, 491, overruled on another point in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 895 [defendant’s action of running toward the victim and snatching the purse from her hand sufficient to constitute force or fear to support a jury’s robbery verdict].) Indeed, “[t]he nonconsensual snatching of a purse has been held to entail such force as to permit a jury to return a verdict of robbery.” (People v. Lescallett, supra, at p. 491.) The use of force or fear need not occur at the time of initial taking, but may be used to retain possession of the property. (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) Thus, because a robbery remains in progress until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety, the use of force or fear to retain property immediately after it has been taken from the owner constitutes robbery. (Id. at p. 772.)
Here, in the third incident, the two girls approached a woman at a bus stop, outnumbering and intimidating her. They attempted to pull the purse away from the woman. This was clearly a use of force intended to overcome her resistance, and more than that necessary to commit the crime. In fact, the struggle attracted the attention of a man driving by in a car, who stopped to help the woman. And, when he did so, the girls tried to hit him. Therefore, the girls also used force or fear in an attempt to thwart the man’s rescue efforts and continue their robbery attempt. We reject appellant’s argument that the girls did not use any more force than necessary to snatch the woman’s purse because they did not push the woman or break the handle of her purse.
We conclude that the juvenile court properly sustained the petition.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.